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ABSTRACT
SYNTHETIC ETHICAL NATURALISM
FEBRUARY 2009
MICHAEL RUBIN, B.A., BOSTON UNIVERSITY
M.A., NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Fred Feldman

This dissertation is a critique of synthetic ethical naturalism (SEN). SEN is a
view in metaethics that comprises three key theses: first, there are moral properties and
facts that are independent of the beliefs and attitudes of moral appraisers (moral realism);
second, moral properties and facts are identical to (or constituted only by) natural
properties and facts (ethical naturalism); and third, sentences used to assert identity or
constitution relations between moral and natural properties are expressions of synthetic, a
posteriori necessities. The last of these theses, which distinguishes SEN from other
forms of ethical naturalism, is supported by a fourth: the semantic contents of the central
moral predicates such as ‘morally right’ and ‘morally good’ are fixed in part by features
external to the minds of speakers (moral semantic externalism).
Chapter 1 introduces SEN and discusses the most common motivations for
accepting it. The next three chapters discuss the influential “Moral Twin Earth”
argument against moral semantic externalism. In Chapter 2, I defend this argument from
the charge that the thought experiment upon which it depends is defective. In Chapters 3
and 4, I consider two attempts to amend SEN so as to render it immune to the Moral
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Twin Earth argument. I show that each of these proposed amendments amounts to an
abandonment of SEN.
Chapter Five explores Richard Boyd’s proposal that moral goodness is a
“homeostatic property cluster.” If true, Boyd’s hypothesis could be used to support
several metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic claims made on behalf of SEN. I
advance three arguments against this account of moral goodness.
In the sixth chapter, I argue that moral facts are not needed in the best a posteriori
explanations of our moral beliefs and moral sensibility. Because of this, those who
accept a metaphysical naturalism ought to deny the existence of such facts or else accept
skepticism about moral knowledge. In Chapter 7, I consider a counterargument on behalf
of SEN to the effect that moral facts are needed in order to explain the predictive success
of our best moral theories. I show that this argument fails.
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CHAPTER 1
MORAL REALISM, ETHICAL NATURALISM, AND THE
NECESSARY A POSTERIORI
1. Chapter.
1.1. Introduction.
Synthetic ethical naturalism (SEN) is a theory in metaethics according to which: (1) there
are stance-independent moral properties and facts; (2) these properties and facts are
identical to—or otherwise constituted only by—natural properties and facts; and (3)
sentences used to assert identity or constitution relations between moral and natural
properties and facts express synthetic a posteriori necessities. The goal of the present
chapter is to explain more clearly what these three theses amount to and to present the
central considerations that make SEN a prima facie attractive metaethical view. In
sketching the commitments of SEN, I will be deferring primarily to the work of three of
its early proponents: Richard Boyd, David Brink, and Nicholas Sturgeon.1 In the
subsequent chapters of this dissertation I will argue that we should reject SEN.
It may be worthwhile to take a moment to get clear about the goals of metaethical
inquiry. I find that the best way to do this is by contrasting metaethics with what is
sometimes called first-order ethics or normative ethics. It is difficult to give a general

1

A fourth that deserves mention is Peter Railton. Although others seem to view Railton as holding the
same sort of view as the trio just mentioned, his metaethical outlook is different enough to warrant
hesitation about lumping him in with this group. Most importantly, Railton—unlike Boyd, Brink, and
Sturgeon—expresses ambivalence as to whether moral realism really requires that moral facts be stanceindependent (see his 1995 and 1996; for a characterization of stance-independence, see §1.2.1 below). On
top of this, he seems favorably disposed towards an ideal observer kind of metaethical theory. (This is
most explicit in his 1996.) Because ideal observer theories render moral facts stance-dependent, to the
extent that Railton accepts such a view he should not be counted as a moral realist. At any rate, he does not
appear to be a realist in the same robust sense in which Boyd, Brink, and Sturgeon are. In spite of all this,
Railton’s credentials as a metaphysical naturalist are impeccable and I will appeal to his work when
explaining the ontological commitments of ethical naturalism.

1

description of first-order ethical claims without begging any questions against a particular
metaethical view.2 It is best to proceed, then, by way of example. The following
sentences express first-order ethical claims: ‘Ann is morally obligated to fulfill her
promise to Ben’; ‘It is good that Carl is happy’; ‘Dana is a virtuous person.’ While these
examples are all expressions of particular moral judgments, first-order ethics includes
claims of a more general kind, such as ‘lying is morally wrong’ and ‘pleasure is better
than pain.’ In addition, the subject matter of first-order normative ethics includes general
moral theories. Among these are theories in the normative ethics of behavior, which are
intended to tell us what makes a morally right action morally right; theories in axiology,
which are intended to tell us what makes one life, state of affairs, or possible world noninstrumentally better than another; and theories in virtue ethics, which are intended to tell
us which traits of character make an agent virtuous.
It will be useful to have before us some sample first-order ethical theories to refer
to. Here are two historically important theories in the normative ethics of behavior:
AUh: Necessarily, for any act-token, x, x is morally right iff x maximizes hedonic
utility (i.e., the balance of pleasure over pain).
CI-2: Necessarily, for any act-token, x, x is morally right iff the agent of x, by
performing x, treats no person as a mere means.
AUh represents a hedonistic form of act-utilitarianism. CI-2 is a restatement of the
second formulation of Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative. It should be noted that
both AUh and CI-2 are more than just theories about what makes a morally right action
right; each expresses a standard of morally right action that one may accept or reject.

2

If I were to set aside concerns about maintaining metaethical neutrality, I would describe first-order ethics
in this way: a first-order ethical claim ascribes a normative, evaluative, or moral property, such as moral
wrongness, goodness, or virtuousness to an action (or kind of action), state of affairs, or character trait etc.
The trouble with this characterization is it precludes a classical non-cognitivist account of moral judgments.
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That is to say, each theory doubles as a possible moral code that agents or social groups
could adopt to regulate their behavior.3
Metaethical theories are theories about first-order ethical claims. Metaethical
inquiry includes (but is not limited to) questions concerning the semantic, metaphysical
and epistemological commitments of first-order ethical thought and discourse. Among
the semantic questions posed by metaethical inquiry are these: Do moral utterances and
sentences express truth-apt propositions? If they do, what is the meaning or semantic
content of moral predicates? If the primary function of moral utterances is not to express
propositions, do they have some other important function? The core metaphysical
questions addressed by metaethical inquiry include (i) the question of whether there are
moral facts or true moral propositions, (ii) the question of whether moral properties and
facts are natural, supernatural, or non-natural, and (iii) the question of whether such facts
are “objective” or “stance-independent.” Epistemological questions asked by
metaethicists include these: Do we have any moral knowledge (or, at any rate,
epistemically justified moral beliefs)? If we do, are moral truths discoverable a priori, or
only a posteriori? Are our moral beliefs justified by their being inferable from
foundational or epistemically basic propositions, or are they justified in virtue of their
mutual coherence with the rest of our beliefs?

3

I hesitate to say that this will be true of all moral theories. It might be argued that a bare divine command
theory in the normative ethics of behavior—a theory according to which an act is morally right just in case
it is permitted by God’s commands—does not, by itself, constitute a moral code, since, without a further
description of God’s commands, it cannot be used by agents in any meaningful way to regulate their
conduct. It is not important for my purposes that I take a stand on this matter. It will suffice that some
theories in the normative ethics of behavior, including AUh and CI-2, double as standards of conduct. My
purpose in bringing this double nature of moral theories to the reader’s attention is to warn that I will
sometimes speak of AUh and CI-2 as theories of right action and at other times speak of them as standards
of conduct or moral codes.

3

1.2. Moral Realism.
1.2.1. Moral Realism and Moral Constructivism.
SEN, as I understand it, is both a form moral cognitivism and a form of moral realism.
Moral cognitivists take sentences of the form, ‘φ is morally right,’ to express
propositions. Such propositions involve the ascription of a property (viz., moral
rightness4) to act-tokens and are truth-evaluable in a straightforward way. By contrast,
according to traditional versions of non-cognitivism, the primary function of moral
sentences and utterances is to express prescriptions or attitudes, rather than truthevaluable propositions.5
Moral realism is the view that (1) there are moral properties and facts and (2)
these properties and facts are “stance-independent.”6,7 The first clause distinguishes
moral realism from moral nihilism. The second clause, which we may call ‘the stanceindependence clause,’ distinguishes moral realism from moral constructivism. The most
clear and concise characterization of the stance-independence clause that I know of
belongs to Russ Shafer-Landau. By his characterization, stance-independence requires
4

Throughout this dissertation I italicize terms that refer to properties (e.g. redness, roundness and
rightness). I do not italicize the names of properties when these names are mentioned and not used; in such
cases, those terms refer to linguistic items rather than to properties. Finally, I do not italicize terms
referring to property instances or tropes (e.g., the redness of Ann’s shirt). In Chapter 5, which deals more
directly with natural kinds, I add a convention of using small capital letters for names of kinds (such as
GOLD, THE TIGER, and BACHELORS). Although the metaphysics of kinds is controversial, it may help the
reader to know that I tend to think of kinds as a distinct sort of entity from their corresponding properties.
As I see it, the property of being a tiger stands in the same relation to the kind THE TIGER that the property
being Socrates stands to the man Socrates.
5
This is a very simplified description of non-cognitivism. Although a non-cognitivist must hold that the
primary function of moral sentences (e.g. ‘φ is morally right’) is to express an attitude or to issue a
prescription, some non-cognitivists allow that moral sentences may have a secondary, descriptive function.
(See, for example, Hare 1952: ch. 7). Furthermore, contemporary non-cognitivists have appealed to
minimalist theories of truth in order to justify the predication of truth to moral sentences (see Blackburn
1998: 75-83).
6
The term ‘stance-independence’ was introduced by Russ Shafer-Landau (2003: 15) who credits Ron Milo.
7
Sturgeon and Boyd, but not Brink, add a third, epistemological component to their statements of moral
realism: “…our ordinary methods of arriving at moral judgments provide us with at least some approximate
knowledge of moral truths” (Sturgeon, 1986b: 117; cf. Boyd 1988: 182).

4

that “the moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made true by virtue of their
ratification from within any given actual or hypothetical perspective” (2003: 15).8,9
Thus, a relativist metaethical view according to which an action’s being morally right
consists in its being permitted by the moral code that is accepted by the members of the
agent’s society fails to render moral facts stance-independent, and therefore, should be
construed as a form of moral constructivism, rather than a form moral realism. Note that
the same holds for ideal observer views of the kind proposed by Roderick Firth (1952).
According to a view of this sort, an action’s being morally wrong consists in the fact that
it violates the moral code that would be endorsed every observer in suitably idealized
epistemic conditions. If it should turn out that all ideal observers would endorse the same
moral code, then the ideal observer view would vindicate ethical absolutism. Even so, it
would not be a genuinely realist metaethical position since the moral standard that fixes
the moral facts is made true by the fact that ideal observers would endorse or ratify it.
It is worth mentioning here a third form of moral constructivism according to
which the truth of a moral theory T simply consists in the fact that T is the moral theory
that we would believe or accept, were our beliefs to achieve a state of reflective
equilibrium or maximal coherence.10,11 What is noteworthy about this form of
constructivism is that it incorporates the same coherentist moral epistemology that is
accepted by all SEN proponents (Boyd 1988; Brink 1989: Ch. 5; Sturgeon 2002). For the
moral realist, however, coherence reasoning is seen as a procedure for discovering the
8

Italicized in the original.
Boyd, Brink, and Sturgeon all include a stance-independence clause in their own formulations of moral
realism (Boyd 1988: 182; Brink 1989: 17; 2001: 154; Sturgeon 1986b: 117).
10
John Rawls defends a form of constructivism along these lines in his (1980). However, because he is
reluctant to ascribe truth to substantive moral theories, he might not accept this particular formulation.
11
For an account of the method of reflective equilibrium in moral theorizing, see Rawls (1971/1999: 40-46)
and Daniels (1979).
9
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moral facts. Among other things, the realist takes it to be a logical possibility that the
moral theory that we would accept in reflective equilibrium (and, so, are justified in
believing) is nevertheless false.12 The moral constructivist, by contrast, views the
procedure of coherence reasoning as by itself settling what the moral facts are;13 the
theory that we would accept in reflective equilibrium is by that very fact the true theory.

1.2.2. The presumptive case for moral realism.
It is has been claimed that the conjunction of moral cognitivism and moral realism
accords with commonsense ethical thought better than its metaethical rivals do. This is
taken as grounds for thinking of cognitivist moral realism as the default metaethical
position: the burden of argument is on opponents of cognitivism and moral realism to
show that these views fail or that rival metaethical views are superior (Brink 1989: ch. 2).
I think this is right. I want to briefly outline the main considerations that support the
claim that cognitivism and moral realism best accord with commonsense ethical thought.
At least four considerations serve as prima facie evidence favoring moral
cognitivism over non-cognitivism.14 First, the surface grammar of moral sentences (and
utterances) is declarative. This suggests that the primary use of moral sentences is to
express propositions. Second, speakers of our language often ascribe truth and falsity to
moral sentences. By the most natural way of understanding what it is for a sentence to be
true, a sentence is true just in case it expresses a proposition that is true. Thus, the
12

This characteristic of moral realism—that it allows for the possibility that the theory we would accept
under ideal epistemic conditions is false—is stressed by Brink (1989: 31-36). Compare this with Putnam’s
characterization of metaphysical (rather than moral) realism as “radically non-epistemic” in the sense that
“the theory that is ‘ideal’ from the point of view of operational utility, inner beauty and elegance,
‘plausibility’, simplicity, ‘conservatism’, etc., might be false” (Putnam 1977: 485).
13
Or, to be more precise, the constructivist views the would-be results of coherence reasoning as settling by
itself what the supervenience bases of moral properties are.
14
In this paragraph, I draw on Brink (1999: 196-199) and Shafer-Landau (2003: 23f).
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practice of ascribing truth or falsity to moral sentences suggests that commonsense
thought takes such sentences to express propositions, as cognitivists claim. Third, moral
sentences can appear in unasserted contexts; for instance, they can be embedded in the
antecedent of a conditional statement. In such contexts it is not plausible to claim that the
embedded moral sentence functions to express a prescription or attitude: the person who
sincerely utters ‘if abortion is wrong, then emergency contraception is wrong as well,’ for
example, does not thereby express an attitude of disapproval towards acts of abortion.
Standard non-cognitivist views according to which moral utterances express the speaker’s
attitudes have trouble accounting for this feature of moral discourse (Geach 1960; 1965).
Cognitivism, by contrast, has no trouble accounting for it. Fourth, moral sentences
appear as premises in seemingly valid deductive arguments. If moral sentences express
propositions, then there is no trouble in seeing how to accommodate the validity of such
arguments. If moral sentences express attitudes, however, then things are more difficult;
unless we are willing reject the validity of moral arguments as a mere appearance, a logic
of attitudes needs to be constructed (Geach ibid.). Since attempts to construct a logic of
attitudes have proven to be controversial, this consideration prima facie favors moral
cognitivism, which can account for logical relations between moral statements using the
widely accepted resources of propositional logic.15
Commonsense moral thought, then, seems to favor moral cognitivism. What
about moral realism? It should be uncontroversial, assuming cognitivism, that the default
commonsense view is that there are moral facts. Since virtually everyone makes moral
claims, it stands to reason that it is part of commonsense moral thinking that some of

15

For a look at attempts to articulate a logic of attitudes, see Blackburn (1984; 1998) and Gibbard (1990;
2003).
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those claims are true. Of course, it might be that speakers use moral discourse in order to
describe a useful fiction, as some moral fictionalists have claimed. But even proponents
of such a view admit that moral fictionalism does not capture moral discourse as
laypersons actually use it, but rather describes a way in which we might continue to use
moral discourse after we have come to accept (on the basis of philosophical argument)
that all affirmative first-order moral claims are literally false (Joyce 2001: 185f; Nolan et
al. 2005: 309).
If moral realism is to be credited as the default metaethical position of
commonsense, it is not enough that moral discourse contains an implicit commitment to
moral facts; it must also include a commitment to the stance-independence of such facts.
Here, I think matters are more difficult. My own pre-theoretical intuitions support moral
realism on this score: when I am struck by a moral intuition, I normally experience it as
an appearance of a fact that obtains independent of what any appraiser (real or imagined)
may happen to think. Others, however, report a different experience of moral value and
obligation. Gilbert Harman writes,
I have always been a moral relativist. As far back as I can remember thinking
about it, it has seemed obvious to me that the dictates of morality arise from some
sort of convention or understanding among people, that different people arrive at
different understandings, and that there are no basic moral demands that apply to
everyone. For many years, this seemed so obvious to me that I assumed it was
everyone’s instinctive view, at least everyone who gave the matter any thought in
“this day and age” (1985: 27).
Harman and others (e.g. Nichols 2004: 169f; Stich and Weinberg 2001: 641) also note
that a significant number of college undergraduates profess their acceptance of moral
relativism. Because standard versions of moral relativism take the moral rightness of
actions to depend upon the attitudes of people belonging to certain social groups, such
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views violate moral realism’s stance-independence clause. Consequently, unless we have
reason to think that Harman and relativist college students are atypical, we might lack
justification for taking moral realism to be the default metaethical position of
commonsense.
Fortunately for those who assert realism to be the metaethics of commonsense,
there are studies that purport to show that children regard the moral wrongness of certain
actions as independent of human conventions and responses (see Nichols 2004: 167-177).
These findings suggest that laypersons espousing moral relativism do so as a matter of
their moral education—rather than on the basis of unvarnished moral appearances. While
these studies and their conclusions could be contested, I am inclined to grant that
commonsense moral theory includes a claim to the stance-independence of moral facts.
In any case, since my goal in this dissertation is to argue that SEN’s brand of moral
realism should be rejected, I see no harm in granting that moral realism enjoys a default
status in metaethics while the burden of argument rests on its opponents.

1.3. Naturalism: Metaphysical and Ethical.
1.3.1. Ethical naturalism.
It is easy enough to say what ethical naturalism is: it is the view that moral, normative,
and evaluative properties and facts are identical with, or else constituted only by, natural
properties and facts (cf. Brink 1989: 22, 176ff; Sturgeon 2006b: 92).16 What is not so

16

The constitution relation is discussed in Brink (1989: 157-160) and Sturgeon (1986a: 75). Constitution
has two jobs to perform for the ethical naturalist. First, it explains the supervenience of the moral on the
natural in a way that does not require moral facts to be anything “over and above” natural facts. Thus, it
avoids the need for a kind of epiphenomenalist account of the supervenience relation between the moral
and the natural. Second, it permits moral properties to be “multiply realizable.” The claim that moral
properties are multiply realizable is thought to absolve the ethical naturalist of the need to promise that
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easy is to say what a natural property or fact is. Some metaethicists have counted as
many as seven distinct ways the natural/non-natural distinction for properties has been
drawn (Copp 2003; Ridge 2008). This is not the space to canvass every proposal that has
been offered. To my mind, the most promising conceptions of natural propertyhood
invoke an epistemological criterion. Drawing on David Copp’s (2003), the account that I
favor is roughly this:
NP: a property, P, is natural just in case a synthetic proposition to the effect that
an individual instantiates P can be known only by way of empirical investigation,
if it can be known at all.17,18
By NP, a property such as maximizing the balance of pleasure over pain counts as a
natural property since the question of whether an act-token instantiates this property can
be settled, if at all, only by empirical means such as observation, induction and perhaps
inference to best explanation. Although I am not in possession of a precise account of
moral properties are reducible to natural properties. For brevity, I will focus on identity claims offered by
naturalists, leaving aside constitution claims.
17
Here I follow the provisional formulation of natural propertyhood that appears in Copp’s (2003: 185f). I
am somewhat hesitant to sign on for the refinements that Copp proposes to this formulation. My hope is
that NP will serve us well enough.
18
Compare NP with other accounts offered by metaethicists: “According to [Naturalistic Ethics], Ethics is
an empirical or positive science: its conclusions could be all established by means of empirical observation
and induction” (Moore 1903); “What I find plausible (even if not a conceptual truth) is that ethical facts
could not be natural if they could not be investigated empirically” (Sturgeon 2003: 543n24); “Natural facts
and properties are presumably something like those facts and properties as picked out and studied by the
natural and social sciences (broadly conceived)…” (Brink 1989: 22); “The natural is whatever is the object
of study by the natural sciences. […] [A] science is a natural science just in case its fundamental
principles are discoverable a posteriori, through reliance primarily on empirical evidence.” (Shafer-Landau
2006: 212, 213); “The vague, pre-theoretic idea that the philosophical naturalist tries to articulate and
defend is that everything – including any particulars, events, facts, properties, and so on – is a part of the
natural, physical world that science investigates” (Timmons 1999: 12).
I should address an objection to criteria of natural propertyhood such as NP. While he accepts
that a property’s being amenable to empirical investigation is necessary for its counting as natural,
Sturgeon expresses doubt as to whether this is sufficient on the grounds that there could in principle be
empirical evidence concerning the instantiation of supernatural properties (such as being a god). If there
were such empirical evidence, then being a god would count as a natural property (and presumably, any
god would count as a natural entity). But Sturgeon objects that “It is not plausible that the success of this
sort of natural [i.e. empirical] theology would show that the divine attributes were really natural properties”
(2006b: 109). While I do not have any knockdown argument against Sturgeon on this point, I do want to
enter into the record that I am less troubled by the prospect of “naturalizing” gods and their attributes. If
there were empirical confirmation that God exists, I would be inclined to say that the natural world includes
one more entity than I had previously supposed.
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what it is for one person to treat another as a mere means, I presume that a property such
as treating no one as a mere means will also come out as natural according to NP.

1.3.2. Metaphysical naturalism.
It is worth considering a somewhat different way of getting at the commitments of ethical
naturalism. This can be accomplished by examining the commitments of metaphysical
naturalism, of which ethical naturalism is a special case.19 Consider, then, the following
characterization of metaphysical naturalism:
The task of the naturalistic metaphysician, as I see it, is simply to draw out the
metaphysical implications of contemporary science. A metaphysics which goes
beyond the commitments of science is simply unsupported by the best available
evidence. A metaphysics which does not make commitments as rich as those of
our best current scientific theories asks us to narrow the scope of our ontology in
ways which will not withstand scrutiny. For the naturalist, there simply is no
extrascientific route to metaphysical understanding (Kornblith 1994: 40).
These comments suggest the following methodological principle, which can be taken as
characteristic of a metaphysically naturalist philosophical approach: posit all and only
those entities that are needed in our best available scientific theories. Since scientific
theories are in the business of providing a posteriori or empirical explanations of
observable phenomena, it seems to me that it would do no harm if we were to restate the
naturalist’s methodological principle as follows:
EC: posit the existence of an entity (or a kind of entity) if and only if reference to
that (kind of) entity is needed in our best available a posteriori explanations of
observable phenomena.

19

This is not to suggest that all ethical naturalists must accept the broader picture of metaphysical
naturalism. For example, someone who accepted the existence of supernatural entities like God might
nevertheless embrace the claim that moral properties are identical with natural properties. Even so, it is my
impression that a good deal of the interest in the ethical naturalist’s project stems from a desire to reconcile
moral realism with metaphysical naturalism.
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EC (the explanatory criterion) is in accord with what some ethical naturalists have
explicitly avowed. Peter Railton, for instance, writes:
What might be called ‘the generic stratagem of naturalistic realism’ is to postulate
a realm of facts in virtue of the contribution they would make to the a posteriori
explanation of certain features of our experience. For example, an external world
is posited to explain the coherence, stability, and intersubjectivity of sense
experience. A moral realist who would avail himself of this stratagem must show
that the postulation of moral facts similarly can have an explanatory function
(Railton 1986: 171f).
The acceptance of EC explains why the metaphysical naturalist who accepts moral
realism is eager to argue that moral facts and properties are identical with or constituted
by natural facts and properties: if it is not possible to discover whether or not an
individual instantiates a moral property by solely empirical means, then it is hard to see
how such a property (or the fact that consists in its being instantiated) would be needed in
the best available a posteriori explanations of observable phenomena. But if moral
properties were not needed in our best a posteriori explanations, then, by EC, the
metaphysical naturalist ought to deny that there are any moral facts and, thus, he ought to
reject moral realism.

1.4. Analytic Ethical Naturalism.
1.4.1. The general strategy of analytic ethical naturalism.
The ethical naturalist’s task is to achieve a naturalistic accommodation of moral
properties and facts. This involves, above all, making the case for the plausibility of the
claim that moral properties such as moral rightness and moral goodness are identical
with (or constituted only by) natural properties. The traditional strategy for achieving
accommodation is to argue that moral predicates are synonymous with predicates known
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to express natural properties. According to the realist version of this strategy, we should
view theories in first-order normative ethics as expressing analytic equivalences. Thus, a
theory such as AUh, if true, is true in virtue of the fact that the predicate ‘morally right’
has the same meaning as the predicate ‘maximizes hedonic utility.’ Because the two
predicates are synonymous, the former expresses the same property that the latter
expresses. And because, as most metaethicists will grant, the latter predicate expresses a
natural property, it follows that ‘morally right’ expresses the very same natural property.
In this way, a successful demonstration of an analytic equivalence between ‘morally
right’ and a natural predicate such as ‘maximizes hedonic utility’ suffices for the
conclusion that moral rightness is identical with (and so, is itself) a natural property, as
the ethical naturalist claims. Call any view that employs this strategy of naturalistic
accommodation a version of analytic ethical naturalism (AEN).20

1.4.2. Semantic assumptions of analytic ethical naturalism.
To get a better grasp on AEN, and to better understand the ways in which SEN departs
from it, it will be useful to have before us a sketch the semantic assumptions that
underwrite the former. I begin with some brief preliminaries.
Call any set of individuals at a possible world an extension. Call any function that
maps possible worlds to extensions an intension. The semantic content of any given
predicate is identified with an intension. The semantic content (and hence, intension) of a

20

Here I am interested in explicating what might be thought of as a “classical” version analytic ethical
naturalism that relies on a traditional understanding of meaning and conceptual analysis. Since my goal in
discussing AEN is simply to provide some motivation for, and a contrast with, SEN, I will not consider
more sophisticated versions of AEN that adopt so-called network analyses and two-dimensional semantics.
To see an implementation of these resources in defense of ethical naturalism, see Smith (1994) and Jackson
(1998).
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predicate determines the contribution that the predicate makes to the truth-conditions of
sentences in which that predicate appears. Thus, the sentences ‘x is F’ and ‘x is G’ have
the same truth-conditions just in case the intension of ‘F’ is the same as the intension of
‘G.’
The semantic theory that grounds AEN is sometimes called descriptivism. By this
view, the intension (and, hence, semantic content) of a speaker’s use of a predicate, ‘F,’ is
determined by a description that she “associates” with ‘F.’ More precisely, the intension
of ‘F,’ as used by a speaker, S, is the function that maps each possible world to the set of
individuals at that world that satisfy the description that S associates with ‘F.’ Some
descriptivists urge that we think of the relevant description not as a linguistic entity, but
rather, as a property or collection of properties that speakers associate with a given
predicate (Jackson 1998: 203f). In either case, the description associated with a predicate
should be thought of as something like a criterion specifying the necessary and sufficient
conditions that any given individual must satisfy in order for that predicate to be correctly
applied to it. In fact, it may be less misleading in some cases to speak of these criteria as
senses or concepts,21 rather than as descriptions: we might suppose that a speaker has a
concept that she associates with ‘red’ even if she cannot produce an interesting
description that applies to all and only red things (perhaps because her concept is more
like a pictorial image than a list of properties). The meaning of a predicate as used by a
speaker should be identified with the concept or description that she associates with it.
Thus, where ‘F’ and ‘G’ are non-indexical predicates, an utterance of ‘F’ is synonymous

21

As I will be using the word ‘concept’, the concept associated with a predicates is something that
(according to descriptivism) fixes or determines which intension is expressed by that predicate. By my
usage, a concept should not be identified with the intension itself; nor should it be identified with the
property expressed by the predicate. In this, my usage differs from that of (e.g.) Carnap (1947/1956: 21).
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with an utterance of ‘G’ just in case the concept or description associated with one is the
same as the concept or description associated with the other.
Something needs to be said about this three-place relation of “association” that
obtains among speakers, concepts, and predicates. If descriptivism is to serve the needs
of AEN, then facts about which concept a given speaker associates with a given predicate
must be discernible for that speaker by a priori introspection. Thus, the relation of
association should be understood as something like an introspectively accessible
psychological state of a speaker. It is for this reason that the form of descriptivism that
underwrites AEN must be construed a form of semantic internalism. According to
semantic internalism, the semantic content of a token predicate is fixed solely virtue of
how things are in the mind of a given speaker; facts about the environment outside of the
speaker’s mind do not directly contribute to fixing the content of the predicates she utters.
It follows from this internalist construal of descriptivism that the matter of which
intension and content is expressed by a given predicate ‘F’ depends entirely upon the
introspectively accessible psychological states of the speaker who utters ‘F.’22
A final point concerns a metaphysical assumption that goes along with the
descriptivist semantics that underwrites AEN: for each intension there corresponds one
and only one property.23 Indeed some descriptivists, such as Carnap, identify intensions
with properties (Carnap 1947/1956: 19). Construing properties this way entails that any
two predicates that share the same intension will also express the same property; in other

22

This accords with the account of intension individuation advanced by Rudolph Carnap. He writes, “the
intension of a predicate ‘Q’ for a speaker X, is the general condition which an object y must fulfil in order
for X to be willing to ascribe the predicate ‘Q’ to y” (1955/1956: 242)
23
Note that this assumption will not be shared by an ethical non-naturalist. A non-naturalist who accepts
AUh will agree that ‘morally right’ has the same intension as ‘maximizes the balance of pleasure over
pain’; but he will deny that the two predicates express the same property.
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words, co-intensionality is sufficient (and necessary) for property identity (cf. Carnap
ibid.: 18f). Moreover, because predicates that share the same meaning also share the
same intension, the descriptivist semantics sketched here implies that synonymy of
predicates is sufficient to establish property identity.24 In other words, a speaker’s
utterance of ‘Necessarily, for any x, x is F iff x is G’ is true just in case her utterance of
‘F’ is synonymous with her utterance of ‘G’. Indeed, this necessity statement is analytic,
since its truth depends solely upon the meanings of the words that compose it.

1.4.3. First-order normative ethics as conceptual analysis.
For the analytic ethical naturalist who accepts both moral realism and the descriptivist
semantics sketched above, first-order ethical theorizing is an exercise in conceptual
analysis. 25 In order to discover whether (e.g.) AUh is true, we must investigate the
description or concept that we associate with the predicate ‘morally right’. If it should
24

Hence, this version of descriptivism implies what Brink calls “the semantic test of properties” (see his
1989: 162).
25
It should be acknowledged that not every naturalistic analysis of moral predicates has the result that firstorder moral theorizing proceeds by way of conceptual analysis. Consider, for example, the following ideal
observer analysis: (IO) ‘φ is morally wrong’ =df. ‘φ is forbidden by the moral standard that would be
endorsed of by all observers in suitably idealized epistemic conditions.’ Even if we agree that IO is the
correct metaethical theory, we still need to engage in further inquiry in order to determine what the correct
moral standard is and which actions are morally wrong. Indeed, two people could assent to IO and yet
disagree as to whether AUh, CI-2, or some other standard is the correct substantive theory in first-order
normative ethics of behavior. To discern which of these theories is correct presumably requires a nonconceptual investigation into what standards an ideal observer would endorse (Firth suggests that this
would be an empirical investigation, drawing primarily on the resources of psychology [1952:325ff]).
My own view is that analyses along the line of IO are far more plausible than analytic versions of
AUh, CI-2, and the like. The trouble, however, is that IO is incompatible with moral realism: IO identifies
moral wrongness with (roughly) the property of being forbidden by the moral standard that would be
accepted by all idealized observers. Because of this, if IO is true, then the matter of which actions are
morally wrong depends upon facts about which moral standard the ideal observers accept. This, however,
is a clear violation of the stance-independence clause associated with realism. The most robust metaethical
view that IO can deliver, then, is a naturalistic version of moral constructivism.
The lesson is that not every naturalistic analysis of moral predicates that has been proposed could
be put to service in defense of moral realism. My suspicion is that only those analyses that double as
theories in first-order ethics will avoid this blatant violation of stance-independence. (Although, as we will
see in §1.5.6, there is reason to worry that all forms of analytic naturalism violate stance-independence). I
will not pursue this suspicion any further, since my primary interest in Realistic AEN is as a contrast to
SEN.
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turn out upon analysis that the concept that we associate with ‘morally right’ is the same
concept that we associate with ‘maximizes hedonic utility’ then we can conclude that the
two predicates are co-intensional and that AUh is, in fact, true (and analytic at that).
More importantly from a metaethical point of view, we could conclude that ‘morally
right’ expresses the same property as ‘maximizes hedonic utility’; and since it is not in
dispute among metaethicists that latter predicate expresses a natural property, we may
conclude that the property expressed by the former is also natural. In that case, it will
have been shown that the property moral rightness just is the natural property maximizing
hedonic utility. In this way, AEN (when armed with a successful naturalistic analysis of
all moral predicates) achieves a naturalistic accommodation of moral properties and facts.

1.5. The Rejection of Realistic Analytic Ethical Naturalism.
Let us turn now to considerations that have lead metaethicists, including proponents of
SEN, to reject analytic ethical naturalism. My treatment will be brief, since my interest
here is only to outline the considerations that motivate the adoption of SEN for
proponents of moral realism and ethical naturalism.

1.5.1. The rejection of analyticity.
One motivation for rejecting AEN that deserves brief mention is a general skepticism
about the existence of any analytic truths whatsoever. An influential case for this
skepticism can be found in Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951).26 Among the

26

Of the proponents of SEN, at least Boyd expresses doubt as to whether there are any interesting analytic
truths at all. He writes, “On Quinean grounds, I doubt that…analytic definitions or specifications of
necessary and sufficient conditions are ever to be found in the case of philosophically important concepts”
(1979: 378f; cf. 1988: 196).
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arguments Quine advances, there is this: a statement is analytic only if it is incorrigible or
immune to revision; no statement is incorrigible; therefore, no statement is analytic (ibid.:
40). Obviously, if no statement is analytic, it follows that, contrary to AEN, no theory in
first-order ethics can have the status of an analytic truth.

1.5.2. Doubts about descriptivism.
The classical version of descriptivism that underwrites AEN is vulnerable to several well
known objections. I will very briefly mention three. First, speakers are sometimes able
to express one property rather than another using a predicate even when the concept that
she associates with that predicate does not distinguish between the two properties.27 For
instance, although Kant offers up yellow metal as the description that he associates with
gold, (Kant 1783/2004: 72f) we take him to speak falsely when, pointing to a sample of
iron pyrites (fool’s gold), he utters ‘this stuff here is gold.’ But if descriptivism were
true, we would have to say that he speaks truly (Kripke 1980 116-119; cf. Putnam
1975b:226f; Donnellan 1970). Second, speakers are sometimes able to express a
particular property using a predicate even though the description they associate with that
predicate is erroneous. For example, it is argued that speakers who, because they were
ignorant of marine biology, associated being a fish with the predicate ‘whale’
nevertheless spoke truly when, pointing to a humpback whale, they uttered ‘this is a
whale.’ If descriptivism were true, however, this would not be so: the object that the

27

Although I continue to speak of predicate expressions here, I should acknowledge that most of the attacks
on descriptivism have focused on the theory as an account of referring expressions such as names and
natural kind terms. For the sake of continuity, I tailor these objections to apply to natural kind predicates.
As far as I can see, there isn’t any reason to think that arguments suitable for refuting a descriptivist
treatment of the names of kinds (e.g. ‘the tiger’) won’t be equally effective to refute a descriptivist
treatment of corresponding predicates (e.g. ‘tiger’).
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speaker is pointing to does not fall within the intension that that corresponds to her
concept (since that intension would include only individuals at a world that are fish)
(Kripke ibid.). The third objection to descriptivism is related to the previous one: in
cases where speakers come to have new beliefs about the nature of a kind—for instance,
that whales are not fish, but mammals, descriptivism seems to entail that the semantic
content of their predicate (e.g. ‘whale,’ or else ‘fish’) has changed. But this, some have
argued, is incorrect (Kripke ibid. 138). An additional objection worth mentioning is
Hilary Putnam’s famous “Twin Earth” argument (1975b: 223ff). (A discussion of this
argument can be found in the next chapter).
The objections outlined here have lead a number of philosophers to reject
classical descriptivism, at least as it applies to proper names and natural kind terms. It
might be argued, of course, that moral predicates are less like natural kind predicates,
such as ‘gold’ and ‘tiger,’ and more like the predicate ‘bachelor’ (for which descriptivism
is still thought to offer a plausible account). Even so, the objections to descriptivism
about natural kind predicates deserve mention since they seem to have played a role in
turning philosophers away from AEN.

1.5.3. The open question argument.
I turn now to objections against AEN that fall more narrowly within the purview of
metaethics. Arguably the most well known of such objections is the open question
argument. The locus classicus for the open question argument is G. E. Moore’s (1903:
66-69), though different versions of the argument have been advanced by Ayer
(1936/1952: 104f) and Hare (1952: 83-93, 154f), among others. Without attempting to be
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faithful to Moore’s own exposition,28 here is a brief sketch of (one version of) the open
question argument: Consider this question: (Q1) “Is act-token φ, which maximizes
hedonic utility, morally right?” If ‘morally right’ is synonymous with ‘maximizes
hedonic utility,’ then any competent speaker of English who fully understands Q1 should
know the answer to it.29 But it seems that there could be (indeed, it seems that there are)
competent speakers of English who fully understand Q1 but do not know the answer to it.
For them, Q1 remains an “open question.” It follows that ‘morally right’ is not
synonymous with ‘maximizes hedonic utility.’ Consequently, when AUh is construed as
an analytic definition of ‘morally right,’ it is false. Proponents of the open question
argument claim that this argument generalizes; they maintain that we would arrive at a
similar conclusion for any other naturalistic analysis of ‘morally right’ that might be
offered (and similarly for naturalistic analyses of ‘morally good’ etc.). If they are right,
then AEN cannot succeed.30

28

For a thorough and sympathetic exposition of Moore’s open question argument, see Feldman (2005).
This premise may look too strong at first glance, but consider what we would say about a speaker who
failed to know the answer to the question (Q2) ‘Is Mr. X, a man who, though eligible for marriage, has
never been married, a bachelor?’ I think we would be strongly inclined to suppose that this speaker does
not understand the meaning of at least one of the words in Q2 and so, we would conclude that she is not a
competent speaker with respect to Q2. The same holds, I believe, for the questions (Q3) ‘Is Fuzzy, who is
a female fox, a vixen?’ and (Q4) ‘Is Alex, who is a male sibling of Bert, the brother of Bert?’
30
The standard defense of AEN against the open question argument is to maintain that there might be
“unobvious synonymies”. In the recent metaethical literature, this line of reply has been pressed by
Jackson (1998: 151) and Smith (1994: 37).
29
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1.5.4. Chauvinistic conceptual relativism.31
Another objection to AEN is that it entails a kind of conceptual relativism that makes
genuine moral disagreement impossible between speakers (or linguistic communities)
that subscribe to different moral standards (Blackburn 1984: 168; 1998: 14f; Boyd 1988:
186f; Gibbard 1990: 9-18; Hare 1952: 49,148f; Moore 1903: 62ff; Sturgeon 1984:
327f).32 To illustrate, let’s suppose there are two islands that had been colonized by
English speakers in the 17th century, but which have not had extensive contact with the
outside world since. Suppose further that the denizens of each island are homogenous
with respect to the moral code that its members subscribe to. On the Island of
Benthamania, (nearly) all denizens accept AUh. Among other things, they tend to feel
anger and resentment towards those (and only towards those) who knowingly perform
actions that fail to maximize hedonic utility. On the island of New Immanuel, (nearly) all
denizens accept CI-2. Among other things, they tend to feel anger and resentment
towards those (and only towards those) who knowingly perform actions that treat others
as a mere means. If, as the realist construal of AEN requires, we view AUh and CI-2 as
expressing analytic definitions of ‘morally right,’ then we must conclude that in this
scenario that ‘morally right’ has a different meaning in the mouths of Benthamanians
than it does in the mouths of New Immanuelers. In addition, we must conclude that

31

I borrow the phrase ‘chauvinistic conceptual relativism’ from Horgan and Timmons (1996a: 15). For
them, a relativistic construal of a given class of predicates is chauvinistic if “it entails lack of genuine
disagreement in cases where two speakers utter apparently contradictory statements which really are
contradictory.” Perhaps they chose the term ‘chauvinistic’ to describe this phenomenon because a further
apparent implication of this sort of relativism is that groups of speakers who do not accept the sort of firstorder normative theory that we accept simply fail to have any moral vocabulary at all. What is
chauvinistic, then, is that this relativism implies that only we have a moral vocabulary, while all those who
fail to share our moral values simply lack one.
32
Although this objection is articulated earlier by G. E. Moore, R. M. Hare’s (1952), with its memorable
example involving a missionary among cannibals, is more widely cited and appears to have the status of the
locus classicus for this particular argument.
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Benthamanian and New Immanueler uses of ‘morally right’ express different intensions
and properties. In the mouth of a Benthamanian, ‘morally right’ expresses the property
maximizing hedonic utility. In the mouth of a New Immanueler, ‘morally right’ expresses
the property treating no one as a mere means. It follows that Benthamanian uses of
‘morally right’ and New Immanueler uses of ‘morally right’ contribute differently to the
truth-conditions of sentences in which they appear. Thus, when Benthamanians utter
‘organ harvesting is morally right’ and New Immanuelers utter ‘organ harvesting is not
morally right’ they are not engaging in a substantive moral disagreement; because their
uses of ‘morally right’ are incommensurable with one another, the two parties are merely
talking past each other. But this seems incorrect. It is obvious that the Benthamanians
and the New Immanuelers are having a substantive moral disagreement and are not
talking past each other. If so, then AEN should be rejected; it (at any rate, the semantics
required to sustain it) commits us to an implausible kind of conceptual relativism with
respect to moral predicates.33

33

My presentation of the argument here is directed against those versions of AEN that attempt to analyze
‘morally right’ in terms of putative right-making properties. It might be thought that a more “indirect”
version of AEN—one that offers, for example, an ideal observer analysis of ‘right’—would be more
successful. By this proposal, we should suppose that both Benthamanians and New Immanuelers associate
the property of being permitted by the moral standard that all ideal observers would endorse with their use
of ‘morally right’. In this way, they express the same intension and property with their uses of ‘morally
right.’ The disagreement between the two parties concerns the matter of which moral standard all ideal
observers would endorse. But this is a substantive (and potentially empirical) disagreement.
There are at least two reasons why this strategy will not work in the present context. First, as we
saw in note 25, ideal observer accounts of moral properties are not compatible with moral realism. Since I
am here interested in AEN as a way of preserving moral realism in the face of a commitment to
metaphysical naturalism, the present suggestion is of no use. Second, there are doubts about whether an
ideal observer can be sufficiently described so that we have reason to think that there is a determinate fact
about which moral standard she would endorse. If there is not a determinate fact about this, then there may
be excessive moral indeterminacy. But even if the ideal observer can be described in enough detail, a new
worry arises: two communities of speakers may associate different descriptions with their conception of an
ideal observer. If so, then the content of ‘right’ in each community will again express different properties
and, thus, chauvinistic relativism returns.
There may be, of course, other indirect versions of AEN (ones that do not directly build a moral
standard into the content of ‘morally right’) that better suit the needs of moral realists. I leave it to
proponents of AEN to produce such an account. My hope is that I have said enough here to make clear that
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1.5.5. The argument from normativity.
The next kind of argument that I want to consider is has been directed against moral
realism in all of its varieties. I am of the mind, however, that this sort of objection is
especially problematic for AEN since, in my estimation, AEN has fewer resources
available to answer it than do other forms of realism (such as ethical non-naturalism and
SEN). The argument comes in two varieties. One focuses on a supposed link between
moral judgment and motivation. The other focuses on a supposed link between moral
facts and reasons for action. I consider each argument in turn.
The argument from motivation, which has its roots in Hume’s writings, begins
with an assertion of moral judgment internalism, the thesis that there is a necessary
connection between judging that an act is obligatory for oneself and being motivated to
perform that act. More specifically,
MJI: Necessarily, if S judges (de se) that S is morally obligated to φ, then S is pro
tanto motivated to φ.34
MJI is typically asserted as an analytic, conceptual truth. The trouble it raises for moral
realists is that, by the standard theory of motivation (which is, again, associated with
Hume), an agent is motivated to φ only if she has some desire that would be served by φing. If this Humean account of motivation is correct, then it follows from MJI that an
agent judges that she is morally obligated to φ only if she has some desire that would be
satisfied by her φ-ing. But it is hard to see why we should think that a speaker’s making
chauvinistic conceptual relativism presents enough of a challenge to realistic analytic naturalism to produce
some motivation for seeking a form of naturalism that does not construe sentences that express necessary
co-variance between moral and natural properties as analytic.
34
MJI, or something very much like it, has been endorsed by Hume (1739/2000: 294-299), Stevenson
(1937: 16), Hare (1952: 172), Nagel (1970: Chh. 1, 2), Harman (1975), Mackie (1977: 40), Blackburn
(1984: 188), Korsgaard (1986), Dancy (1993: Ch. 1), and Smith (1994: ch. 3), among others.

23

a moral judgment entail the existence of a desire in this way unless moral judgments are
themselves expressions of speakers’ desires;35 but to allow that moral judgments express
conative states such as desires is to abandon moral cognitivism. In that case, there would
be no point in maintaining moral realism.
One way to answer the anti-realist argument from moral internalism is to reject
the Humean theory of motivation. This maneuver requires belief in the existence of
“intrinsically motivating propositions.” For reasons that are not always well-articulated,
naturalists have generally been reluctant to dispense with the Humean theory of
motivation and have agreed with Mackie’s contention that intrinsically motivating facts
would be a “queer sort” of entity (Mackie 1977: 40f; cf. Brink 1997: 12-15; Sturgeon
1992: 100f; 2002: 195). Instead, the standard response to the argument from motivation
is to deny MJI. But if proponents of MJI are correct in supposing that the thesis is a
conceptual truth, it is hard to see how analytic ethical naturalists can reject it without
entering into a stalemate over conceptual intuitions.
The other version of the normativity argument takes as its starting point a thesis
that is sometimes called moral rationalism:36
MR: Necessarily, if S is morally obligated to φ, then S has a pro tanto normative
reason to φ.37

35

There are other alternatives that merit acknowledgement. For one, MJI can be satisfied by adopting a
cognitivist-subjectivist analysis of moral obligation. Such an analysis might look something like this: ‘φ is
morally obligatory =df. ‘I disapprove of the failure to φ.’ But this subjectivist maneuver does the realist no
good; it violates realism’s stance-independence clause and so represents a constructivist account of moral
facts.
36
In Brink’s favored taxonomy, ‘agent internalism about reasons’ denotes what I am calling ‘moral
rationalism’ (1989: 40). I prefer the latter name since it cuts down on the number of philosophical theses
that go by the name ‘internalism’.
37
MR, or something like it, is endorsed by Dancy (1993: 4), Harman (1975: 8), Mackie (1977: 29), Joyce
(2001: ch. 2), Shafer-Landau (2003: ch. 8) and Smith (1994: 182ff), among others.
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As with MJI, MR is claimed to be an analytic, conceptual truth. It raises trouble for
naturalistic moral realism because, according to the standard naturalistic account of
normative reasons, an agent’s normative reasons are relativized to her desires. When this
account of reasons is combined with MR, it follows that an agent’s moral obligations are
also relativized to her desires. But this is implausible. Surely, a very powerful
psychopath is morally obligated to refrain from torturing his victims even if this serves
none of his desires. In order to accommodate MR and a plausible first-order account of
our moral obligations, it looks like we must reject the thesis that normative reasons are
desire-relative. But this raises some dangers for AEN since there is reason to think that
desire-independent normative reasons (sometimes called “external reasons”) cannot be
accommodated within a naturalistic framework (see Joyce 2001 and §4.5.2 of this
dissertation).

1.5.6. Analyticity and stance-independence.
A final problem for AEN that I will mention has not received much attention, though it is
hinted at by Nicholas Sturgeon (1986b: 117). This problem concerns the question of
whether the conception of moral epistemology that goes along with AEN is compatible
with the moral realist’s claim that moral facts are stance-independent. For a proponent of
AEN, the question of which first-order moral theory is correct depends upon which
description (or which set of properties) we happen to associate with moral predicates like
‘right’ and ‘good.’ But it looks as though the matter of which description we associate
with ‘right’ and ‘good’ just depends upon which moral theory (construed now as a moral
standard) we happen to (perhaps tacitly) accept. (In other words: I associate maximizing
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hedonic utility with ‘morally right’ if and only if I accept AUh). If so, then the moral
facts turn out to be stance-dependent: what makes a theory like AUh true (if it is true) is
that we happen to accept AUh as our moral standard. If we had accepted a different
theory, such as CI-2, then it would be the case that we associate treating no one as a mere
means with ‘morally right.’ But in that case, CI-2 would be the true theory in the
normative ethics of behavior instead of (say) AUh. In this way, AEN looks to be
incompatible with a genuinely realist construal of moral facts and moral theory.

1.6. Synthetic Ethical Naturalism.
1.6.1. The necessary a posteriori.
The analytic ethical naturalist achieves naturalistic accommodation by construing
sentences expressing necessities between moral and natural properties as expressions of
analytic, a priori necessities. As we have seen, this construal of moral theorizing leads to
a host of problems. Fortunately for ethical naturalists, advances in the philosophy of
language during the 1970’s opened up new metaethical possibilities. Perhaps the most
important advance was the recognition of property identities and relations of necessity
that are a posteriori and synthetic (Kripke 1980; Putnam 1975b). Perhaps the most
common example cited of an a posteriori identity is the claim that water is identical with
H2O. By the necessity of identity, this identity claim entails that, necessarily, something
is a quantity of water just in case it is a quantity of H2O. This latter proposition (like the
former) is thought to be synthetic because ‘water’ is not synonymous with ‘H2O’: the
description a competent speaker associates with ‘water’ may be entirely distinct from the
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description she associates with ‘H2O’.38 The proposition is thought to be a posteriori
because its truth is (and was) discovered, not by conceptual analysis or by synthetic, a
priori intuition, but by experimental chemistry, which is an a posteriori form of inquiry.
Taking the theoretical identities of chemistry as their inspiration, ethical
naturalists argue that sentences used to assert identities (or constitution relations) between
moral and natural properties should be understood as expressing synthetic, a posteriori
necessities:
The [ethical] naturalist can concede that there are neither synonymies nor
meaning implications between moral and nonmoral, for instance, natural, terms
and still maintain that moral facts and properties are identical with, or constituted
by, natural and social scientific facts and properties. The naturalist’s identity or
constitution claims can be construed as expressing synthetic [a posteriori]39 moral
necessities (Brink 1989: 166, 175; cf. Boyd 1988; Lycan 1988; Railton 1989: 157;
Sturgeon 1985a: 75n16; 1985b: 25f).40
This claim, as I see it, is the distinguishing feature of SEN as a form of naturalistic moral
realism.
38

The idea is that the description a competent speaker associates with ‘water’ may include only the
superficial qualities of water. For instance, such a speaker might associate with the predicate ‘water’ the
property of being a clear, potable liquid (at room temperature) that fills the lakes, rivers and oceans of
Earth. By contrast, a competent user of ‘H2O’ is likely to associate with it something like the following
description: being a substance composed of molecules consisting in two hydrogen atoms bonded to one
oxygen atom.
39
Although he does not say so in the passage cited here, Brink later adds (in 1989: 175) that the
epistemological status of these moral necessities is a posteriori.
40
To my knowledge the first person to suggest this view of moral identities is Hilary Putnam in his
(1975a)—though his remarks are very brief and inchoate. Putnam gives this view a more explicit
endorsement later on (1981: 205-208); but by that time he has already abandoned robust metaphysical
realism. Thus, it is not clear whether he should be counted as a proponent of SEN since SEN, as I am
understanding it, includes a commitment to realism about moral facts. Two other philosophers deserve
mention as having proposed early on that moral identities are a posteriori, although they do not fall within
the SEN camp. The first is Robert Adams. In his (1979: 76), he writes “ethical wrongness is (i..e. is
identical with) the property of being contrary to the commands of a loving God. I regard this as a
metaphysically necessary, but not an analytic or a priori truth.” It is not clear that Adams should be classed
as a proponent of SEN, however, since he identifies wrongness with a supernatural property. (On the other
hand, Adams suggests both that God plays a causal role in the world and that we can discover the correct
moral theory via a posteriori inquiry. As I have mentioned above, I am inclined to think that, if there is a
god who plays a causal role in the world, and if there is empirical evidence of his presence, then we should
count that god as a natural entity.) The second philosopher deserving mention is Gilbert Harman. In his
(1977: 19f), he suggests that an ethical naturalist could argue that moral identities are a posteriori in order
to answer Moore’s open question argument. Since Harman rejects moral realism in favor of a relativistic
moral constructivism, I do not classify him as a proponent of SEN.
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SEN proponents maintain that the question of which natural properties are to be
identified with moral properties (or taken to constitute them) is to be settled by
substantive, first-order ethical theorizing (Brink 1989: 177f, 238). Sturgeon, for instance,
writes that
“If hedonistic act utilitarianism…turns out to be true, for example, then we can
define the good as pleasure and the absence of pain, and a right action as one that
produces at least as much good as any other…” (Sturgeon 1985a: 61; cf. Brink;
2001: 162; Railton 1989: 167).
From these remarks it should be clear that synthetic ethical naturalists view first-order
theories like AUh and CI-2, which identify the natural supervenience base of moral facts
and properties, as expressing definitions of moral terms. In addition, they view these
theories as expressing property identities: “The ethical naturalist claims that moral facts
and properties supervene upon natural facts and properties, because moral facts and
properties are natural facts and properties” (Brink 1989: 176, emphasis in the original).41

1.6.2. The semantic and metaphysical underpinnings of the necessary a posteriori.
In §1.4.2 I noted that AEN rests upon a semantic foundation: viz., descriptivism of an
internalist sort. SEN also rests upon a semantic foundation: proponents of SEN support
their view by adopting an externalist semantics for moral predicates and property names.
According to semantic externalism, the semantic contents of certain predicates are
individuated in part by features of the speakers’ environment. This semantic view goes
hand in hand with the metaphysical doctrine that there exist natural kinds—kinds whose
membership is delimited by a “real” (as opposed to “nominal”) essence (Boyd 1988: 19441

Brink goes on to clarify that the appearance of ‘are’ here may represent either the ‘is’ of identity or the
‘is’ of constitution (ibid.). Presumably a moral constitution claim would look like a one-way conditional of
the form “Necessarily, for any φ, if φ has N in a circumstance of type C, then φ is morally right” where ‘N’
expresses a natural property.
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199; Brink 2001: 160ff; Sturgeon 1985b: 26). A kind’s real essence is typically
understood to be a property (or collection of properties) that is causally responsible for
the observable similarities among its members. The significance of natural kinds for
semantic externalism is this: Suppose there is a natural kind, K, with real essence, E. If
there is a predicate, ‘F,’ that expresses the property of being a K, then, for any world, w,
and any object, o, o is in the extension of ‘F’ at w iff o instantiates E at w. The resulting
function that maps possible worlds to extensions is the intension and semantic content of
‘F.’ Importantly, competent users of ‘F’ may have no a priori access to the matter of
which properties are included in E. That is a fact about their environment; it is not settled
by how things are in the minds of speakers. As a result of this, speakers will have no
purely a priori route towards knowing precisely which intension is expressed by their
uses of ‘F.’
We can now see the connection between semantic externalism, natural kinds, and
a posteriori necessity. Suppose that there is a predicate ‘G’ that expresses the property E.
Given the stipulations above, ‘G’ is co-intensional with ‘F.’ Even so, it may be that ‘F’
and ‘G’ are not analytically equivalent.42 In that case, speakers will be unable to know
that ‘F’ and ‘G’ are co-intensional without the benefit of an a posteriori investigation into
which properties belong to the real essence of K. It follows that the necessity claim,
‘Necessarily, for any x, x is F iff x is G,’ is knowable only a posteriori.43

42

We can suppose this only if we deny that that the meaning of a predicate is to be identified with its
intension. Brink rejects the identification of meaning with intension in his (1989: Ch. 6).
43
Again, this necessity claim can be construed further as expressing an a posteriori property identity if we
assume that co-intensionality is sufficient for property identity.
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1.6.3. Causal theories of reference.
Semantic externalism needs to be supplemented by an account that specifies how a given
real essence comes to fix the intension of a given predicate. While it is possible to adopt
a more sophisticated version of descriptivism to accommodate externalism about
semantic content, externalists have traditionally adopted some kind of causal theory of
reference (or, better, content-fixing).44 On a view of this sort, the intension of a predicate
is fixed by the real essence of the kind or property that bears the right causal relation to
speakers’ use of that predicate (Kripke 1980; Putnam 1975b). The version of the causal
theory of content most closely associated with SEN is Boyd’s “causal regulation”
account. In the most widely cited formulation of this view, Boyd writes,
Roughly, and for nondegenerate cases, a term t refers to a kind (property, relation,
etc.) k just in case there exist causal mechanisms whose tendency is to bring it
about, over time, that what is predicated of the term t will be approximately true
of k […]. Such mechanisms will typically include the existence of procedures
which are approximately accurate for recognizing members or instances of k (at
least for easy cases) and which relevantly govern the use of t, the social
transmission of certain relatively approximately true beliefs regarding k,
formulated as claims about t […], a pattern of deference to experts on k with
respect to the use of t, etc. […]” (Boyd 1988: 195; cf. Boyd 2003a: 538).
Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have introduced a useful shorthand to denote the
right-hand side of Boyd’s biconditional. Following them, let us say that when the right
hand side the biconditional is satisfied, k causally regulates the use of t.
Boyd’s statement of his theory of reference is not as lucid as one might like. In
the remainder of this section, I want to indicate how I understand his account of
reference-fixing (and content-fixing) to work. To begin with, I should note one
complication. Hitherto, I have been speaking about the relationship between predicates
and the semantic contents (i.e. intensions) that they express. However, Boyd’s account of
44

For sketches of sophisticated descriptivism, see Chalmers (1996), Jackson (1998) and Lewis (1970).
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reference is stated in terms of singular terms and the kinds that they putatively refer to.
To facilitate discussion, I make the following assumption: if a property causally regulates
the use of a property-name (e.g., ‘being gold’, ‘tigerhood’, ‘goodness’, etc.), then that
property not only serves as the referent of that property name, but also fixes the intension
of any corresponding predicate of which the property name is a nominalization (e.g.,
‘gold’, ‘tiger’, ‘good’, etc.). In saying that a property (or essence), P, fixes the intension
of a predicate ‘F’, I mean simply that the intension of ‘F’ is a function that maps each
possible world to the set of individuals at that world that instantiate P (or to the empty set,
if nothing at the world instantiates P). Although it may be best for the purposes of SEN
not to identify properties with intensions, when a property fixes the intension of a
predicate, I will say that that predicate expresses that property.45 In addition, I will
assume that when a property as causally regulates the use of a property-name, it also
regulates the use of that name’s corresponding predicate.
Here, then, is a (very rough) illustration of Boyd’s causal regulation theory of
reference as I understand it: Let’s assume that it is a necessary truth that something is a
quantity of (pure) gold iff it is a quantity of substance composed solely of atoms with
atomic number 79 (Au, for short). Consider, now, the use of ‘gold’ by speakers living
prior to the rise of atomic chemistry. How does Boyd’s theory of reference explain the
fact that these speakers used ‘gold’ to express the property of being Au, even though they
were not in a position to know or believe anything about atomic numbers, etc.? Here is
the sort of story Boyd might tell: First, there is a tendency for it to be true that the pieces

45

Although it is customary in semantics to identify each intension with a property, this may conflict with
some commitments expressed by SEN proponents. In particular, Brink appears to favor a sparse
conception of properties whereby not every meaningful or contentful predicate expresses a genuine
property (Brink 1989: 158f; cf. Armstrong 1978: 19-29).
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of stuff to which the predicate ‘gold’ is applied by these speakers have the property of
being Au. Similarly, there is a tendency for it to be true that, when other properties are
ascribed to the pieces of stuff to which ‘gold’ is applied, those pieces really have those
other properties. For instance, when the speakers utter ‘everything that is gold is
malleable,’ it is true of everything that has the property of being Au that it also has the
property of being malleable. I take this to be what Boyd has in mind when he requires
for reference that “what is predicated of the term t will be approximately true of k.”
Second, this tendency for the speakers’ ascriptions to be correct is the result of the sorts
of causal mechanisms that Boyd describes. I take it that, at bottom, this involves the
claim that the dominant,46 ultimate47 causal source of these speakers’ ‘gold’-related
beliefs is being Au (or its instances).48 Under roughly49 these conditions, according to

46

Here I am drawing on Gareth Evan’s (1973) for help. The importance of the dominance condition is this:
it may be that some number of our ‘gold’-related beliefs have their causal origin not in the property of
being Au, but rather, in being FeS2 (i.e., being fool’s gold). This can happen when someone comes to
believe that ‘there is gold in them hills’ expresses a truth as a result of having seen instances of being FeS2
in those hills. Nevertheless, provided that being Au is the dominant source of speakers’ ‘gold’-related
beliefs (and that being FeS2 is the source of relatively few of those beliefs) we should judge that the
property expressed by ‘gold’ is being Au, and not being FeS2 (and not a disjunction of the two properties).
47
I say ‘ultimate’ because it will likely be the case that many speakers never have direct contact with the
relevant property expressed by their predicate. For instance, it may be that some users of ‘gold’ have never
been in its presence, and that all of their ‘gold’-related beliefs are acquired second hand, by testimony from
other speakers. In that case, what is important for reference, as I understand Boyd views, is that at the
beginning of the chain of speakers from whence the information related to (e.g.) ‘gold’ came, there is some
speaker for whom being Au is the dominant causal source of her ‘gold’-related beliefs.
48
Compare this with Boyd’s claim that “the sorts of causal connections which are relevant to reference are
just those which are involved in the reliable regulation of belief…” (1988: 195).
49
Why only “roughly”? I add this hedge because it is doubtful that the conditions Boyd lays out are really
sufficient to deliver determinate referents or semantic contents to the relevant terms and predicates in all
circumstances. The trouble is this: It could turn out that every piece of Au that the speakers have ever
causally interacted with was impure and mixed with some other element, for example, oxygen. In that
case, there is another property besides being Au that is a candidate for the honors of being the property
expressed by ‘gold’: viz., the property of being a compound of Au and O. This is one manifestation of the
so-called “qua problem,” noted by Kim Sterelny (1983), among others. Boyd addresses the qua problem
(though not by that name) in his (1999c: 58f) and (2003a: 536f). His discussion is difficult and I am sure I
do not fully understand his solution to the problem. As best as I can tell, it involves adding an additional
condition for reference: “[In] order for t to refer to p, the epistemic access which uses of t affords speakers
to the real properties of p must (help to) explain the theoretical and/or practical successes achieved in the
domains of inquiry or of practice to which t-talk is central” (2003a: 515). Returning to the example
involving ‘gold,’ this means, presumably, that we should expect that the causal connection between our
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Boyd’s theory of reference, we can say that being Au is the real essence that fixes the
intension of ‘gold’ (as used by our sample speakers). The intension of ‘gold’ among
these speakers then, is a function that maps each possible world to the set of all
individuals at that world that exemplify being Au, if there are any such individuals.
Let us turn, now, to Boyd’s theory of reference as it applies to moral terms and
examine the way in which it supports the claim that moral necessities are synthetic a
posteriori.
Boyd proposes that, among English speakers, the use of moral terms like ‘moral
goodness’ and ‘moral rightness’ is causally regulated by certain natural properties. I
understand this to imply that those natural properties also causally regulate the
corresponding predicates ‘morally good’ and ‘morally right.’ If Boyd’s hypothesis is
correct, and if his causal regulation account of content-fixing is true, it follows that, for
any natural property, N, that uniquely causally regulates (e.g.) ‘morally right,’ the
following necessity claim with be true (where ‘N’ is a non-moral predicate that expresses
N): ‘Necessarily, for any x, x is morally right iff x has N.’ As long as N is not among the
properties that are analytically associated with ‘right,’ this necessity claim is synthetic.
Since it is presumably an empirical question which natural property causally regulates
our use of ‘right’—and not something that can be discovered by conceptual analysis or
synthetic a priori intuition—whether or not this necessity claim is true can be discovered
only by a posteriori inquiry. In this way, semantic externalism, supplemented with a
‘gold’-related beliefs and being Au helps to explain the theoretical and/or practical success achieved
through the use of the predicate ‘gold,’ whereas the connection between our ‘gold’-related beliefs and
being a compound of Au and O does not explain this (or else explains it less well). Among the things that
are unclear here is the matter of what constitutes theoretical and practical success of ‘gold’-talk among the
speakers living prior to modern chemistry. Although I must set aside these worries about the qua problem,
I must nevertheless acknowledge that how these matters are resolved by Boyd have the potential to affect
the cogency of arguments I will be advancing in later chapters.
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casual theory of reference, explains how it is possible for there to be moral identity
claims whose truth-value is discoverable only a posteriori.

1.6.4. The epistemological commitments of SEN.
It may be worth making note of some further aspects of the epistemological commitments
and preferences associated with SEN and the philosophers who defend it. In addition to
holding moral knowledge to be a posteriori, the principal defenders of SEN endorse a
coherentist account of epistemic justification for moral (and non-moral) beliefs (Boyd
1988; Brink 1989: ch. 5; Sturgeon 2002). According to Brink’s characterization, moral
coherentism “…holds that one’s moral belief p is justified insofar as p is part of a
coherent system of beliefs, both moral and nonmoral, and p’s coherence at least partially
explains why one holds p” (1989: 103). On such a view, no moral belief is self-evident
or self-justifying. (That is, no moral belief is justified independently of its inferential
relations to other beliefs held by the epistemic agent).
Brink (ibid. 104), Boyd (1988: 207) and Sturgeon (2006b: 105) all cite the
method of wide reflective equilibrium as their preferred characterization of a coherentist
method of moral inquiry.50 According to this method, roughly, an epistemic agent begins
with a stock of considered moral judgments, general moral principles, and non-moral
background beliefs. She then makes modifications to all three elements with the goal of
producing a new set of judgments, principles, and background beliefs that exhibits
maximal coherence. (Note that none of the three elements are thought of as incorrigible
or as playing a privileged “foundational” role; all three are susceptible to revision in the

50

The method of wide reflective equilibrium for moral inquiry was articulated by Rawls (1951; 1971/1999;
1980). For an especially clear description of this method, see Daniels (1979).
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interest of coherence.) When her moral judgments, moral principles, and background
beliefs exhibit maximal coherence, the agent’s moral beliefs can be said to be in
“reflective equilibrium.” In this state, her moral beliefs (taken as a complete system)
enjoy maximal epistemic justification for her.
It is expected that, in pursuing reflective equilibrium among her moral (and nonmoral) beliefs, an epistemic agent will make use of her moral intuitions. We may
understand an agent S to have a intuition that p just in case it seems to S that p, where this
seeming is neither (i) the product of S’s sensory perception nor (ii) the product of S’s
introspecting her own mental operations nor (iii) a process of reasoning from other
premises held by S that can be introspectively accessed by S (cf. Bealer 2000: 3f; Huemer
2005: 101f). Following Huemer, we can say that a moral intuition is an intuition with a
moral proposition as its content (Huemer ibid.).51
The role of intuitions here raises some questions about the empirical purity of
moral knowledge as it is conceived by proponents of SEN. At first sight anyway, moral
intuitions have the appearance of being a priori. Synthetic ethical naturalists, however,
cannot allow this. They cannot allow that moral intuitions are analytic a priori, since this
would jeopardize their contention that the moral theories arrived on the basis of such
intuitions are synthetic. Nor can they allow that moral intuitions are synthetic a priori.
This is because the synthetic a priori is not an empirical way of knowing. In light of the
characterization of natural propertyhood in §1.3.1, we could not regard moral properties

51

In formulating this characterization of a moral intuition I draw on the work of Bealer and Huemer. I
depart from them, however, in allowing that it is possible that S has a moral intuition that p even if p is the
product of a process of reasoning. I require only that any such process of reasoning is hidden from the
epistemic agent (i.e., that the process is not accessible to her via introspection). My reason for loosening
the account in this way is to avoid begging the question against the account of intuition preferred by
naturalists.
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as natural properties if synthetic a priori intuition is required to know which things
instantiate them.
What is needed by the synthetic ethical naturalist, then, is a naturalistically
acceptable account of synthetic moral intuition. To fill this need, SEN proponents
contend that moral intuitions are really covert inferences from tacitly held background
moral theories. They maintain that moral intuitions resemble scientific intuitions in this
respect. With respect to intuitions of the latter kind, Boyd writes,
…[I]t seems overwhelmingly likely that scientific intuitions should be thought of
as trained judgments which resemble perceptual judgments in not
involving…explicit inferences, but which resemble explicit inferences in science
in depending for their reliability upon the relevant approximate truth of the
explicit theories which help to determine them (1988: 193).
Sturgeon adds,
…I find it more plausible to think that what is [in scientific practice] called
intuition is actually a product of inference in a broad but epistemologically wellmotivated sense. Judgment here outruns the ability to articulate reasons; but we
need some account of why the only people with physical intuition worth trusting
are those with extensive knowledge of highly sophisticated, approximately true
physical theory and a lot of experience in applying it (2002: 203).
Although Boyd and Sturgeon here suggest that the scientific theories that ground
scientific intuition are themselves explicitly known, other naturalists note that scientific
intuitions can be grounded in tacit theories that epistemic agents cannot easily articulate
(Kornblith 2002: 13). Most importantly, all of these naturalists suppose that the relevant
background scientific theories are empirically justifiable (if justifiable at all). As a result,
the scientific intuitions that are covert inferences from such theories should not be
thought of as a priori; they are, instead, a posteriori, since they are inferences drawn
from empirically or a posteriori justifiable background theories.
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SEN proponents argue that this conception of scientific intuition extends to moral
intuitions as well. Thus, Boyd writes
…[W]e may now treat moral intuitions exactly on a par with scientific intuitions,
as a species of trained judgment. Such intuitions are not assigned a foundational
role in moral inquiry…[they] are simply one cognitive manifestation of our moral
understanding, just as physical intuitions, say, are a cognitive manifestation of
physicists’ understanding of their subject matter (1988: 207f; cf. Sturgeon 2002:
203).
The idea, as I understand it, is this: When contemplating possible cases, an epistemic
agent will often have moral intuitions. Although these intuitions may be
“phenomenologically basic,” in the sense that “their inferential heritage is not
introspectively available” to the agent (Kornblith 2002: 20), they are, nevertheless, the
result of tacit inferences from the agent’s background moral beliefs and theory. The
epistemic agent who has these intuitions can use them as evidence in coherence
reasoning, where the goal is to move from the tacit background theory to an explicit
moral theory that is more coherent, and thus, better justified than the initial tacit theory.
Naturally, critics of SEN will want to ask where the agent’s tacit background
theory comes from. Sturgeon suggests that such a theory might be innate, though, in his
view, the answer to this question “doesn’t much matter” (2006a: 254). I disagree: the
genealogy of our tacit moral beliefs is of grave metaethical importance. In the first place,
it isn’t obvious that our tacit theory has a genealogy that is compatible with the
commitments of the naturalist’s empiricism. An ethical non-naturalist, for instance,
might concede that many of our particular moral intuitions are inferences from a tacit
background moral theory but insist, nevertheless, that the tacit theory, inchoate as it may
be, enters our minds by way of a synthetic a priori grasping. While I am not inclined to
accept the non-naturalist line suggested here, I do think the naturalist owes us greater
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assurances that the tacit theory has a genealogy that is compatible with his empiricism.
But secondly, there is to my mind a more serious challenge to SEN than the worry about
preserving the empirical purity of moral epistemology. This challenge asks whether there
is a plausible story about the origins of our tacit moral theory according to which that
theory is a roughly accurate reflection of moral reality. All SEN proponents recognize
that, in order for the method of reflective equilibrium to yield moral knowledge (rather
than merely justified moral belief), it needs to be the case that the background moral
beliefs with which we start are “sufficiently near the truth” (Boyd 1988: 201, 207; Brink
1999: 207; Sturgeon 1985a: 67; 2006a: 254f; 2006b: 105f). The present worry is that the
most plausible genealogical stories about the sources of our tacit moral beliefs and
theories—including stories according to which they are innate—may turn out to
undermine our confidence that such theories really are “approximately true.” (This worry
is expanded in to a full-blown argument against SEN in Chapter 6 of this dissertation).
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1.7. How SEN answers the objections to AEN.
In this, the final section of Chapter 1, I want to revisit the objections to AEN discussed in
§1.5 and briefly indicate how SEN promises the ethical naturalist an answer to them. Its
answers to first two objections require little comment. In the first place, because SEN
takes knowledge of moral claims to be synthetic, it does not run afoul of skepticism about
analyticity. Second, since SEN is grounded in an externalist moral semantics, it does not
require the kind of internalist-descriptivist semantics thought to be refuted by the
arguments of Kripke, Putnam, and others.
The externalist moral semantics also supplies the ethical naturalist with a simple
response to the open question argument. The open question argument can be used to
show that moral properties are distinct from all natural properties only if it is assumed
that two predicates express the same property only if they are synonymous. However,
recall from §1.6.2 that semantic externalism makes it possible for two predicates to
express the same property even when their meaning (thought of as the concepts speakers
associate with them) are distinct. The synthetic ethical naturalist can claim that, just as
‘water’ and ‘H2O’ express the same property despite being non-synonymous, so too is it
(epistemically) possible for us that ‘morally right’ and the natural predicate (e.g.)
‘maximizes hedonic utility’ express the same property even if these predicates are known
not to be synonymous (Boyd 1988: 199; Brink 1989: 165; Lycan 1988: 199-202; Railton
1989: 157f; Sturgeon 1985b: 25f; 2003: 533f).
SEN also promises the ethical naturalist a way out of the problem of chauvinistic
conceptual relativism. Given the externalist moral semantics favored by SEN, it does not
follow from the fact that two speakers accept a different moral standard (and thus,
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associate different descriptions with their use of moral predicates) that their uses of
‘morally right’ must express different semantic contents. It may be that the very same
property causally regulates the use of both speakers’ predicates even if (at least) one of
them has an incomplete or mistaken concept associated with that predicate. Thus, it
could be that the property of treating no one as a mere means causally regulates the use
of ‘morally right’ among the Benthamanians (who, recall, accept AUh). If so,
Benthamanian uses of ‘right’ express the same content as the New Immanuel uses of
‘right.’ The Benthamanians are simply mistaken as to the real nature of the property that
regulates their own uses of ‘right.’ (One possible explanation that might be offered for
their error is, perhaps, the fact—if it is a fact—that most of the actions that treat no one as
a mere means also maximize hedonic utility.)52 Whatever the case may be, SEN’s
externalist moral semantics makes it is possible—in certain cases, at least—for speakers
who accept different moral standards to engage in a substantive disagreement about what
is morally right or morally good (Boyd 1988: 199, 209f; Brink 2001: 163; Sturgeon 1984:
329; 1986b: 124).
SEN proponents respond to the normativity objections by denying both MJI and
MR. For an analytic naturalist, this denial can succeed only if he can show that neither
MJI nor MR is part of the concept that we associate with ‘moral judgment’ or ‘moral
obligation.’ While SEN proponents have followed this strategy (thereby embracing what
is sometimes called moral externalism),53 it has two disadvantages. In the first place,

52

In advancing this hypothesis, I am merely trying to indicate how an explanation of their error might go.
For what it’s worth, I have grave doubts that most actions that treat no one as a mere means also maximize
hedonic utility.
53
Brink argues this way in his (1989: ch. 3). He offers as conceptual possibility the existence of an
amoralist. There are two salient kinds of amoralist, and Brink contends that both are possible. The first
amoralist is an agent who judges an action to be obligatory but has no motivation to perform it. The second
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while MJI might be thought to be a vulnerable principle, the denial of MR is much harder
to swallow. To deny MR is to allow that it is a conceptual possibility that there is some
very powerful psychopath who, while morally obligated to refrain from harming his
victim, simply has no reason to so refrain. I believe that the concept of a moral
obligation does not allow for such a possibility. A second disadvantage for this strategy
is that a straight denial of MJI and MR appears to be doomed to end in stalemate at best.
Fortunately, the synthetic ethical naturalist’s acceptance of an externalist moral semantics
makes available a stronger reply. One of the supposed benefits of an externalist
semantics is that it makes it possible for speakers to use a predicate to express a property,
even if the concept that those speakers associate with that predicate is erroneous. For
example, we saw in §1.5.2 that semantic externalism about biological species predicates
makes it possible for a community of speakers to use ‘whale’ to express the property of
being a whale even if the description they associate with that predicate mistakenly
includes the property of being a fish. With this in mind, the SEN proponent is in a
position to concede that MJI and MR are both part of the concept or description that we
associate with the predicate ‘morally obligatory’ while denying that the real property of
moral obligation satisfies either conceptual requirement.54
The last objection to AEN concerns the question over whether construing moral
theories as expressing conceptual or analytic truths leaves enough room for the possibility
(characteristic of robust moral realism) that our best moral theory is nevertheless false.
SEN seems able to account for this possibility with less difficulty. According to the
amoralist is an agent who has an obligation but, because of his preferences, has no reason to fulfill it. See
also Boyd (1988: 214ff) and Sturgeon (1986b: 121f).
54
I am not aware of any synthetic ethical naturalist who explicitly advances this argument in precisely this
fashion. Brink comes close when he rejects the status of MJI as a conceptual truth on what he calls
“Quinean grounds” in his (1987: 294).
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semantics of SEN, the matter of which property is expressed by ‘morally right’ is not
settled merely by the concept we associate with the predicate. Because of this, it appears
to be in principle possible that we achieve reflective equilibrium among our beliefs about
what is morally right while the moral theory we accept fails to capture the true nature of
the natural property that causally regulates our use of ‘morally right’ (i.e., the property
moral rightness).55

55

Contrast this with Putnam who, writing against metaphysical realism, argues that “The supposition that
even an “ideal” theory (from a pragmatic point of view) might really be false appears to collapse into
unintelligibility” (1977: 486). If Putnam is right, then even SEN’s central supposition that moral terms
pick out kinds or properties with a posteriori real definitions will not deliver a robustly realistic metaethic.
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CHAPTER 2
MORAL TWIN EARTH VERSUS EXTERNALIST MORAL SEMANTICS
2. Chapter.
2.1. Introduction.
In the previous chapter, we saw that the realist variety of AEN cannot accommodate the
existence of genuine moral disagreement between speakers (or communities of speakers)
who subscribe to different moral standards; instead, AEN entails a chauvinistic form of
conceptual relativism, wrongly implying that speakers disagreeing with one another
about moral matters are only verbally disagreeing. As we also saw, the adoption of SEN
is thought to promise a way around this problem for the ethical naturalist. Because the
externalist moral semantics that grounds SEN makes it possible for two speakers to
express the same content with a predicate even when the concepts they associate with that
predicate are distinct, the fact that two speakers associate different moral standards with
their uses of ‘morally right’ need not entail that they express distinct properties; and if
their predicates do express the same property, they will be able to use those predicates to
engage in substantive moral disagreement, even if they happen to associate different
moral standards with their use of those predicates.
In a series of papers, Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons (H&T) have advanced
an argument that shows that this supposed advantage for SEN over AEN is illusory: the
externalist moral semantics favored by SEN also entails a chauvinistic form of conceptual
relativism. If they are right, then the externalist semantics that serves as the foundation
of SEN should be rejected.
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H&T’s argument centers around their “Moral Twin Earth” thought experiment
(MTE). In constructing this thought experiment, H&T draw inspiration from the famous
Twin Earth thought experiment introduced by Hilary Putnam in his “The Meaning of
‘Meaning’” (1975b). However, whereas Putnam’s thought experiment convinced many
that semantic externalism offers the correct semantics for natural kind terms like ‘water’
and ‘aluminum,’ the MTE thought experiment is meant to show that externalist semantics
do not offer a correct account of the contents of moral predicates. In the present chapter,
I begin by sketching Putnam’s original Twin Earth argument for natural kind terms. I
then present H&T’s MTE thought experiment and the accompanying argument against
semantic externalism for moral predicates. In the remaining sections, I consider several
challenges to H&T’s argument. These challenges all involve the claim that the MTE
thought experiment is misleading and that the intuitions generated from it—intuitions that
undermine SEN’s semantics—should not be trusted. If these objections are wellfounded, then we should reject H&T’s argument against SEN. I argue, however, that
these objections miss their mark: there is no reason to suppose that the MTE thought
experiment is misleading. The intuitions generated by the thought experiment are at least
as innocent as the intuitions generated by Putnam’s original. (In Chapters 3 and 4, I go
on to consider other attempts to defend SEN from the MTE argument.)

2.2. Putnam’s Twin Earth.
Putnam asks us to imagine a planet in our galaxy that is as near a duplicate to Earth as is
possible save for the following difference: on Twin Earth “…the liquid called ‘water’ is
not H2O but a different liquid whose chemical formula is very long and complicated.”
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Putnam calls this chemical formula ‘XYZ.’ Despite its different chemical structure, XYZ
is indiscernible from H2O in all of its superficial properties. In addition, the role that
XYZ plays on Twin Earth is very similar to the role that H2O plays here on Earth: e.g. it
fills the lakes, rivers, and oceans; nourishes Twin Earthling life forms; etc. (Putnam
1975b: 223).
In light of the Twin Earth scenario, there are two salient alternative ways of
describing the extensions of ‘water’ as used by Earthlings and ‘water’ as used by Twin
Earthlings. (Hereafter, I use t-‘water’ to represent Twin Earthling uses of ‘water.’) In
the first place, we can say that ‘water’ and t-‘water’ have the same extension. This
extension includes all molecules of XYZ and all molecules of H2O and nothing else. By
the second alternative, we can say that ‘water’ has all and only molecules of H2O as its
extension, while t-‘water’ has all and only molecules of XYZ as its extension. Putnam
contends (and much of the philosophical community agrees) that the second alternative is
correct.
Putnam recognizes that he has not yet established semantic externalism as an
account of the semantic contents of predicates like ‘water.’ For all that has been said, our
judgment that ‘water’ and t-‘water’ differ in extension may be due to our supposing that
Earthlings and Twin Earthlings have different ‘water’-related concepts or beliefs. After
all, many present day Earthlings believe that the stuff they call ‘water’ is composed of
H2O. Given Twin Earth’s similarities with Earth, we should expect that many Twin
Earthlings believe that the stuff they call t-‘water’ is composed of XYZ. Thus, it may be
that the difference in extension is a result of differences in the internal1 mental states of

1

Here I use ‘internal’ where others might use ‘narrow.’ An individual’s narrow mental states are typically
understood to be those mental states that the individual shares with all of her intrinsic duplicates. Some
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Earthling and Twin Earthling speakers, and not simply a result of differences in their
environments, as Putnam wants to claim.
To block the semantic internalist’s preferred explanation of the intuition that
‘water’ and t-‘water’ have different extensions, Putnam asks his readers to imagine both
planets as they were in 1750, prior to the rise of modern chemistry. It may now be
plausibly supposed that the beliefs and concepts that Twin Earthlings associate with t‘water’ are exactly like—if not identical to—the beliefs and concepts that Earthlings
associate with ‘water.’ But even in this case, Putnam contends (and many philosophers
agree) that “the extension of the term ‘water’ was just as much H2O on Earth in 1750 as
in 1950; and the extension of the term [t-]‘water’ was just as much XYZ on Twin Earth in
1750 as in 1950” (ibid. 224).
The pre-chemistry Twin Earth case shows that it is possible for two speakers A
and B to associate the same descriptions or concepts with a kind predicate ‘F’ and yet A
expresses a different intension using ‘F’ than B does.2 It follows that the intensions (and
hence semantic contents) of these predicates are not fixed solely in virtue of the concepts
that speakers associate with them. Something external to the speaker’s mind is needed.
The upshot of Twin Earth, then, is that semantic externalism offers the correct account of
the semantic contents of natural kind predicates like ‘water.’
have noticed that, on this construal, it isn’t clear that an Earthling and her Twin Earth counterpart can have
the same narrow mental states. The problem is that over half of the Twin Earthling’s body is presumably
composed of XYZ molecules, whereas the same proportion of the Earthling’s body is composed of H2O
molecules. If so, the two are not intrinsic duplicates, strictly speaking. Thus, they cannot have the same
narrow mental states. In light of this, I prefer the somewhat less loaded ‘internal mental state.’ This
locution is meant to capture intuitively whatever kind of mental state Putnam intended each Twin Earthling
to share with his or her Earthling counterpart in the 1750 story.
2
Putnam does not himself state the conclusion of the Twin Earth argument in terms of intensions. This
may be because in “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” he is thinking of intensions as “something like an
individual speaker’s concept” (1975b: 245, cf. 216-219). I am not using ‘intension’ in this way. I take
intensions to be functions from worlds to extensions. The intension of a term need not be fixed by
speakers’ concepts. If intensions are thought of as functions from worlds to extensions, then it follows that
if two predicates have different extensions at any single world, they have different intensions.

46

It is worth observing that causal theories of reference such as Boyd’s nicely
explain the intuition that ‘water’ and t-‘water’ have different extensions. On Earth,
speakers have causal contact with H2O but not with XYZ. On Twin Earth, speakers have
causal contact with XYZ but not with H2O. A defender of a causal theory of reference
might argue that the intuition that ‘water’ and t-‘water’ have different extensions is due to
our tacit recognition that some sort of causal acquaintance is necessary for successful
reference.

2.3. Moral Twin Earth.
H&T’s Moral Twin Earth thought experiment draws inspiration from Putnam’s thought
experiment in order to undermine the application of Boyd’s semantics to moral terms.
We have already met Boyd’s causal theory in §1.6.3. Here is H&T’s formulation of this
theory as it applies to moral terms:
CSN Causal semantic naturalism: Each moral term t rigidly designates the natural
property N that uniquely causally regulates the use of t by humans (1990-91:
455).
We should understand CSN to include the claim that each moral predicate, ‘F,’ expresses
the natural property that uniquely causally regulates the use of ‘F’ by humans.3
The Moral Twin Earth thought experiment (MTE) begins with the stipulation that
on Earth “human uses of ‘good’ and ‘right’ are causally regulated by certain functional
properties;4 and that, as a matter of empirical fact, these are consequentialist properties

3

That is to say, if there is a natural property N that uniquely causally regulates the actual use of ‘F,’ then
the intension of ‘F’ is the function that maps each possible world to an extension containing all and only
instances of N at that world.
4
By stipulating that moral properties are functional properties, H&T are following Brink’s suggestion in
his (1984: 121f). There, Brink invokes a functionalist account of moral properties in order to explain the
supervenience of moral properties on physical properties.
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whose functional essence is captured by some specific consequentialist normative theory;
call this theory Tc” (1990-91: 458).5 I find that it makes for easier discussion if we name
one of these consequentialist properties. Let us add to H&T’s stipulations that the
property of maximizing utility causally regulates the use of ‘morally right’ among
Earthling speakers.
Moral Twin Earth is a planet in our galaxy that is as near a duplicate of Earth as
possible save for one difference to be noted shortly. But first, let us highlight an
important similarity between the two planets: like us, Twin Earthlings
…use the terms ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ ‘right’ and wrong’ to evaluate actions, persons,
institutions and so forth…[T]he terms are used to reason about considerations
bearing on Moral Twin Earthling well-being; Moral Twin Earthlings are normally
disposed to act in certain ways corresponding to judgments about what is ‘good’
and ‘right;’ they normally take considerations about what is ‘good’ and ‘right’ to
be especially important, even of overriding importance in most cases, in deciding
what to do, and so on (1990-91: 459).
Despite this similarity, on Moral Twin Earth the use of these terms is causally regulated
by certain functional properties whose essence is captured by a non-consequentialist,
deontological normative theory called ‘Td’. Again, I find it useful to name one of these
properties. Let’s say that the property of treating no one as a mere means causally
regulates the use of ‘morally right’ on Moral Twin Earth. (Hereafter, I use t-‘right’ to
represent uses of ‘morally right’ by Twin Earthlings.) To account for this respect in
which Twin Earthlings differ from Earthlings, H&T stipulate that there are “species-wide
differences in psychological temperament” between Earthlings and Twin Earthlings (ibid.
For more on this, see §2.5.3 below).

5

Recall from Chapter §1.6.1 that SEN proponents suppose that the essence of moral properties will be
captured by theories in first-order normative ethics (see Brink 1989: 177f, 238; 2001: 162; Sturgeon 1985a:
61).
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With this description of the MTE case in hand, H&T present the reader with two
alternative ways to describe the uses of ‘good’ and ‘right’ by Earthlings and Twin
Earthlings. On the first interpretation, “moral and twin-moral terms differ in meaning,
and are not intertranslatable.” On the second interpretation, “moral and twin-moral terms
do not differ in meaning or reference” (1990-91: 460, emphasis in the original).
Although H&T here speak of the sameness of meaning as being what is at issue, I think it
is better to speak of the sameness of semantic content.6 As mentioned in §1.4.2, I take
the semantic content of a predicate to be its intension. The intension of a predicate
determines the contribution the predicate makes to the truth-conditions of sentences in
which it appears. In my view, then, the question before us is whether we should view
Earthling utterances of ‘φ is right’ as having different truth-conditions from Twin
Earthling utterances of ‘φ is [t-]right.’ (Putting things this way commits us to moral
cognitivism. However, since cognitivism is already a commitment of SEN, I see no harm
in assuming it to be true so long as we keep in mind that one possible lesson of MTE is
that the content of moral predicates is [primarily] non-cognitive or of some expressivist
sort.)
H&T contend that the second interpretation is correct: the content of ‘φ is right’
on Earth is the same as the content of ‘φ is [t-]right’ on Twin Earth. If their judgment is
correct—and I think it is—it spells trouble for CSN. Since distinct properties causally
6

One reason to avoid casting the question as one about meaning is that Brink, for one, separates the
meaning of a predicate from the property or intension it expresses. This is apparent in his rejection of “the
semantic test of properties” (Brink 1989: 162, 166). He allows that a natural predicate could express the
same property as a moral predicate even when the two predicates do not have the same meaning. Brink
evidently thinks of the meaning of a predicate as something like a Fregean sense. On such a view, a
predicate’s meaning is roughly a criterion for its application that speakers associate with that predicate. If
this is the way meaning is to be construed, then it is immaterial to the defense of CSN whether ‘right’ has
the same meaning (i.e., associated criterion of application) as t-‘right.’ For this reason, I find it preferable
to pose the present question as being about semantic content rather than meaning.
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regulate the use of ‘right’ and t-‘right,’ CSN entails that utterances of ‘right’ and t-‘right’
express different content. ‘Right’ expresses the property of maximizing utility. T-‘right’
expresses the property of treating no one as a mere means. That these are distinct
properties can be seen when we consider organ harvest cases in which an individual
person is treated as a mere means in order to maximize utility.7 Such actions fall within
the intension of ‘right’ but not within the intension of t-‘right.’ It follows that, if H&T
are correct in judging that ‘right’ and t-‘right’ have the same content, CSN is false.
The defender of CSN may be tempted simply to reject the judgment that ‘right’
and t-‘right’ have the same content. Such a move would commit CSN to a kind of
conceptual relativism whereby ‘right’ and t-‘right’ are incommensurable. The
implausibility of this maneuver is revealed when one considers how things would go if
Earthlings and Twin Earthlings were to meet:
Suppose that Earthlings visit Twin Earth (or vice versa), and both groups come to
realize that different natural properties causally regulate their respective uses of
‘good,’ ‘right,’ and other moral terms. If CSN were true, then recognition of
these differences ought to result in its seeming rather silly, to members of each
group, to engage in intergroup debate about goodness—about whether it conforms
to normative theory Tc or to Td. […] But such intergroup debate in the Moral
Twin Earth story would surely strike both groups not as silly, but as quite
appropriate, because they would regard one another as differing in moral belief
and moral theory, not in meaning (Timmons 1999: 62f).
By contrast, in Putnam’s original Twin Earth scenario (‘PTE,’ hereafter) it is plausible to
suppose that Earthlings and Twin Earthlings who meet would cease debating about the
true chemical composition of “water” as soon as they recognized that different chemical
substances causally regulate the use of ‘water’ and t-‘water.’ One expects that they
would readily acknowledge that their disagreement was merely verbal.

7

The standard organ harvest case involves a surgeon who kills one innocent healthy patient (without his
consent) in order to transplant his organs to five other patients who would otherwise die.
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It would appear, then, that MTE refutes CSN. Since CSN is the semantics that
underwrites SEN, MTE deals a blow to SEN as well. Nor is there much promise in
replacing CSN with an externalist moral semantics that has a different content-fixing
mechanism from Boyd’s. H&T characterize the basic MTE story as providing a “recipe”
for generating arguments against any version of externalist moral semantics that one
might propose. They contend that, for any relation that is proposed as sufficient to fix the
reference (and, presumably, the contents) of moral terms, one of the following will be
true: (a) the relation is insufficient to fix a determinate reference for moral terms; or else
(b) a population of Twin Earthlings can be imagined whose moral terms bear the
proposed reference relation to a different natural property than Earthling moral terms bear
this relation to. In that case, the proposed moral semantics will again result in an
objectionably “chauvinistic” form of relativism.8

2.4. The Attack on the Moral Twin Earth Thought Experiment.
2.4.1. Introduction.
Several philosophers have argued that H&T’s Moral Twin Earth thought experiment is a
“flawed-intuition pump.” This line of argument receives its most sustained articulation in
a jointly authored essay by Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis and Angus Dawson
(LM&D). They claim that the MTE argument provides “no reason at all for rejecting
ethical naturalism” (1999: 135). This is because the MTE thought experiment contains
misleading features that distort readers’ semantic intuitions. To make their case, they
highlight the ways in which MTE differs from PTE:

8

H&T sketch a “generic” form of the MTE argument in their (2000). For a look at MTE in action against
other proposed moral semantics see H&T (1996a; 2000; Forthcoming).
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Like H&T, we will not question the legitimacy of Putnam’s original Twin Earth
thought experiment. Our question is whether H&T’s Moral Twin Earth thought
experiment is as legitimate as the original. The whole point of H&T’s direct
argument is that there is supposed to be an asymmetry between the intuitions
generated by Twin Earth and Moral Twin Earth; this asymmetry is supposed to
argue for the claim that the moral terms aren’t rigid designators.9 For the
argument to work, however, the two thought experiments have to be constructed
in analogous fashion. The problem with the argument is that they aren’t. There
are a number of crucial disanalogies between the two thought experiments, and
it’s these disanalogies that do much of the work in generating the intuitions that
H&T’s arguments rely upon (1999: 155; cf. Geirsson 2003: 118).
Now, I think LM&D vastly overstate the importance of MTE’s connection with Putnam’s
original. The MTE argument would stand just fine on its own even if no one had ever
dreamed up PTE. But even if the connection were important, the MTE argument cannot
be undermined simply by pointing to ways in which the MTE thought experiment differs
from PTE. Those differences ought to be such that there is good reason to think that they
will contribute to the distortion of our intuitions. In the remainder of this chapter, I
consider the three disanalogies between MTE and PTE that LM&D highlight. I argue
that LM&D fail to show that the respects in which MTE differs from PTE exert (or are
likely to exert) a distorting influence on our intuitions. My aim here is to establish only
that the MTE thought experiment is no worse an intuition pump than PTE. I have
nothing to say in defense of the use of these (or any other) thought experiments more
generally.

2.4.2. A preliminary objection.
Before turning to the objections raised by LM&D, I want to deal with a worry about
MTE that David Brink raises. In the version of PTE that establishes semantic

9

Whereas LM&D suggest that what is at stake is whether moral terms are rigid designators, I think the real
issue is whether the contents of moral terms are fixed in accordance with the semantic externalist’s picture.
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externalism (where the story is set in 1750), it is important that the speakers on Twin
Earth associate the very same concept with t-‘water’ that Earthlings associate with
‘water.’ To ensure that they do, Putnam asks us to imagine that the relevant Twin
Earthling speaker in his example (Oscar2) is an exact duplicate of his Earthling
counterpart (Oscar1) with respect to his “appearance, feelings, thoughts, interior
monologue, etc.” (1975b: 224). Since the only relevant difference between Earth and
Putnam’s Twin Earth is the underlying composition of the “watery” stuff, this
supposition can be entertained without much difficulty. But this is not so for MTE. As
Brink observes,
If people have the same commitments to morality on Earth and Moral Twin Earth,
the differing standards will cause each planet’s people to assess people, actions,
and institutions differently; over the long run, this should affect the course of
individual and social histories on Earth and Moral Twin Earth. Though the
members of both planetary pairs—Earth and Twin Earth and Earth and Moral
Twin Earth—are…otherwise indistinguishable, this caveat includes many more
differences in the second pair than in the first. As it seemed important to
Putnam’s original arguments that differences between Earth and Twin Earth be
minimized, the more extensive differences between Earth and Moral Twin Earth
may complicate Timmons and Horgan’s argument (2001: 165n21).
Since the inevitable differences in the behaviors of Earthlings and Moral Twin Earthlings
are undoubtedly due to differences in their internal mental states, it is hard to see how we
can maintain that Moral Twin Earthlings have the very same internal mental states as
their Earthling counterparts. Here then, we are confronted with an obvious and glaring
difference between MTE and PTE. What should we make of this difference?
What Brink’s observation reveals is that MTE could not be used to confirm an
externalist semantics for moral terms. If, contra H&T, we had judged that ‘right’ and t‘right’ express different content, we would not have been free to conclude that the
contents of moral terms are (at least partly) individuated by features of the external
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environment. For we would not have ruled out the possibility that our judging ‘right’ and
t-‘right’ to have different content is due to our taking Earthlings and Twin Earthlings to
associate different concepts or beliefs with their respective predicates.
This should not worry us. Although MTE could not confirm externalist moral
semantics like CSN, it remains an important test that such theories must pass in order to
remain viable. In this respect, it is much like Putnam’s own initial setup of Twin Earth.
Recall that Putnam first warms up his readers with a version of PTE where the relevant
users of ‘water’ and t-‘water’ are our contemporaries (or nearly so). In that example it is
understood that Twin Earthlings have different internal mental states from their Earthling
counterparts. Indeed, one such difference is that, whereas contemporary Earthlings
believe that ‘Water is composed of H2O’ expresses a truth, Twin Earthlings do not
believe this. It is important to recognize that it is not trivial that Putnam’s audience
widely agreed that contemporary Earthlings and Twin Earthlings express different
properties using ‘water’ and t-‘water.’ If readers had judged otherwise, Putnam’s entire
argument would have been stopped dead in its tracks. If we had judged that ‘water’ and
t-‘water’ had the same content in 1950, despite the different concepts and beliefs that
speakers on each planet associate with these terms, there would have been no way that
our intuitions would be reversed by making Earthlings and Twin Earthlings more alike in
their ‘water’-related internal mental states. Nor would there be any grounds to complain
that the differences allowed in the Twin Earthlings’ internal mental states unfairly stack
the deck against an externalist semantics for ‘water.’ If anything, the inclusion of such
differences favors the sort of intuition that externalists hope to elicit. But if this is so with
respect to the 1950 version of PTE, then we must conclude that there are no grounds for
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the complaint that MTE stacks the deck against an externalist semantics for ‘right’ by
allowing (indeed, stipulating) that Moral Twin Earthlings have some internal mental
states that differ from those of their Earthling counterparts.

2.4.3. First objection: competing theories of a kind.
LM&D observe that in PTE the relevant substance that the Twin Earthlings are causally
acquainted with is a fictitious philosophical invention that readers have no familiarity
with. They write that XYZ is a “chemical composition that’s tied to a chemical theory
that no one has ever supposed is true of water” (1999: 156). Although it may be, strictly
speaking, an epistemic possibility for us that water is XYZ, it is not a “live” epistemic
possibility; it is not a possibility that we take seriously in non-skeptical contexts. To
abbreviate this feature of PTE, let’s say that PTE does not involve competing theories of a
kind. In the MTE scenario, by contrast, the properties that causally regulate ‘right’ and t‘right’ do answer to competing theories of a kind. Both consequentialism and deontology
are live epistemic possibilities for us. As LM&D observe, both theories have “strong
advocates in philosophical circles” (ibid.).
LM&D argue that this feature of MTE—the fact that it involves competing
theories of a kind—distorts readers’ intuitions about the case. In particular, it makes it
much more tempting for readers to view the parties on Earth and Twin Earth as
expressing the same property than would be the case if the Twin Earthlings’ moral theory
were something with very little plausibility as the correct theory of our own use of
‘right.’10 If it is to be legitimate, the MTE thought experiment should be purged of this

10

Eric Gample makes the same point in his (1997: 152); see also Merli (2002). Merli argues that, if both
Earthlings and Twin Earthlings separately achieve reflective equilibrium with respect to the question of
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misleading feature. The story should be retold so that the property regulating t-‘right’
does not have its essence specified by a moral theory that is a live epistemic possibility
for us (ibid.).

2.4.4. First reply.
As a matter of fact, I think a compelling MTE thought experiment can be constructed that
does not make use of competing moral theories (see §2.4.5 below). For the moment,
however, I want to argue that it is by no means obvious that MTE’s inclusion of
competing moral theories is grounds for criticism. In fact, it seems to me that LM&D’s
observation poses a greater threat to PTE than it does to MTE. In particular, PTE is
vulnerable to the objection that the externalist intuition gets unfair leverage precisely
because Putnam’s example fails to involve competing theories of the nature of water. To
see why PTE is vulnerable on this front, consider the following complaint that might be
raised by a semantic internalist against Putnam’s original argument for externalism:
Surely, all of Putnam’s readers do in fact associate the property being composed
of H2O molecules with their use of ‘water.’ Indeed, many young children know
that water is composed of something called ‘H2O’ long before they know what
‘H’ and ‘O’ stand for. Being H2O is thus almost certainly part of the concept we
associate with ‘water.’ In the version of Twin Earth that putatively establishes
semantic externalism (the 1750 version) readers are asked to set aside the concept
that they themselves associate with ‘water’ and imagine the concept that a prescientific speaker might associate with it (e.g., “the clear, drinkable liquid in the
rivers and lakes etc.”). We are then asked to make a judgment about what the
extension of ‘water’ is in the example. What must be recognized is that
performing this exercise requires great care. There is always a threat that we will
sneak our own more familiar concept back into the example. In addition, we must
not allow our knowledge that ‘water’ actually refers only to H2O to influence our
which property regulates their use of ‘right,’ and further conversation will not move either from their
normative theory, then “it seems increasingly reasonable to think that moralists and Twin-moralists would
be warranted in interpreting each other as using different terms” (ibid. 228). Nevertheless, since both Tc
and Td are epistemically possible for us, it still (incorrectly) appears to us as if the Earthlings and their
Twins are having a substantive disagreement.

56

judgment about the semantic facts of the imagined Twin Earth case. If we do,
then we are all but guaranteed to judge that the extension of t-‘water’ is different
from the extension of ‘water.’ In such an event, our inability to set aside our own
concept that we associate with ‘water’ would have given the false appearance of
confirmation to semantic externalism.
This complaint shows that it is no virtue of PTE that it avoids the use of competing
theories of water’s composition. Indeed, this very feature threatens the integrity of the
thought experiment. Our own judgment that XYZ is not water may be due to the fact that
we cannot easily suspend our belief that water is in fact nothing but H2O.
The defender of semantic externalism for natural kind terms could allay this
worry by finding another Twin Earth story that involves competing theories of a
(scientific) kind. This story must again yield the intuition that speakers on Twin Earth
refer to a different kind (or express a different property) than Earthlings refer to using an
orthographically identical term. Unfortunately for LM&D, if the externalist is successful
in finding a replacement, then, in addition to having defended PTE, he will have shown
that the use of competing theories of a kind does not give us reason to doubt our
intuitions about Twin Earth cases. In that case, MTE is vindicated. On the other hand, if
the externalist fails to find a suitable replacement for the twin water case, then this would
suggest that Twin Earth thought experiments cannot be used to support semantic
externalism. If so, PTE is a failure. But then, the observation that MTE lacks the very
feature that renders PTE useless is hardly grounds for criticism against MTE.

2.4.5. Second reply.
Above, we saw that LM&D challenge the opponents of SEN to devise a compelling MTE
story that does not make use of competing theories of rightness. I believe this challenge
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can be met. Suppose that on Moral Triplet Earth ‘morally right’ is causally regulated by
a property whose functional essence is specified by the following Nietzsche-inspired
moral theory:11
Tw: Necessarily, for any act, x, x is morally right iff by performing x, the agent
of x expresses her will to power.
As in H&T’s MTE story, we should suppose that Triplet Earthlings are normally
disposed to perform actions they believe to have the “Tw property”12 of expressing will to
power. Moreover, they normally take an act’s expressing will to power as an overriding
reason for the agent to perform it. Let us add that Triplet Earthlings look upon those who
fail to act in accordance with Tw with some sort of negative attitude (e.g., scorn or
disgust). Agents who fail to act in accordance with Tw tend to feel some sort of negative
attitude toward themselves (an attitude like shame, for instance). Importantly, such
reactive attitudes do not generally accompany failures to act in altruistic ways; or, more
precisely, these attitudes do not accompany failures to perform altruistic acts when those
acts do not also express the agent’s will to power.
I submit that Triplet Earthlings can use the predicate ‘morally right’ to engage in
substantive moral disagreement with any Earthlings they might encounter. If we assume
moral cognitivism, it follows that the Triplets’ use of ‘morally right’ expresses the same
property as is expressed by Earthling uses of ‘morally right.’ It does so despite the fact
that the natural property that causally regulates the Triplets’ use of ‘morally right’ is

11

This example is inspired by David Copp’s (1990: 247f). I do not mean to attribute Tw to Nietzsche
himself.
12
That is, the natural property whose functional essence is specified by TW. Throughout this chapter, I also
use ‘Tc property’ and ‘Td property’ to denote the natural properties whose essences are specified by Tc and
Td respectively.
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different from the one that regulates its Earthling uses. If this is correct, then CSN is
again refuted.
Now, if Moral Triplet Earth is to satisfy LM&D’s challenge, then it must also be
true that (a) Tw is not an “epistemically live” theory of moral rightness and that (b) Tw
supplies a potential criterion of moral rightness and not some other kind of rightness (e.g.
prudential, or aesthetic). If (b) were false, then the defender of SEN could allow that
Triplet Earthlings can have a substantive practical disagreement with Earthlings by using
(tr-)‘right’ while denying that this disagreement is over which acts are morally right.
I am satisfied that both (a) and (b) are true. For me at any rate, Tw is not a live
epistemic possibility. It is not among those theories in normative ethics that I can
seriously entertain as true. I suspect this attitude toward Tw is widely shared by
contemporary philosophers. On the other hand, the claim that (b) is true may face greater
resistance. Some may take it to be a minimal requirement of a criterion of morally right
action that the well-being of others is directly relevant to the rightness of any agent’s
act.13 Call a criterion of right action that meets this requirement other-regarding. By Tw,
the well-being of others is never directly relevant to the rightness of an agent’s act.
Hence, Tw is not other-regarding and, so the objection goes, it is not an eligible candidate
for a criterion of morally right action. A further consequence is that Triplet Earthlings
cannot use the term ‘right’ to have a substantive moral disagreement with Earthlings.
Whatever else they are saying about an act when they apply ‘morally right’ to it, Triplet
Earthlings are not ascribing moral rightness to it.

13

Of course, the well-being of others may be indirectly relevant to the moral rightness of actions, given Tw.
For example, there are likely to be situations in which an agent can express her will to power by forming
alliances that benefit others.
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Against an objection of this sort, I offer two observations. First, neither the
Oxford English Dictionary, The American Heritage Dictionary, nor the Merriam-Webster
Dictionary mention anything about other-regarding duties (or altruism) in their
definitions of the adjective ‘moral.’ Second, it is common for moral philosophers to
include ethical egoism on the menu of theories of morally right action (see, for example,
Brandt 1959; Feldman 1978; Kagan 1998; Moore 1903; Ross 1930; Sidgwick 1907; cf.
Foot 1958).14 For an ethical egoist, the welfare of others is not directly relevant to the
rightness of an action. Consequently, we would not expect egoism to be catalogued as a
moral theory by these philosophers if other-regardingness were a requirement for any
admissible theory or criterion of morally right action. I believe these two observations
shift the burden of proof to those philosophers who would deny that Tw expresses a
candidate criterion of moral rightness.

2.5. Isolating Moral Properties.
2.5.1. Second objection.
LM&D note that, given the fact that Moral Twin Earthlings are so similar to Earthlings, it
is likely that the natural properties that regulate Earthling uses of ‘good’ and ‘right’ will
be instantiated on Moral Twin Earth. Likewise, the natural properties that regulate t‘good’ and t-‘right’ on Twin Earth will also be found on Earth (1999: 160). If I
understand them correctly, the following may suffice to establish their point. According
14

Philippa Foot’s comments are especially relevant to the present discussion. In her “Moral Arguments”
she considers various criteria that a proposition must meet in order to be counted as a moral proposition.
She is emphatic that whatever criteria is adopted, it must count Nietzsche’s doctrines as part of the subject
matter of morality: “If a moral system such as Nietzsche’s has been refused recognition as a moral system,
then we have got the criteria wrong…We recognize Nietzsche as a moralist because he tries to justify an
increase in suffering by connecting it with strength as opposed to weakness, and individuality as opposed to
conformity” (1958: 33).
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to the Earthling’s moral theory, Tc, an act is right iff it has the property of maximizing
utility. The same theory entails that an act is wrong iff it has the property of not
maximizing utility.15 Given bivalence, a Tc property (be it maximizing utility or not
maximizing utility) will inevitably be instantiated by every action in the world. It makes
no difference whether that action is performed in a social environment like Twin Earth
where (it might be supposed) the moral agents do not take an active interest in the utility
of their actions. Consequently, all of the Twin Earthlings’ actions will inevitably
instantiate a Tc property. Similar considerations apply, mutatis mutandis, for Earthlings
and Td properties. (I am assuming that, by Td, an act is right iff it has the property of
treating no one as a mere means and wrong iff it has the property of treating someone as
a mere means). The upshot of all this is that any coherently described MTE case will
have to include the presence of Tc properties and Td properties on both planets. By
contrast, according to the PTE story, Earth is entirely devoid of XYZ and Twin Earth is
entirely devoid of H2O. Here, then, we have another disanalogy between MTE and PTE.
According to LM&D, this feature of the MTE story raises trouble. If the Tc
properties are ubiquitous on Twin Earth, and if the persons on Twin Earth really are
psychologically similar to us, then surely they, like us, will take an interest in these
properties just as we do. The problem is this:
[I]f [Earthling] moral properties occur on Moral Twin Earth (and presumably play
much the same roles that they play here), we should expect that the Moral Twin
Earthlings have terms for them. The problem is that these sorts of considerations
are likely to eclipse the facts in the Twin story about what properties “casually
regulate” their use of terms like “good”, “wrong”, and so on. The business about
15

In saying this, I am countenancing negative properties. Not everyone does so. I am uneasy about them
myself. I help myself to negative properties here only because doing so makes it easier to see the basis for
LM&D’s claim that Tc and Td properties exist on both planets. I believe their essential point could be made
without appeal to negative properties. If not, and if negative properties really are indefensible, then so
much the worse for LM&D.
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what causally regulates what is bound to be ignored [by readers], given the
overwhelming likelihood that beings so similar to us would take an interest in
[our] moral properties. Every other property they have lexicalized corresponds
exactly to one we have lexicalized. Why stop short of [our] moral properties?
(LM&D 1999: 160)
There are three key claims being made here: (i) Tc properties (such as maximizing utility)
occurring on Twin Earth play “much the same roles” that they play on Earth, (ii) we
should expect Twin Earthlings to have predicates that express Tc properties, and (iii) the
expectation that Twin Earthlings possess such predicates distorts our understanding of the
MTE scenario in such a way that we are misled into judging that Twin Earthlings really
do express (e.g.) maximizing utility by t-‘right’ when, given the facts of the case, they do
not. It is because of this confusion that we mistakenly judge that ‘right’ and t-‘right’
express the same semantic content and can be used to engage in substantive moral
disagreement.

2.5.2. Reply to (i).
Claim (i) is unwarranted. If we stick to H&T’s version of MTE, then we should not say
that Tc properties play “much the same roles” on Twin Earth as they do on Earth. First, it
is stipulated that Tc properties do not causally regulate Twin Earthlings uses of moral
terms like ‘right,’ ‘wrong,’ and ‘good.’ So that is one respect in which the Tc properties
do not play the same role on Twin Earth. More importantly, the role of Tc properties is
rather different when it comes to the behavior of agents on Twin Earth. Given the MTE
story that H&T tell, it is natural to suppose that, on Earth, an action’s failure to maximize
utility is taken by agents as strong grounds for avoiding it. We should also expect,
furthermore, that when acts that fail to maximize utility are knowingly performed on
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Earth, Earthling observers take a negative moral attitude toward the agent and the act.
However, given H&T’s stipulations, it seems clear that not maximizing utility does not
play this role on Twin Earth. Twin Earthlings do not take an act’s failure to maximize
utility as strong grounds for avoiding it. Nor do they take a negative attitude towards acts
and agents that fail to maximize utility. The property that plays that role on Twin Earth is
the property of treating someone as a mere means. In short, Tc properties and Td
properties do not play “much the same roles” on both planets. Their roles are most
saliently different with respect to the attitudes and behaviors of moral agents.16 (Note the
parallel with PTE: whereas on Earth the kind that plays the “watery” role is H2O and not
XYZ, on Twin Earth the kind that plays the watery role is XYZ and not H2O.)

2.5.3. Reply to (ii).
Claim (ii) is also unwarranted. Indeed, I believe LM&D’s assertion of (ii) is due to an
oversight. To motivate it, they write that given
…the assumption that Moral Twin Earthlings are like their Earthling counterparts
in almost every respect…it’s extremely natural to suppose that they have some
way of referring to all the same sorts of things that we find significant, including
[Earthling] moral properties. But if they have the ability to refer to these
properties—properties that Earthlings take quite an interest in—there would have
to be some special compelling reason to suppose that they did not refer to them
(LM&D 1999: 60).
This claim overlooks the crucial detail that H&T include in the MTE story that prevents
the Twin Earthlings from being exactly like their Earthling counterparts. In order to
explain why different properties causally regulate Twin Earthling moral terms, H&T
16

Of course, it may be that many of the Twin Earthling acts that instantiate Td right-making properties also
instantiate Tc right-making properties. But this should not trick us into taking Tc properties to play the
same role on MTE that Td properties play there. The difference in their roles is revealed when we consider
how Earthlings and Twin Earthlings respectively would behave in either actual or counterfactual cases
where an action instantiates a Tc right-making property but not a Td right-making property (or vice versa).
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stipulate that Earthlings and Twin Earthlings differ somewhat in their psychology. They
offer only a hint as to what this difference might be:
The differences in causal regulation, we may suppose, are due to species-wide
differences in psychological temperament that distinguish Twin Earthlings from
Earthlings. (For instance, perhaps Twin Earthlings tend to experience the
sentiment of guilt more readily and more intensively, and tend to experience
sympathy less readily and less intensively, than do Earthlings) (1990-91: 459).
This stipulation is included precisely to account for the fact that Twin Earthlings fail to
take an interest in the properties that are so important to their Earthling counterparts.
Although the stipulation is not developed in much depth, it seems plausible to suppose
that some sort of psychological difference along these lines could result in Twin
Earthlings taking an interest in different properties found in their natural and social
environment than Earthlings take an interest in.17
Furthermore, a difference of interest along these lines could easily result in each
planet’s population failing to have a predicate that expresses the natural property that the
other planet’s population takes to be of moral importance. To take a less science fictional
example, consider that a significant number of actual Earthlings take a very strong
interest in the property of being kosher. Despite the lengths that some communities go to
in order to consume only kosher animals, we would not be at all surprised to find a
community of Earthling speakers who have no term that is translatable as ‘kosher.’ Nor
would we find their lack of such a term more surprising upon our discovery that they
have daily contact with kosher animals (e.g. bovines and chickens) and unkosher animals
(e.g. pigs and shellfish). But if this is unsurprising in the case of being kosher, it is hard
to see why it should be surprising in cases involving putative right-making natural

17

For a review of psychological research that I believe lends empirical support to this speculation, see
Richard Nisbett and Dov Cohen’s Culture of Honor (1996).
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properties. I conclude that if there is some reason why the stipulated difference in
psychological temperament between Earthlings and Twin Earthlings is not sufficient to
account for the former lacking predicates for Td properties and the latter lacking
predicates for Tc properties, then LM&D need to say what that reason is.

2.5.4. Reply to (iii).
But what if Twin Earthlings did have a predicate that expressed (a Tc property such as)
maximizing utility? This would add yet another feature to the MTE scenario that is not
shared by PTE. For, as LM&D note, in the PTE story it was supposed that XYZ entirely
took the place of H2O on Twin Earth; no H2O was to be found there at all (1999:160).
Because Putnam’s Twin Earthlings had no H2O in their environment, they presumably
had no word to refer to it.
As we saw, LM&D contend that because it must be supposed in the moral case
that Earthlings and Twin Earthlings have predicates that express each other’s putative
right-making properties, readers become confused in such a way that they (incorrectly)
judge that t-‘right’ is used by Twin Earthlings to express the same content that Earthling
uses of ‘right’ express. In particular, readers overlook all the details about the Td
property treating no one as a mere means causally regulating t-‘right’. As a result, they
erroneously suppose that t-‘right’ expresses maximizing utility, just as ‘right’ does. 18 The
intended upshot here is that the judgment that ‘right’ and t-‘right’ share the same content
should not be taken as a reflection of the semantic facts. It is instead a result of readers’
inattentiveness to H&T’s stipulations—where this inattentiveness is abetted by the fact
18

Or perhaps LM&D meant to suggest that readers cannot help but to assume that there is some other
natural property that both Earthlings and Twin-Earthlings express by ‘right,’ a property whose functional
essence is captured neither by Tc nor Td. This hypothesis is addressed Chapter 3.
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that the MTE story tempts readers to suppose that Twin Earthlings possess predicates that
express the same natural properties that causally regulate Earthling moral predicates.
Is there any reason to think that readers are likely to become so hopelessly
confused by the supposition that Twin-Earthlings have predicates that express Earthling
right-making properties (and vice versa)?19 What is needed is another Twin Earth case
against which we can calibrate our intuitions. Since it is taken as established that
semantic externalism is true of chemical kind terms, I suggest that we devise another
chemical kind Twin Earth story that embodies the allegedly suspicious features of the
MTE story. If (contrary to what semantic externalism predicts) we find that we have the
intuition that the target chemical kind term used by speakers on each planet has the same
extension—and thus, their disagreements employing the term are substantive and not
verbal—then we have reason to suppose that the MTE story is a flawed intuition pump.
If, on the other hand, we have a firm intuition that the chemical kind term and its
phonological twin have different extensions, then the differences between the MTE story
and the PTE story that we are currently focused on give us no reason to doubt our
intuitions generated by MTE.
Fortunately, we do not have to look far for a Twin Earth story with which we can
calibrate our intuitions. Putnam had already provided one in “The Meaning of
‘Meaning’.” Just after finishing his discussion of the twin water case, Putnam asks his
readers to consider another Twin Earth where the inhabitants use the substance
molybdenum for all the purposes that we use aluminum for:
19

A more charitable hypothesis about how readers are likely to deal with this supposition is that they will
simply assume that if Twin Earthlings want to refer to Earthling Tc right-making properties, they (the Twin
Earthlings) will simply use a non-moral, natural property name (e.g. ‘maximizing utility’) rather than a
moral term such as ‘rightness.’ This hypothesis does no service for LM&D; and is not addressed in their
paper.
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We will now suppose that molybdenum is as common on Twin Earth as
aluminum is on Earth, and that aluminum is as rare on Twin Earth as
molybdenum is on Earth. In particular, we shall assume that ‘aluminum’ pots and
pans are made of molybdenum on Twin Earth (1975b: 225f).
In this Twin Earth story, Putnam stipulates that molybdenum is indiscernible from
aluminum in its superficial properties. For our purposes, we may also add the stipulation
that, here on Earth, the term ‘aluminum’ is causally regulated by the element with atomic
number 13 (Al) and ‘molybdenum’ is causally regulated by the element with atomic
number 42 (Mo). On Twin Earth, however, ‘aluminum’ is causally regulated by Mo, and
‘molybdenum’ is causally regulated by Al.20 In line with this stipulation, we should
suppose that the vast majority of Twin Earthling uses of ‘aluminum’ are applied to
samples of Mo.
In the twin aluminum story, both Al and Mo are found on both Earth and Twin
Earth. Moreover, speakers on each planet have terms that putatively refer to each of
these kinds. Consequently, the twin aluminum story shares the feature of the MTE story
that allegedly confuses readers. If MTE really is misleading as a result of this feature,
then we should expect that our intuitions about the twin aluminum case will either run
counter to our intuitions in the twin water case or else be held with less confidence. But
this is not what we find. It is obvious that the extension of ‘aluminum’ when spoken by
Twin Earthlings is different from its extension when spoken by Earthlings. Furthermore,
when Earthlings say ‘aluminum is composed of atomic number 13 atoms’ and Twin

20

For his own part, Putnam simply adds the stipulation that on Twin Earth ‘aluminum’ names molybdenum
and ‘molybdenum’ names aluminum. At first sight, it would appear that this stipulation is question
begging, since he uses this case to conclude that ‘aluminum’ and t-‘aluminum’ have different extensions.
However, Putnam’s interest in the aluminum example seems to be as a case where some members of each
linguistic community know the underlying nature of the stuff they call ‘aluminum’ while others do not. If
we needed to, the example could be modified so that no one on either planet knows enough chemistry to
distinguish the two metals. The point presently being made would still stand.
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Earthlings say ‘aluminum is not composed of atomic number 13 atoms,’ it is clear that
their disagreement is merely verbal.
I conclude that LM&D have not shown that our intuitions are distorted by the
feature that the twin aluminum story shares with MTE. If there is something misleading
about MTE, it is not the fact that instances of Tc properties exist on Twin Earth. Nor is it
the fact that Twin Earthlings are likely to have predicates to express such properties. It
follows that there is no need for the opponent of SEN to redescribe the Moral Twin Earth
story so as to purge it of these features.

2.6. Functional and Non-Functional Kinds.
2.6.1. Third objection.
LM&D write, “Another potentially distorting influence on the intuitions about Moral
Twin Earth is the fact that moral properties are assumed to be functional properties. In
contrast, the original Twin Earth thought experiment is framed in terms of non-functional
natural kinds” (1999: 157). As I understand it, a property, P1, is a functional property
when an individual’s instantiating P1 depends upon that individual’s instantiating another
property, P2, that “realizes” a certain causal role in that its environment. One of the
interesting features of a functional property is that its instances may lack any intrinsic
similarities with one another. What unifies these instances as instances of the same
functional property is that they all share an extrinsic feature: they realize the same causal
role. To take an extreme example, when instantiated in the right environments, being a
laser disk and being a filing cabinet both realize a common functional property: being an
information storage device. Nevertheless laser disks and filing cabinets share almost no
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interesting intrinsic similarities. By contrast, I understand a non-functional kind (or
property) to be a kind whose members (or instances) share a certain number of interesting
intrinsic similarities (e.g., they share a similar physical structure and composition).
LM&D contend that our intuitions are less secure in Twin Earth cases involving a
contrast between two (putatively different) functional properties than they are in cases
involving non-functional natural kinds. The primary reason they offer for this insecurity
is that, where functional properties are at issue, it may be unclear whether a functional
predicate expresses a property, P1, or some higher-level functional property, P2, that is
realized by P1 in certain environments. The worry is that, because moral properties are
assumed to be functional properties, readers may be led to suppose that ‘right’ and t‘right’ both express a common higher-level property that is simply realized by different
lower-level properties on each planet. That is, readers mistakenly suppose that there is a
single functional property that is realized by maximizing utility on Earth and realized by
treating no one as a mere means on Twin Earth. This possibility grounds LM&D’s
complaint that “H&T may gain some false leverage against ethical naturalism merely
because at the crucial point in their argument, they compare ethical properties to nonfunctional natural kinds like water” (1999: 159).

2.6.2. Reply.
Let me begin by noting that defenders of SEN are in no position to criticize H&T for
comparing moral properties to non-functional natural kinds like water. Many wellknown defenders of SEN have themselves made this very comparison when defending
their view (Boyd 1988: 196; Brink 1989: 157; 2001: 160; Lycan 1988: 200f; Railton
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1989: 157f; Sturgeon 2003: 534). If there is a difficulty with extending to moral terms
the semantics appropriate for non-functional natural kind terms like ‘water,’ then it is
SEN’s proponents (rather than its detractors) who need to resolve it.
More importantly, however, the PTE argument should be seen as establishing—
rather than presupposing—that being water is a non-functional property. Putnam’s
readers have always had the option of judging that ‘water’ and t-‘water’ both express a
single functional property found both on Earth and Twin Earth. On such a view, the
essence of being water is given by a certain causal role. On Earth, the “watery role” is
played by being H2O. On Twin Earth, the same role is played by being XYZ. We can
thus say that one and the same functional property of being water exists on both Earth
and Twin Earth. The difference between the two planets concerns only the matter of
which lower-level property realizes being water. On Earth being water is realized by
being H2O, while on Twin Earth being water is realized by being XYZ.21 That this
interpretation of the PTE story has always been available shows that the MTE story
cannot be reproached for leaving a similar kind of interpretation available.

2.7. Conclusion.
LM&D along with Brink elucidate four apparent differences between the MTE thought
experiment and the original PTE thought experiment. They claim that the respects in
which MTE differs from PTE exert a distorting influence on our intuitions regarding the
content of ‘right’ and t-‘right.’ I have argued that these differences are benign. If my

21

Indeed, some philosophers actually have endorsed this reading of PTE, or something much like it. See,
for example Zemach (1976) and Mellor (1977). Although they do not use the language of functional
properties, both philosophers maintain that the extension of ‘water’ as used on both planets includes both
H2O and XYZ.
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arguments are successful, then Brink and LM&D have failed to establish that MTE is any
worse a thought experiment than PTE.
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CHAPTER 3
MORAL TWIN EARTH AND HIGHER-LEVEL PROPERTIES
3. Chapter.
3.1. Introduction.
Towards the end of the previous chapter, we saw that LM&D raise the possibility that,
within the MTE scenario, moral rightness is a single “higher-level” functional property
that has distinct realizer properties on Earth and Twin Earth. They cite this possibility in
order to cast doubt upon the clarity of our intuitions generated by MTE. However,
following Eric Kraemer (1990-91), LM&D also entertain the hypothesis that moral
rightness really is a higher-level functional property.1 If true, this hypothesis appears to
supply ethical naturalists with a different kind of answer to H&T’s Moral Twin Earth
argument against SEN.
In this chapter, I continue my defense of H&T’s moral twin earth argument
against SEN. I begin with a preliminary sketch of what I call the “higher-level properties
reply” (HLPR) to MTE. Next, to get a clearer picture of the theoretical machinery upon
which this reply depends, I outline a functionalist theory in the philosophy of mind.
After that, I offer a more detailed statement of the HLPR to MTE. Finally, I argue that,
while the metaethical theory that emerges from the HLPR avoids the chauvinistic
conceptual relativism that results from the standard version of SEN, it is undone by a
different form of relativism.2

1

This reply to MTE is also suggested in Copp (2000), though Copp’s ideas about how the reply should be
spelled out appear to be different from those of Kraemer and LM&D.
2
H&T (2000: 143) make the observation that the HLPR implies a kind of relativism in their reply to
Copp’s (2000).
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3.2. A Prelimary Sketch of the Higher-Level Properties Reply to Moral Twin
Earth.
Let us call the judgment that ‘right’ and t-‘right’ express the same content and can be
used to engage in substantive moral disagreement ‘the MTE intuition.’ What explains
why we have the MTE intuition? One possible explanation is that, as expressivists urge,
we take the primary function of moral predicates to consist in expressing prescriptions, or
speakers’ attitudes, rather than intensions or properties of actions. According to this
expressivist-type view, we should reject the cognitivist assumptions that we have granted
the proponents of SEN. Earthlings and Twin Earthlings are able to have a substantive
disagreement because both ‘right’ and t-‘right’ are used to prescribe or express approval
of actions. An alternative explanation is that, as ethical non-naturalists urge, we take
moral predicates to express non-natural properties that epiphenomenally supervene upon
certain natural properties.3 The non-naturalist can reject the claim that a predicate’s
being causally regulated by a natural property is sufficient (or even necessary) for that
predicate to express that property.4 She would then be free to assert that one (or even
both) of the parties in the MTE scenario are simply mistaken about which actions have
the non-natural property of being right.

3

A non-natural property should be thought of as “epiphenomenal” in the sense that it is neither identical to,
nor constituted by, the properties upon which it supervenes. Of course, this makes it difficult to explain
why it is that non-natural properties co-vary in a law-like way with their subvenient natural properties.
This difficulty gives rise to Mackie’s charge that such properties are “queer” (1977: especially page 41).
Arguably, non-natural properties are also epiphenomenal in the more traditional sense that they are causally
inert (at any rate, their instances are causally inert). It is unclear to me, however, whether ethical nonnaturalists would (or should) accept this latter characterization of moral properties.
It is worth adding that not all who call themselves non-naturalists will agree that moral properties
are epiphenomenal. Shafer-Landau is one example. He agrees with synthetic ethical naturalists that moral
properties are constituted by natural properties (2003: 72-78). Unlike ethical naturalists, however, he
maintains that moral knowledge depends, in part, upon synthetic a priori intuition (ibid. Ch. 11).
4
The non-naturalist would then owe us a different semantics for moral terms. I do not know what that
semantics would look like. My brief comments about non-naturalism here are intended merely to
acknowledge that MTE should not be seen as refuting all forms of moral realism.
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There may be, however, another explanation of the MTE intuition that is
available—an explanation that renders the MTE intuition compatible with CSN. In his
commentary on H&T’s (1990-91), Eric Kraemer recommends the following reply to
MTE:
One might claim that any moral theory that would suffice to capture the
functional essence of a community which used the words ‘good’ and ‘right’ the
way that earthlings do would have, whatever its ideological orientation
(consequentialist or deontological), a functional core that would remain the same
from population to population. Thus, the defender of CSN might claim that there
is some ideology-neutral theory, Tn, which describes the functional essence of the
core of any moral theory. The CSN supporter might suggest that Tc and Td,
though different in many obvious ways, both share Tn as a proper subset (199091: 469; cf. Laurence, Margolis and Dawson 1999:157ff).
Kraemer’s proposal suggests what I call the “higher-level properties reply” (HLPR) to
MTE. In its broadest sketch, the HLPR claims that a moral property like moral rightness
is a multiply realizable functional property; in particular, it is a property whose essence is
specified by an “ideology-neutral” theory).5 On Earth, this functional property is realized
by (but is not identical with) maximizing utility. On Twin Earth it is realized by (but is
not identical with) treating no one as a mere means. Furthermore, we should understand
that it is this “higher-level” functional property—and not the lower-level properties that
realize it—that causally regulates the use of ‘right’ and t-‘right.’6 Thus, both of these

5

As I suggest in §3.4 below, Kraemer’s view seems to be that a theory is ideology neutral to the degree that
its truth is compatible with the truth of a number of different competing first-order normative ethical
theories.
6
I should say something about my use of ‘higher-level property’ and contrast it with the notion of a
second-order (or higher-order) property. I have noticed that some writers use these terms interchangeably.
My use of ‘higher-level property’ corresponds to a picture of reality as divided into levels corresponding
roughly to the various sciences. Some of these levels are “higher” in the sense that the items studied by the
higher-level science supervene on the items studied by the lower-level science. From highest to lowest, it
is common to rank the levels of reality as follows: psychology, biology, chemistry, and physics (this list is
not meant to be exhaustive). With this picture in mind, we can view the higher-level property reply to
MTE as claiming that moral properties are not to be identified with properties belonging to any of these
levels. Instead, moral properties belong to a distinct level of reality that is higher than these others.
I understand a second-order property, roughly, to be a property that quantifies over other
properties. A property is second order just in case it is the property of having a property of some sort. A
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predicates express one and the same property. As a result, Earthlings and Twin
Earthlings can use these predicates to engage in substantive moral disagreement with one
another. In this way CSN is able to accommodate the MTE intuition.
To get a clearer picture of how this reply to MTE is supposed to work, it will be
useful to reflect on functionalist accounts of mental properties.7 In the next section, I
take a brief detour through the philosophy of mind.

3.3. Functionalism about Mental Properties.
As Brink notes, functionalists about mental properties have typically thought that such
properties are individuated by their causal roles:
Mental states are identified and distinguished from other mental states in terms of
the causal relations which they bear to sensory inputs, behavioural outputs, and
other mental states. To take a hoary example, functionalist theories of mind claim
that pain is identified and distinguished from other mental states by virtue of its
tendency result from tissue damage, to produce an injury avoidance desire, and to
issue in appropriate injury avoidance behaviour. The physical states which realise
this functional state are the physical states upon which pain supervenes. (Brink
1984: 121; cf. Boyd 1980: 90; Jackson and Pettit 1988: 384; Shoemaker 1981:
263; Putnam 1967: 438).
Drawing on the example that Brink cites, let’s sketch a toy theory of the mental property
being a pain:
Tp: A token state, x, is a pain iff there is a physical property, P, such that x has P
and there is a tendency for token states that have P (i) to be caused by tissue
damage in the organism in which the state occurs, and (ii) to result in aversive
behavior in that organism.

second-order property need not be of a higher-level than the first-order properties it quantifies over. E.g.,
the property of being a pain may have the second-order property of being disliked by most people.
Nevertheless, both properties belong to the level of psychology.
7
Indeed, Kraemer cites functionalist theories of mental properties as inspiration for his reply to MTE
(1990-91: 469).
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To be sure, Tp is an impoverished theory of pain.8 It is intended for illustrative purposes
only.
Perhaps the most important feature of Tp for the present discussion is that it
allows for pain to be multiply realized. Let me explain. Suppose that, in humans, brain
states with the physical property of being a C-fiber firing tend to be caused by tissue
damage and typically result in aversive behavior. Given Tp, we should say that C-fiber
firings are pains. Next, let’s suppose that there are creatures on Mars of a very complex
sort. Following David Lewis’s famous example,9 let us suppose that, when a Martian
undergoes tissue damage, this tends to cause the inflation of cavities in his feet. In turn,
the inflation of the Martian’s foot cavities tends to result in aversive behavior. For
brevity, let’s use ‘being an FCI’ to denote the property of being a foot cavity inflation.
Given Tp, we should say that FCIs are pains. The property being a pain, then, is multiply
realizable: in humans, it is realized by states with the property being a C-fiber firing; in
Martians, it is realized by states with the property being an FCI. Despite their distinct
realizing properties, Human pains and Martian pains are instances of one and the same
higher-level property: being a pain.
Jackson and Pettit note that a functionalist theory like Tp is open to two readings
(Jackson and Pettit 1988: 384f). Call the first reading of Tp, the “realizer reading.” By
the realizer reading, being a pain is identified with the property that plays the pain role—
the “realizer” property. In our example, being a C-fiber firing and being an FCI are both
8

The most obvious defect that comes to mind is the number of causal input and output conditions. Surely a
plausible account of pain would include far more conditions. Furthermore, the most promising
functionalist accounts of mental states include other mental states among the input and output conditions
(see Lewis 1994). A final defect will be noted and corrected in §3.5. To anticipate: Tp needs to be
modified to take account of the fact that certain lower-level properties may fail to realize being in pain if
they are instantiated in the wrong system or environment.
9
From his “Mad Pain and Martian Pain” (1980).
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realizer properties; both play the pain role. Now, whatever the merits of the realizer
reading, this is not how I understand Tp. In order to be coherent, the realizer reading of
Tp requires acceptance of contingent identity (at least with respect to identities between
mental and physical properties).10 However, it is clear that the principal defenders of
SEN reject contingent identity (Boyd 1980; Brink 1989: 157-159; Sturgeon 1985:
78n30). Moreover, given the semantics espoused by SEN’s proponents, the realizer
reading of Tp would lead us to deny that Martian FCIs are part of the extension of ‘pain.’
Here is why: If being a pain is identical to being a C-fiber firing, then presumably our
use of ‘pain’ is causally regulated by the property of being a C-fiber firing. But if that is
true, then, given Boyd’s semantics, something is in the extension of ‘pain’ at a world just
in case it has the property of being a C-fiber firing. Since FCIs necessarily lack the
property of being a C-fiber firing, we should conclude that FCIs are in neither the
extension nor intension of ‘pain.’ But this is wrong. If we see a Martian writhing on the
floor after undergoing tissue damage and experiencing an FCI, we speak truly when we
utter ‘The Martian is in (or has a) pain.’ This could not be so if FCIs were excluded from
the intension of ‘pain,’ as would be the case given the conjunction of the realizer reading
of Tp and Boyd’s causal-regulation semantics.
For present purposes, then, we should read Tp in the alternative way outlined by
Jackson and Pettit. By the alternative “role reading” of Tp, being a pain is identified with
the second-order property of having a property that plays the pain role. In other words,
10

Here’s why. Assume for reductio that identities between mental and natural properties are not
contingent. Such identities, then, are necessarily true, if true at all. Now assume that being a pain = being
a C-fiber firing. By the necessity of identity, it follows that in all possible worlds, being a pain = being a
C-fiber firing. However, we have also been supposing that pain is multiply realizable. Given the realizer
reading of Tp, this means that there is a possible world, w, in which, being a pain = being an FCI. By the
transitivity of identity, we are forced to conclude that, at w, being an FCI = being a C-fiber firing. But this
is absurd. We have been supposing that these are distinct properties. Thus, if we were to suppose that pain
is identical to its realizer properties, we should take these identities to be contingent.
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something has the property of being a pain just in case it has some other property (e.g.,
being a C-fiber firing, being an FCI, etc.) that plays or realizes the pain role. If we allow
that this second-order property fixes the intension of ‘pain,’ then Martian FCIs fall within
that intension, as they should. For such states instantiate the property of having a
property that plays the pain role, just as human C-fiber firings do. (Importantly, on the
role reading, it is a mistake to identify being a pain with either of its realizer properties.
It is a distinct property.)

3.4. The Higher-Level Properties Reply to MTE.
Although Brink has expressed a willingness to view moral properties as multiply
realizable functional properties (1984: 121; 1989: 157-159), it should be recalled from
§1.6.1 that he and his fellow SEN proponents suppose that the essence of moral rightness
will be specified by a theory in first-order normative ethics. It is this assumption that,
when conjoined with CSN, leads to the conclusion that ‘right’ and t-‘right’ express
different properties. The central insight of the HLPR is that this assumption must be
abandoned. Instead, the defender of SEN should suppose that the essence (and functional
role) of rightness is to be specified by a theory of a more “metaethical” flavor—a theory
that is to a large extent neutral between first-order normative theories (this is what I take
Kraemer to mean when he says the functionalist account of rightness should have an
“ideology-neutral” core). In §3.7 I offer a sketch of the sort of neutral theory that I
believe the HLPR requires. For the moment, I would cite ideal observer theories as
familiar examples of metaethical accounts of rightness that are, in important respects,
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neutral with respect to first-order normative theories.11 Whatever theory is adopted, it
must be such that it is possible for the rightness role to be played (or realized) by
maximizing utility on Earth and played by treating no one as mere means on Twin Earth.
Rightness, however, is not to be identified with either of these realizer properties that play
the rightness role.12 Like being in pain, rightness is to be thought of as the second-order
property (that is of a higher-level than its realizers); it should be thought of as something
like the property of having a property that plays the rightness role.
The HLPR to MTE can now be stated. In their thought experiment, H&T
stipulate that the essences of the properties regulating the use of moral terms will be
specified by theories in first-order normative ethics. Given the revision that Kraemer
proposes for SEN, H&T are no longer entitled to this stipulation: by the new version of
SEN, we expect that a higher-level, ideology-neutral property will causally regulate the
use of moral terms. With this new understanding of what sort of property causally
regulates the use of moral terms, the MTE intuition—the intuition that ‘right’ and t-

11

This requires some comment. First, it is controversial whether ideal observer accounts of moral
properties are realist accounts. The trouble is that they make moral facts stance-dependent: the standard
that fixes the moral facts is made true by the beliefs and attitudes of the ideal observer. If so, then it would
seem that proponents of SEN (who are realists) cannot avail themselves of an ideal observer theory of
moral rightness in pursuit of a HLPR to MTE. Second, there may be some controversy as to whether ideal
observer theories really are (in the required respect) neutral with respect to first-order normative theories.
Indeed, it might be argued that an ideal observer theory is itself a competing theory in first-order normative
ethics. After all, like theories in normative ethics, ideal observer theories supply us with a criterion for
morally right action (e.g.: “An act is morally right iff it would be approved of by an ideal observer”). What
is important for our purposes, however, is that a theory of this sort need not be seen as a competitor to
utilitarian and deontological accounts of right action. For it could turn out, upon investigation, that ideal
observers approve of all and only those acts that maximize utility. In that case, utilitarianism would be true
alongside the ideal observer theory. Similarly, it could turn out that ideal observers approve of all and only
those acts that treat no one as a mere means. In this way, the ideal observer theory is at least prima facie
neutral with respect to (at least some of) the competitors in normative ethics. For illustrations of ideal
observer theories of rightness see Firth (1952) and Smith (1994).
12
Nor should rightness be identified with any other natural property that is treated as right-making by
theories in first-order normative ethics. Note that, in this respect, the functionalist account of rightness
being developed here differs from the moral functionalism of Frank Jackson (1998). Jackson identifies
rightness with its realizer properties. He suggests, for example, that rightness might turn out to be identical
to maximizing expected hedonic value (ibid. 141-143).
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‘right’ have the same content and can be used to engage in substantive moral
disagreement—is rendered compatible with CSN. For all H&T have said (minus the
contested stipulation) it may be that there is a single higher-level property that causally
regulates the use of both ‘right’ and t-‘right.’ If so, then, by CSN, these predicates share
the same semantic content.13 The remaining differences between the Earthlings and the
Twin Earthlings can be accounted for by the hypothesis that this higher-level property is
realized by one natural property on Earth and a different natural property on Twin Earth.
In this way, defenders of SEN can accommodate the MTE intuition without abandoning
their preferred externalist moral semantics embodied in CSN.14
In the next section, I consider some difficulties facing the synthetic ethical
naturalist who adopts the HLPR.

13

Notice that the HLPR cannot work unless it is denied that that the lower-level realizer properties are what
causally regulate the uses of ‘right’ and t-‘right.’ This is worth taking note of, since one might be tempted
to state the HLPR this way: although distinct natural properties causally regulate the use of ‘right’ and t‘right,’ they nevertheless share the same semantic content since the both of properties that regulate these
predicates realize the same, single higher-level property. The problem with this way of putting the HLPR
is that the mere fact that a lower-level property that causally regulates the use of a predicate, ‘F,’ happens to
realize a higher-level property does not, as I understand CSN, make it true ‘F’ expresses the higher-level
property rather than the lower-level property. To see why not, consider the predicate ‘C-fiber firing.’ That
being a C-fiber firing realizes the higher-level property of being a pain does not make it the case that ‘Cfiber firing’ expresses the property of being a pain. For if that were the case, we would speak truly when
we say of a Martian writhing on the floor after undergoing tissue damage, “That Martian is having (or
experiencing) a C-fiber firing.” But this is wrong. For all that has been said, the Martian’s body may not
even contain any C-fibers.
14
Of course, the opponent of SEN might return with a revised MTE case. Here, we might imagine that two
different ideology-neutral, higher-level properties regulate the use of ‘right’ and t-‘right.’ I will leave this
avenue unexplored for three reasons. First, it isn’t obvious to me just how to develop such a case. Second,
even if I did see how to develop it, I believe it would require more space than I can afford here. Third, I
believe that, even if such a case could be spelled out, the judgment that ‘right’ and t-‘right’ express the
same property—despite being causally regulated by distinct ideology-neutral, higher-level properties—
would not be all that compelling.
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3.5. Troubles for the Higher-Level Property Reply: Agent’s-Group Moral
Relativism.
At first glance, the HLPR looks to be a neat solution to the challenge of MTE.
Unfortunately, it comes at a high price for moral realists. Moral realism is typically
intended as a form of moral absolutism. Indeed, Brink himself characterizes moral
realism as an “antirelativist metaethical view” (1989: 26). In light of this, it should come
as an unpleasant surprise—though perhaps it will be obvious to the reader by now—that
the HLPR in defense of CSN carries a commitment to moral relativism.15 Let me
explain.
In my example involving mental properties, I suppressed one important detail.
We should not say, without qualification, that being a C-fiber firing realizes being a pain;
for there may well be C-fiber firings that do not realize pains. This could occur if there
are creatures in which C-fiber firings play an entirely different neurological role than they
play in humans. Suppose that, in octopi, instances of being a C-fiber firing are never
caused by tissue damage and never result in aversive behavior. Instead the C-fiber firings
in octopi tend to be caused by sensing prey and tend to result in hunting behavior. It is
obvious that, in the octopus, being a C-fiber firing does not realize being a pain.16 The
lesson here is that a property realizes the functional role of pain only with respect to
certain “systems” or environments. In this example, the relevant environment would be a
15

In fairness, Kraemer appears to recognize that some form of relativism will result from his proposal,
though his acknowledgement is both indirect and buried in a footnote in the conclusion of his commentary
(safely away from the section of text where the higher-level property proposal is actually presented).
There, he calls David Lewis’s functionalism about mental properties a “relativistic approach.” He does not,
however, explicitly acknowledge that the relativism might carry over to the functionalist account of moral
properties (1990-91: 472n10).
16
It is obvious, at least, given Tp. But note that Tp makes no claim concerning the qualitative feel of pain
states. Philosophers of mind who emphasize the role of qualitative feel in individuating mental properties
may have lingering doubts that the octopus’s C-fiber firings aren’t pains. For them, let me add the
stipulation that octopus C-fiber firings do not have a similar qualitative feel to human C-fiber firings.
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particular brain—or, perhaps more narrowly, a particular region of a particular brain. To
make this explicit, we should revise our toy theory of pain as follows:
Tp2: A token state, x, is a pain iff there is a physical property, P, such that x has P
in a system, S,17 and there is a tendency for token states that have P in S (i) to
be caused by tissue damage in the organism in which the state occurs and (ii)
to result in aversive behavior in that organism.
Similar considerations should extend to the functionalist account of rightness under
discussion here. It is not sufficient to say that an act is right just in case it has whatever
property plays the rightness role. Given the MTE scenario, more than one property plays
the rightness role. What a functionalist account of rightness should say is that an act is
right just in case it has whatever property plays the rightness role in the relevant system
or environment in which the act is performed. Presumably, the systems in question will
be social groups or social environments. Thus, it should be denied that the property of
(e.g.) maximizing utility realizes rightness simpliciter. Rather, it realizes rightness only
in those social environments where maximizing utility plays the rightness role. In the
MTE story, it is plausible to suppose that maximizing utility plays the rightness role on
17

By ‘system’ I mean ‘system-token.’ In this case, a system-token would be a particular individual’s brain
at a time. It should be noted that, by relativizing instances of pain to system (i.e., brain) tokens, Tp2 is
unable to accommodate the phenomenon that Lewis calls “mad pain.” The madman is a human being
whose C-fiber firings have different causes and effects than that of nearly all other humans. For the
madman, C-fiber firings are caused by “moderate exercise on an empty stomach” rather than tissue
damage. Moreover, his C-fiber firings result in him concentrating on mathematics, rather than engaging in
aversive behavior. In Lewis’s view, the madman’s C-fiber firings are pains. This is so despite the fact that
the madman’s C-fiber firings do not play the same sort of causal role that they play in his fellow human
beings. To accommodate Lewis’s judgment that the madman is in pain when he undergoes C-fiber firings,
Tp2 would need to be reformulated. In particular, where Tp2 quantifies over system-tokens, the
reformulated theory should quantify over system-kinds. Something along the following lines might do the
trick:
Tp3: A token state, x, is a pain iff there is a property, P, such that x has P in a system of kind, K,
and there is a tendency for token-physical states that have P in systems of kind K (i) to be caused
by tissue damage in the organism in whom the physical state is realized and (ii) to result in
aversive behavior in that organism.
The madman’s brain, for all its odd wiring, is still a human brain. Since C-fiber firings realize pain in
human brains, the madman’s C-fiber firings constitute pains according to Tp3. (For an argument against
mad pain, see Shoemaker [1981: 267-272].)
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Earth but not on Twin Earth. Likewise, it is plausible to suppose that treating no one as a
mere means plays the rightness role on Twin Earth but not on Earth.
If the functionalist theory of rightness is understood in this fashion, then it carries
a commitment to “agent’s-group moral relativism.” David Lyons describes agent’sgroup moral relativism (hereafter, “agent-relativism”) as the view that “an act is right if,
and only if, it is permitted by the norms of the agent’s group” (1976: 109; cf. Sturgeon
1994: 83).18 It should be clear that, given the functionalist account of rightness, the
answer to the question of which norms apply to a given agent depends upon which
property realizes the rightness role in that agent’s social environment. Because
maximizing utility realizes rightness in the Earthlings’ environment, the moral status of
Earthlings’ actions depends upon consequentialist norms; and because treating no one as
a mere means realizes rightness in the Twin Earthlings’ social environment, the moral
status of Twin Earthlings’ actions depends upon deontological norms.
To illustrate the sort of moral relativism at issue, consider the performance of an
organ harvest on Earth. (Recall that the organ harvest is an act that maximizes utility by
treating someone as a mere means.) Since maximizing utility realizes rightness on Earth,
the Earthling organ harvest is morally right. Suppose, however, that a duplicate organ
harvest is performed on Twin Earth.19 There, rightness is realized by treating no one as a
mere means. Since the Twin Earthling organ harvest lacks this latter property, it is not
morally right. It is immaterial that the act also maximizes utility: maximizing utility does

18

Some may find it desirable to amend Lyon’s formulation of agent-relativism with the further claim that,
as a matter of contingent fact, different social groups have different norms. As it stands, his formulation is
consistent with there being a single set of norms that applies to all moral agents. It is unclear to me
whether we should describe such a scenario as one in which moral relativism prevails.
19
And, moreover, suppose that this duplicate act also maximizes utility. (This stipulation needs to be
added since maximizing utility is an extrinsic property of actions and need not be shared among duplicates.)

83

not realize rightness on Twin Earth. It would seem, then, that a consequence of the
higher-level property reply to MTE is that two actions alike in all salient non-moral
features may nevertheless diverge in their moral status. The moral status of either act
depends largely upon features of the social environment in which it was performed. In
particular, it depends upon those features of the social environment that determine which
natural property plays the rightness role there.20

3.6. “Merely Possible” Relativism.
Although the proponent of the HLPR must allow that a natural property realizes rightness
only relative to a particular social environment, he may deny that this entails a full form
of agent-relativism. As we saw, the relativization clause in the formulation of the
functionalist theory of rightness is needed in order to deal with possible worlds like the

20

Could it simply be denied that the functionalist account of rightness needs to include the sort of
relativization to environments that is needed by the functionalist account of being a pain? I doubt it. Such
a denial would commit us to the claim that a natural property that realizes rightness in one social
environment realizes rightness in all social environments. Thus, an act-token is right iff it has a property
(any property) that plays the rightness role anywhere in the world. In the confines of the MTE story, this
entails that, on either planet, an act is right iff performing it either (a) maximizes utility or (b) treats no one
as a mere means. Because the same disjunctive standard of rightness applies to all moral agents in all
environments, this understanding the functionalist account of rightness avoids agent-relativism.
For those who do not immediately find this strategy implausible, I offer the following as reason to
reject it. Hitherto, I have mentioned only the predicate ‘morally right’ in my examples. However, a full
functionalist account of moral properties will need to say something about the properties expressed by
‘morally wrong’ and ‘morally obligatory.’ I take it that, for the functionalist, an act is wrong (obligatory)
iff it has a property that plays the wrongness (obligation) role. Given the utilitarian morality of Earth, we
should suppose that wrongness is realized by the property of failing to maximize utility. On the other hand,
given the deontological morality of Twin Earth, we should also suppose that wrongness is realized by the
property of treating someone as a mere means. By the strategy under consideration, it seems that we
should say that, in the confines of the MTE story, an act is wrong iff performing it either (a) fails to
maximize utility or (b) treats someone as a mere means. The trouble is, with these disjunctive criteria of
rightness and wrongness, it is possible for one and the same act to be both right and wrong at once. For
example, an act of performing an organ harvest is right because it maximizes utility; but it is also wrong
because it treats someone as a mere means. We are now in the throes of a practical contradiction. To make
matters worse, when combined with an independently plausible deontic principle, the practical
contradiction becomes a logical contradiction. The deontic principle in question is simply that, if an act is
wrong, then it is not right to perform it. From this, it follows that it is right to perform the organ harvest
and it is not right to perform the organ harvest. But that is absurd. The present proposal for avoiding
agent-relativism, then, is incoherent.
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one containing the MTE-scenario. Still, the proponent of the HLPR may insist that, as a
matter of contingent fact, here on Earth in the actual world (where Twin Earth does not
exist) there is one and only one property that realizes rightness. Thus, as a matter of
contingent fact, there is a single standard of moral rightness that applies to all actual
Earthlings. It might be claimed that this is all the absolutivity that a moral realist need
ask for. That there could have been multiple moral standards—or even that there may
actually be other standards on distant planets we will never visit—is no cause for alarm.
The only relativism this realist is bothered by is the intra-planetary and intra-worldly
variety.
It is worth observing that there is really no need for H&T to stipulate that Earth
and Twin Earth are separate planets. That stipulation, I believe, is a mere tip of the hat to
Putnam’s original Twin Earth thought experiment. The MTE story could be easily be
recast using socially isolated groups of Earthlings.21 Consequently, the realist must
assure us that such a scenario is not how things actually are. That is to say, he must
assure us that, although rightness is capable of being realized by different natural
properties in different social groups on Earth, as a matter of fact, among all actual
Earthling social groups, there is only one rightness realizer. Whether or not this
assurance is to be believed will depend upon what the best functionalist account of
rightness turns out to be and whether the empirical evidence shows the rightness role to
be realized by a single property for all Earthling groups.
Given our current evidence, I see little reason for optimism on the part of the
realist. The existence of deep and seemingly irresolvable intercultural disagreement
21

R. M. Hare, for example, offers an Earthbound MTE-type story involving a missionary and cannibals
(Hare 1952: 148ff); and, of course, my example in Chapter 1 (§1.5.4) involving the Benthamanians and
New Immanuelers provides the template for another story of this kind.
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about which acts are morally right has long been cited as evidence that there is no single
standard of rightness that applies to all humans (Mackie 1977: 36ff; Westermarck
1932/1960: Ch. 7). While Brink and others have offered alternative explanations of
moral disagreement that are more acceptable to moral absolutists (Brink 1989: 197-210;
Boyd 1988: 212-214), it cannot be denied that the relativist’s preferred explanations are
dramatically favored once the concession is made that rightness is multiply realizable in
the way that the HLPR requires. Surely, given this concession, the most charitable
explanation for why different cultures behave as if rightness is realized by a different
natural property than the one that we believe realizes it is that, for some of those cultures
anyway, rightness actually is realized by a different property. The alternative
explanation—the one needed by the realist—is far less charitable. It requires us to hold
that all of those cultures who disagree with us are simply mistaken about the moral facts
or relevant non-moral facts. Of course, charity is not the only theoretical virtue to be
considered when weighing competing explanations of persistent moral disagreement.
Still, it seems to me that once we accept the view that rightness is multiply realizable, the
difference in charity between the competing explanations is so dramatic that it shifts the
presumption in favor of the relativist’s explanation (especially for those cases where the
moral disagreement does not obviously result from one party being mistaken about the
non-moral facts).

3.7. Is Agent-Relativism Compatible With Moral Realism?
It seems likely, then, that a proponent of SEN who adopts the HLPR will find himself
committed to (actual) agent-relativism. At any rate, he is certainly committed to agent-
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relativism with respect to hypothetical cases such as the MTE scenario. Although Brink
has characterized moral realism as an anti-relativist view, nothing that has been said so
far shows that realism logically precludes relativism.22 If it does not, then there may be
moral realists who find agent-relativism to be a tolerable price to pay for the HLPR. In
the present section, I argue that there is good reason to believe that the functionalist
account of rightness needed for the HLPR is incompatible with moral realism.23
The reason moral realism is thought to preclude moral relativism is that standard
forms of relativism violate realism’s stance-independence clause. In §1.2.1 we saw that
in order to satisfy the stance-independence condition, it must be the case that the moral
standard that fixes the moral facts is not made true in virtue of its being “ratified” by
some actual or hypothetical appraisers. As Sturgeon’s characterizes it,
…we ought not to count a view as realist unless it holds that these moral truths are
in some interesting sense independent of the subjective indicators—our moral
beliefs and moral feelings, as well as moral conventions constituted by
coordinated individual intentions—that we take as guides to them (1986b: 117; cf.
Boyd 1988: 182; Brink 2001: 154).
It is important to note that the kind of ratification that is relevant here need not be thought
of as a conscious activity of appraisers; their mere tacit acceptance of the relevant
standard suffices to render moral facts dependent on “subjective-indicators” of the sort
that Sturgeon mentions.
For illustration, consider a version of moral relativism that holds that the moral
status of an act depends upon whether or not it is permitted by a code of rules that are

22

For arguments to the effect that moral realism can be reconciled with relativism, see Oddie (1999) and
Sayre-McCord (1991)
23
As far as I can see, the argument of the present section does not depend upon the success of my rebuttal
to the objection raised in §3.6. Here, I argue that whatever functionalist account of rightness the realist
adopts for the HLPR, it will violate the stance independence clause. Such a violation could occur even if,
as a matter of contingent fact, only one property actually realizes rightness.
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accepted or endorsed by the members of a given social group. That a view like this
violates the stance-independence clause can be seen when we consider that the moral
status of the act would have been different had the members of the group accepted or
endorse a different code of rules. The truth of this counterfactual proposition is evidence
that moral facts, as conceived by this version of relativism, are not independent of
subjective indicators, as the stance-independence requirement demands.
The question before us, then, is whether the functionalist account of rightness
needed for HLPR can preserve the stance-independence of facts about which actions are
right. I believe that it cannot. When the functionalist account of rightness is fully spelled
out, it will be seen to entail that moral facts depend upon subjective indicators. If so, the
HLPR is incompatible with moral realism and, hence, cannot be adopted as a means of
defending the SEN brand of realism from the MTE argument. While I cannot attempt to
offer a full functionalist account of rightness here, I hope to say enough to show why it is
doubtful that moral facts would be stance-independent on the sort of account needed for
the HLPR.
Recall from §3.3, that Brink understands a functional property to be individuated
by its causal role. A functional account of rightness, then, will involve a specification of
the causal role that this property plays. As with our toy account of pain, the causal role of
rightness will be articulated by a theory specifying the causal relations that right acts
stand in with respect to certain inputs and outputs. Assuming the sort of realism about
moral properties that SEN proponents favor, let us ask what sorts of things cause and are
caused by morally right actions.24 The most obvious answer, it seems to me, is that moral

24

I expect that many, including some moral realists, will be skeptical of the claim that moral properties
exert a causal influence on anything (e.g. Nagel 1986: 144; Shafer-Landau 2006: 225). Nevertheless all of
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facts cause and are caused by human behaviors, thoughts, and attitudes.25 After all, right
actions are actions; and the standard causal explanations of actions invoke the beliefs,
desires and intentions of those creatures that perform them (Davidson 1963). It stands to
reason, then, that the beliefs, desires and intentions that drive human behavior will figure
in the causal profile of morally right actions. In light of this, we might offer as a causal
input clause the claim that sympathetic or impartial agents tend to prefer the performance
morally right acts to their alternatives.26
For a causal output clause, we will need to cite the sorts of events that result from
morally right actions. Among the most obvious causal consequences of an action’s being
wrong is that, often, impartial observers take a negative attitude toward both the action’s
performance and the agent who performed it. Indeed, the agent herself often takes a
negative moral attitude towards her act (e.g., she feels guilt). In turn these negative
attitudes tend to give rise to behaviors such as the condemning of the act, or the
punishing of the agent. This suggests as an output clause the claim that morally wrong
acts tend to cause observers—at least, those observers who are sympathetic and
impartial—to condemn and take a negative moral attitude toward the act and its agent.

the principal synthetic ethical naturalists affirm the causal efficacy of moral properties. Indeed, if moral
properties do not enter into causal relations, then we have a quick refutation of CSN. For in that case,
moral properties could not be what causally regulate our use of moral terms. Moreover, in light of their
commitment to EC, it is hard to see how they could countenance unreduced moral properties unless those
properties had some sort of causal profile.
A more general worry that some may have is that it simply makes no sense to speak of any
property—moral or non-moral—as having causal powers. Behind such a concern is the thought that
properties are abstract objects and abstract objects cannot enter into causal relations. One way to deal with
this worry is to translate talk about the causal powers of a given property, P, into talk about the causal
powers that concrete individuals have in virtue of instantiating P.
25
Below, I will consider human welfare as another item that stands in a causal relation to right acts.
26
Although he takes it to be an output clause, Frank Jackson acknowledges something like this principle in
his own sketch of a functionalist account of rightness: “The judgment that an act is right is normally
accompanied by at least some desire to perform the act in question…” (1998: 131; Cf. Smith 1994: 39).
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Using these proposed input and output clauses, let us formulate a toy functionalist theory
of moral rightness.
Tn: An act-token x is morally right iff there is a natural property, P, such that x
has P in system S and there is a tendency for (i) act-tokens that have P in S to
be preferred to their alternatives by sympathetic and impartial agents, and (ii)
act-tokens that lack P to elicit condemnation and negative moral attitudes on
the part of impartial observers.
As with the toy account of pain, we are to identify rightness with the property of having a
natural property that plays the rightness role; rightness is not to be identified with the
realizer properties that are quantified over by ‘there is a natural property P’ (e.g. natural
properties like maximizing utility and treating no one as a mere means).
If Tn (or something relevantly like it) were our best higher-level functionalist
account of rightness, then the HLPR implies the falsity of moral realism. The reason for
this is that, by Tn, the standard that fixes the moral facts is itself determined by subjective
indicators (i.e., moral attitudes and beliefs). For example, given Tn, it is plausible to
suppose that the reason rightness is realized by a different property on Twin Earth is that,
unlike Earthlings, Twin Earthlings tend to prefer actions that treat no one as a mere
means and take a negative moral attitude to actions that do treat someone as mere means.
Furthermore, given Tn, if we Earthlings had sufficiently different preferences and moral
attitudes, a different natural property would make our actions right than the one that
currently makes them right. By rendering moral facts dependent upon our attitudes and
preferences in this way, Tn violates the stance-independence requirement for moral
realism. It would appear, then, that moral realists cannot avail themselves of the HLPR
to MTE.27

27

Note that functionalist accounts of rightness that treat the lower-level realizer property as identical with
rightness do not have this problem and are compatible with moral realism. For whether or not (e.g.) an act

90

To save the HLPR, the realist needs a functionalist account of rightness that does
not determine which natural properties realize rightness by appeal to the attitudes that
agents and observers take towards actions with those properties. Conspicuously absent
from my list of things that cause and are caused by right actions is any mention of the
causal impact right action has on human welfare. Perhaps we should look here for a
realist-friendly functional account of rightness. Consider Brink’s own suggestion for the
functional role that moral goodness plays:
[T]he realist might claim that moral properties are those which bear upon the
maintenance and flourishing of human organisms. Maintenance and flourishing
presumably consist in necessary conditions for survival, other needs associated
with basic well-being, wants of various sorts and distinctively human capacities
(1984: 122).
One might turn this into an output clause for an account of rightness by supposing that
when an act is right, it has a natural property, P, and occurs in a social environment, S,
such that there is a tendency for acts with P in S to promote the flourishing of human
organisms. Call this the flourishing condition.
One worry about the flourishing condition is that, on some ways of understanding
it, it threatens to commit us to consequentialism of some form.28 However, in order for
the functionalist account to serve the HLPR, it must be such that a deontological property
(such as treating no one as a mere means) can realize the rightness role. Otherwise, t‘right’ would not count as being causally regulated by the same higher-level property as
‘right.’ In that case, the reply to MTE collapses. The same difficulty will arise for any

maximizes utility does not depend upon the attitudes of observers in a way that violates stanceindependence. Thus, if rightness is identified with maximizing utility, rightness itself (or facts about which
acts are right) counts as stance-independent.
28
Indeed, it looks as though it could force us to accept a normative view according to which an act is
morally right just in case it is permitted by the moral code whose currency in our social environment would
maximize human flourishing.
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other functionalist account that the realist offers insofar as that account fixes rightmaking properties by input and output clauses that embody substantive moral principles.
Of course, there is no harm in including some substantive principles among the
inputs and outputs in our functionalist account, as long as those principles are construed
in a broad enough way that the rightness role could be realized by any number of
potential right-making properties. Surely, even a deontologist could admit that right
actions tend to promote human flourishing (even if not all right acts do so).
Unfortunately, this means that a property’s satisfaction of the substantive input and
output clauses will be (indeed, must be) insufficient to fix a determinate natural property
as the rightness realizer in a given environment. To yield determinate moral facts, the
functionalist account of rightness must be supplemented with ideology-neutral input and
output clauses. It seems to me that such clauses will need to make reference to the
attitudes, beliefs, or behavior of agents within a social environment. I cannot see any
other options. If I am right, then even a functionalist account of rightness that includes
substantive input and output clauses will violate realism’s stance-independence
requirement; it remains true on this sort of account that, if our attitudes (or other
subjective indicators) had been different, a different natural property would have realized
rightness.29

29

Horgan and Timmons themselves recognize in their (2000) that naturalist moral realists confront a
dilemma of the sort described in this section. They write, “The first horn is that the putatively referencefixing relation R might fail to fix determinate reference-relations between moral terms and certain natural
properties because there are too many eligible natural properties that satisfy the constraints imposed by R.
[…] The second horn of the dilemma arises if one grants that the proposed reference-fixing relation R
suffices to pin down some unique class of natural properties as the putative referents of moral terms.” In
that case, the realist’s semantics falls to an MTE counterexample (H&T 2000: 240; cf. 1996a: 32-34).
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It appears, then, that the realist cannot avail himself of the HLPR in order to
defend CSN since the HLPR requires a functionalist account of rightness that is
incompatible with realism.

3.8. Conclusion.
The HLPR is a natural and tempting answer to the challenge that MTE poses to
Boyd’s causal semantics for moral terms (CSN). In this chapter, I hope to have given a
clear picture of what the HLPR is and what its commitments are. In particular, I have
argued that the adoption of the HLPR carries a commitment to agent-relativism. In
addition, I have argued that the HLPR requires a functionalist account of moral properties
that is incompatible with moral realism. Since CSN is of interest to us primarily for its
role in the defense of the naturalist moral realism, the HLPR turns out to be selfdefeating: it preserves CSN at the cost of abandoning moral realism.
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CHAPTER 4
BRINK’S MORAL SEMANTICS
4. Chapter.
4.1. Introduction.
Until now I have been supposing that the theory of content-fixing that underwrites SEN’s
externalist semantics is Boyd’s causal regulation account. As we have seen, this account
is vulnerable to H&T’s Moral Twin Earth argument. H&T contend that the MTE thought
experiment can be used to undermine any externalist moral semantics insofar as that
semantics succeeds in pinning down a determinate (and realist-friendly) semantic content
for moral predicates. They claim that any such theory will lead either to a form of
chauvinistic conceptual relativism, or else to a form of agent (or “standard”) moral
relativism that is in tension with moral realism (H&T 2000: 139-142).
Notwithstanding H&T’s contention, David Brink (2001) has recently advanced a
novel account of content-fixing for moral terms that is promised to avoid the threat of an
MTE counterexample. In the present chapter, I examine Brink’s proposed moral
semantics. I argue that his semantics fails to yield a solution to MTE that is compatible
with naturalist moral realism. In particular, his semantics impales SEN on the horns of a
dilemma. Understood one way, his semantics is incompatible with the stanceindependence of putative moral facts; and thus, it is incompatible with moral realism.
Understood another way, it requires the acceptance of non-natural facts, and so, is
incompatible with ethical naturalism. Because SEN is a form of both moral realism and
ethical naturalism, whatever solution Brink’s moral semantics offers with respect to MTE
is a solution that SEN cannot avail itself of.
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4.2. Brink’s Moral Semantics.
4.2.1. Brink’s Moral Semantics: an initial formulation.
Brink’s account of content-fixing for moral terms is presented in his “Realism,
Naturalism, and Moral Semantics” (2001). One of the main attractions of this account is
that it is supposed to provide the ethical naturalist with an answer to the argument from
chauvinistic conceptual relativism. Although it is a form of semantic externalism,
Brink’s moral semantics re-emphasizes a role for speakers’ intentions with respect to
content-fixing. To illustrate the role of speakers’ intentions with respect to content-fixing
Brink begins with an example involving a non-moral, natural kind term. He maintains
that, when speakers introduce such a term into their lexicon, their referential intentions
determine which feature of our environment they are naming. For example,
…those who introduced the term ‘water’ intended to refer to the structure,
whatever it is, that explains the perceptible and functional features of the
colorless, odorless stuff—found in lakes, rivers, etc.—that is suitable for drinking,
bathing, and supporting life. It is this intention that fixes the reference of ‘water’.
As it turns out, it is the chemical microstructure H2O that answers this explanatory
description (Brink 2001: 172).
Thus, the referent of the kind name ‘water’ is the chemical kind H2O, while, presumably,
the content of the corresponding predicate ‘water’ is the property of being H2O.
(It is important to note that, for Brink, the speakers’ referential intention functions
only to identify the content of ‘water.’ The content of the description embodied in their
‘water’-related referential intention does not itself become the semantic content of
‘water.’ For if it did, then the property expressed by ‘water’ would be something like
being a colorless, odorless stuff found in lakes and rivers that is suitable for drinking,
bathing and supporting life. If this were the content of ‘water,’ then we would have to

95

say that Putnam’s XYZ belongs to the extension of ‘water’; but this is not what Brink
wants to say.)
Turning his attention to moral discourse, Brink writes that
…we need some parallel descriptive specification of the referential intentions of
moral inquirers that would justify us interpreting a community of inquirers as
engaged in moral inquiry…[B]ut it must be a description that is sufficiently
abstract, so that a wide variety of views…might be thought to satisfy this
description. Moreover, what best satisfies this description must be a matter of
substantive moral theory (ibid.).
He ultimately recommends the following descriptive specification of the content-fixing
intentions of moral inquirers:
… we should understand perhaps all moral appraisers, and certainly those who
introduced moral categories and terms, as using those categories and terms with
the intention of picking out those properties of people, actions, and institutions—
whatever those properties are—that play an important role in the interpersonal
justification of people’s characters, their actions, and their institutions (ibid. 174).
If Brink is right, then we should understand speakers on both Earth and Twin Earth as
using ‘right’ (and t-‘right) with the intention of expressing a property (or properties) that
play “an important role in interpersonal justification.” Only under this assumption are we
permitted to view both groups as engaged in moral inquiry and as making moral
judgments when they use their respective predicates. If it were to turn out that Twin
Earthlings use t-‘right’ without the intention of picking out properties that play an
important role in interpersonal justification, then we would have good reason to doubt
after all that t-‘right’ is really translatable as our ‘morally right.’ Consequently, we
would be within our rights to conclude that the resulting conceptual relativism is neither
chauvinistic nor otherwise objectionable.
So far, so good. But if this suggestion is to succeed in steering ethical naturalism
clear of chauvinistic conceptual relativism, then there needs to be some kind of guarantee
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that all speakers who deploy seeming moral terms with this referential intention will
succeed in fixing a common semantic content for those terms. How does Brink’s
semantics guarantee this? Here I quote Brink at length:
Recall that relativism appeared to be a commitment of the theory of direct
reference [i.e., semantic externalism] insofar as this theory was unable to identify
a common meaning and reference about which appraisers from Earth and Moral
Twin Earth held different beliefs. But our account of the shared referential
intention to pick out people, actions, and institutions that are interpersonally
justifiable, in virtue of which the judgments of Earthlings and Moral Twin
Earthlings are both moral judgments, identifies just such a common meaning or
reference about which the two communities have disagreement in belief. Their
disagreement is one about which features of people, actions, and institutions make
them interpersonally justifiable, with Earthlings holding consequentialist views
and Moral Twin Earthlings holding deontological views. Moral realism and the
theory of direct reference [i.e., semantic externalism] then, are compatible, and
there is no reason to see a tension between ethical naturalism and moral realism
(ibid. 174f).
Brink’s explanation of how his semantics avoids chauvinistic relativism goes by
too quickly. In order to see his solution more clearly, we will need to spell out his
proposed semantics with more precision. To keep things simple, my formulation of his
semantics will focus only on the deontic moral predicate ‘right’ as it applies to actions.
For the same reason, I also omit mention of content-borrowing mechanisms that Brink
discusses earlier in his paper.1 Here, then, is one way to understand the externalist moral
semantics that Brink proposes:
BMS*: A predicate, ‘F,’ as used by the members of a linguistic community, C, is
a deontic moral predicate translatable as the English ‘morally right’ and expresses
the natural property N iff:
1. The members of C use ‘F’ with the intention of expressing a unique property
of actions in virtue of which those actions are interpersonally justifiable for
the members of C.

1

Reference to such mechanisms may be unnecessary for our purposes since my formulation concerns itself
with uses of a predicate by an entire linguistic community, as opposed uses by individual speakers.
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2. An action, x, is (in fact) interpersonally justifiable for the members of C iff x
instantiates N.
It is important to avoid confusion about what BMS* implies. The descriptive content of
the referential intention to express a property that makes actions interpersonally
justifiable serves only to fix a natural property as the semantic content of ‘morally right.’
The descriptive content of that intention does not itself serve as the content of ‘morally
right.’ So, for example, if it should turn out that for the members of our community the
property of maximizing utility makes acts interpersonally justifiable, then maximizing
utility is the content and property expressed by our uses of ‘morally right.’ BMS*
should not be understood as expressing the claim that the content of ‘morally right’ is the
property being interpersonally justifiable or the property being permitted by an
interpersonally justifiable standard of action.2

4.2.2. A revised formulation of Brink’s Moral Semantics.
If BMS* is the correct interpretation of Brink’s proposed moral semantics, then he has
not supplied ethical naturalism with an acceptable answer to the problem of chauvinistic
2

Two comments are worth mentioning here. First, this incorrect understanding of BMS* yields an account
of the content of ‘morally right’ that is similar to the one defended by David Copp (1995). Very roughly,
Copp’s view is that ‘morally right’ expresses the property of being permitted by a moral code that is
justified for the action’s circumstance (ibid: 25f). Although Copp prefers to classify his view as a form of
moral realism (ibid: 7, 223), in a recent paper, he acknowledges that, when his account is spelled out in
detail, it does not satisfy the stance-independence requirement for the robust form of realism that we are
interested in here (Copp 2005: 277).
A second point that merits comment is this: although I emphasize that BMS* implies that ‘morally
right’ expresses (something like) the property of maximizing utility rather than (something like) the
property of being interpersonally justifiable, this claim oversimplifies matters. If, as naturalists suggest
(see §1.6.1), we are to view theories in first-order normative ethics as expressing property identities, then it
is likely that we will need to assume that necessary co-extension is sufficient for property identity.
However, given this assumption, it follows that if (e.g.) act-utilitarianism were true, we should probably
conclude further that that maximizing utility is necessarily co-extensive with being interpersonally
justifiable. And in that case, these properties are identical. From this, it follows that, given BMS* and the
present assumptions, ‘morally right’ expresses being interpersonally justifiable after all. As best as I can
tell, whether or not this really is an implication of BMS* (or an implication of the refined BMS that I
present below) does not significantly impact the cogency of the arguments that I marshal against the view
below. Thus, I will largely ignore this matter.
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relativism. Let me explain. Given the description of the MTE scenario, it is natural to
suppose that, for speakers on Earth, the property in virtue of which an act is
interpersonally justifiable is the property of maximizing utility. It is also natural to
suppose that, for speakers on Twin Earth, the property in virtue of which an act is
interpersonally justifiable is the property of treating no one as a mere means. Unless
these assumptions render the MTE story incoherent—and I see no reason to think that
they do—it follows from BMS* that ‘right’ and t-‘right’ express different semantic
content and cannot be used to engage in substantive moral disagreement.
It isn’t difficult to see where BMS* goes wrong. BMS* attributes to moral
speakers the intention to express the natural property that makes actions interpersonally
justifiable for their own community. Moreover, the theory treats interpersonal
justifiability a relation between actions and discrete linguistic communities. Because of
these two features, it is possible that there be one natural property that makes actions
interpersonally justifiable for Earthlings, and thus, serves as the content of ‘right,’ while
another, different natural property makes actions interpersonally justifiable for Twin
Earthlings, and thus, serves as the content of t-‘right.’ In other words, these two features
render BMS* vulnerable to MTE counterexamples.
I do not believe that BMS* represents the moral semantics that Brink means to
advance. However, this mistaken formulation of his view has revealed a crucial—though
unspoken—assumption that underwrites his defense of naturalist moral realism: whatever
natural property makes actions interpersonally justifiable, that property must make
actions interpersonally justifiable for all possible communities of moral agents. A
secondary assumption is that ‘morally right’ (and any other predicate translatable as
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‘morally right’) is used by speakers with the intention of expressing whatever natural
property makes an act interpersonally justifiable for all possible communities of moral
agents.3 It seems to me, then, that the moral semantics Brink means to propose is best
captured by the following formulation:
BMS: A predicate, ‘F,’ as used by the members of a linguistic community, C, is a
deontic moral predicate translatable as the English ‘morally right’ and expresses
the natural property N iff:
1. The members of C use ‘F’ with the intention of expressing a unique property
of actions in virtue of which those actions are interpersonally justifiable for all
possible moral agents.
2. An action, x, is (in fact) interpersonally justifiable for all possible moral
agents iff x instantiates N.
This account of content-fixing for moral predicates appears to solve the problem of
chauvinistic conceptual relativism. If BMS is true, then it is not possible for there to exist
a community of speakers who use a predicate that is both translatable as ‘right’ and that
expresses a natural property distinct from the property expressed by our own use of
‘right.’4
It would seem, then, that Brink has supplied ethical naturalism with a moral
semantics that eludes MTE-type counterexamples. In this respect, BMS represents a
3

These two assumptions constitute very strong claims. I suspect something weaker might do the job for
Brink’s purposes. It might be argued on behalf of ethical naturalism that the more psychologically different
from us that Twin Earthlings are, the less confident we are that t-‘right’ really does express the same
content as ‘right.’ We are troubled only by MTE scenarios in which Twin Earth is populated with moral
agents that fall within the “normal” range of human psychology. Fair enough. As long as it is granted that
the Twin Earthlings described here fall within that range, I am happy to construe the locution ‘all moral
agents’ as short for ‘all moral agents relevantly similar to Earthlings.’ I will, however, leave this
qualification merely implicit in the reformulation of Brink’s moral semantics that I am about to propose.
4
In case this isn’t clear: Suppose that, in fact, an action is interpersonally justifiable for all possible moral
agents iff it instantiates maximizing utility. When BMS is conjoined with this assumption, it follows that
any community of speakers who successfully use a predicate translatable as ‘right’ express maximizing
utility by that predicate. If a community’s use of ‘right’ failed to express maximizing utility, but expressed
some other property instead, that would entail that they do not use ‘right’ with the intention of expressing a
property that makes actions interpersonally justifiable for all possible moral agents. In that case, however,
there is no pressure to view their predicate as translatable with our ‘right.’ Consequently, there is also no
pressure to view their apparent disagreement with us as substantive.
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significant improvement over Boyd’s CSN. In the remainder of this chapter, I will argue
that, whatever its merits as a semantics for ‘morally right,’ BMS is of no use to a sincere
defender of realistic ethical naturalism. Upon closer inspection, it will be seen that BMS
embodies commitments that are incompatible with a metaethics that is at once realist and
naturalist.

4.3. Interpersonal Justification.
Brink makes no secret of the fact that the statement of his moral semantics makes
essential use of a baldly normative term. He writes,
[T]his account of moral semantics in terms of referential intentions to adopt the
point of view of interpersonal justification is fiercely nonreductionist. To
characterize the moral point of view in terms of interpersonal justification is to
characterize it in ineliminably normative terms. This makes it a substantive
question, which I have not addressed here, whether moral terms do refer and, if
so, which properties they pick out (2001: 176).
As we see, Brink acknowledges that, by making the content of moral terms depend upon
substantive normative facts about which properties make for interpersonal justification,
BMS leaves us vulnerable to moral nihilism: If it were to turn out that there is no unique
property that makes actions interpersonally justifiable for all moral agents, then ‘morally
right’ would fail to express any property. In that case, all English sentences of the form
‘φ is morally right’ would be either false, or else lacking a truth-value.
The threat of nihilism from this direction is not trivial. But I want to set it aside
for the moment (we will revisit it below). I am interested in a more subtle threat that
arises for SEN as a result of the content-fixing role that BMS assigns to substantive
normative facts about interpersonal justification. The threat is this: Judgments about
interpersonal justification are themselves the subject of metaethical theorizing. If BMS is
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to be utilized in a defense of ethical naturalism, then the metaethics that underwrites
judgments about interpersonal justification had better be compatible with moral realism
and ethical naturalism itself.5 If it is not compatible, then BMS is in vain; its adoption
would constitute an abandonment of naturalist moral realism, rather than a defense.
In order to evaluate the success of BMS, then, we need to examine what it is for
an action (or for a standard of right-action) to be interpersonally justifiable. About this
matter, Brink offers only a very broad sketch of an account. He writes that, according to
the concept of morality that identifies moral standards with those that are interpersonally
justifiable, “what is distinctive about the moral point of view is that we assess people,
actions, and institutions according to standards that others can and should accept” (2001:
174). If by ‘others’ Brink means ‘all moral agents,’ his words suggest the following
characterization of interpersonal justification:
IJ: An action, x, is interpersonally justifiable iff x is permitted by a standard of
right-action that every moral agent can and should accept.
With this conception of interpersonal justification in hand, I want to argue that ethical
naturalism faces a dilemma when it is supplemented with BMS. To see the dilemma
more clearly, I suggest one terminological adjustment to IJ. Instead of speaking of
standards that agents should accept, I propose that we speak of the standards that agents
have normative reason to accept.6 By making this terminological swap, we can now
avail ourselves of the distinction between internal and external normative reasons.
5

Or, to be more precise: the metaethics that correctly accounts for judgments and facts about interpersonal
justification had better not combine with BMS in a way that undermines either moral realism or ethical
naturalism.
6
I follow John Broome first in treating ‘should’ as roughly synonymous with ‘ought,’ and second in taking
claims about what an agent ought to do as being equivalent—even if not synonymous with—claims about
what an agent has “perfect” reason to do. Perfect (or all-things-considered) reasons differ from “pro-tanto”
(or prima facie) reasons in that it is possible for an agent to have pro-tanto reason to φ even if it is false that
he ought to φ. Such a case can arise when there is a more weighty pro-tanto reason not to φ. See Broome
(2004: 34-42).
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Roughly, an agent has internal reason to perform an action φ just in case φ-ing would
contribute to the satisfaction of her (informed) desires (or other elements in her
“subjective motivational set”).7 By contrast, external reasons obtain independently of
agents’ desires so that an agent can have external reason to φ, even if φ-ing would serve
none of her informed desires. (I understand the distinction between internal and external
reasons to be exhaustive).
In outline, the dilemma facing BMS is this: Suppose that IJ is read in such a way
that judgments about which standard an agent should accept are understood as judgments
about what an agent has internal reason to accept. Two problems ensue. The first is that
it is doubtful that there is a single standard of action that all moral agents have internal
reason to accept. If there is no such standard, then BMS entails moral nihilism. The
second problem is that facts about what internal reasons an agent has are stancedependent. When the internal reasons reading of IJ is combined with BMS, the stancedependence of normative (internal) reasons is transferred to the moral facts themselves.
Thus, the resulting metaethic is incompatible with moral realism.
For the second horn of the dilemma, we suppose that IJ is read in such a way that
judgments about which standard an agent should accept are understood as judgments
about what an agent has external reason to accept. Now, facts about what there is
external reason to do are typically held to be irreducible to facts picked out by a purely
non-moral vocabulary. Thus, the acceptance of such reasons appears to require that we
7

The canonical statement of the distinction between internal and external reasons is Williams (1980). I
will understand ‘desire’ in a broad way so as to include all the elements Williams includes in an agent’s
subjective motivational set. These include “dispositions of evaluation, patters of emotional reaction,
personal loyalties, and various projects…embodying commitments of the agent” (ibid.: 105). It may be
possible to offer a unifying account various phenomena included in a subjective motivational set by appeal
to the notion of “direction of fit.” Whereas belief is a state of mind that aims for its content to fit the world,
elements of an agent’s subjective motivational set (i.e., her desires) are states of mind that aim to get the
world to fit their content.
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expand our ontology. The trouble is, facts about what there is external reason to do fail
to satisfy EC; they play no ineliminable role in our best available a posteriori
explanations. This might lead some to want to opt for a reductive account of external
reasons. But even if a reductive account could be made plausible, it appears that the
resulting version of BMS is once again vulnerable to MTE and the problem of
chauvinistic conceptual relativism.
Since the internal reasons interpretation and external reasons interpretation of IJ
are exhaustive, it turns out that there is no conception of IJ that combines with BMS so as
to solve the problem of chauvinistic conceptual relativism in a way that is consistent with
both moral realism and ethical naturalism. Thus, BMS fails in its task: it is of no use in
defending naturalist moral realism. In the remaining sections, I present the details of this
dilemma, taking each horn in turn.

4.4. First Horn: Internal Reasons.
4.4.1. Internal reasons and the failure to converge.
On standard versions of reasons internalism (the view that all genuine normative reasons
are internal reasons), the desires relevant to an agent’s having a reason to φ are taken to
be those desires that she would have, were she in ideal epistemic circumstances – e.g., in
a condition of full information and correct deliberation (cf. Williams 1980; Smith 1995).
Call the desires that an agent has under such idealized circumstances her ideal desires.
For a reasons internalist, whether an agent has reason to accept a given standard of rightaction depends upon whether her accepting that standard will satisfy her ideal desires.
The trouble for BMS on the internal reasons-reading of IJ, is that it is very unlikely that a
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single standard of right-action serves the ideal desires of every individual moral agent.
For example, a very strong, clever, and unsympathetic agent with Nietzschean tastes
would probably be better served by accepting a standard different from the standard
appropriate for someone with a slower wit and a more delicate physique and sensibility.
In that case, however, there is no standard that all agents have reason to accept. Given IJ,
it follows that no actions are interpersonally justifiable. It follows further that BMS
implies our use of ‘morally right’ expresses no property. We are left with moral nihilism.

4.4.2. Smith’s absolutist conception of internal reasons.
This is too quick, however. Some philosophers reject this relativistic conception of
internal reasons in favor of an absolutist conception. Perhaps the ethical naturalist can
escape the present difficulty by drawing on their work. In this section, I will consider
what the ethical naturalist might gain by adopting the sort of absolutist conception of
internal reasons advanced by Michael Smith.
According to Smith’s conception of an internal reason, an agent counts as being in
ideal epistemic circumstances only when her entire set of desires is “systematically
justified” in the sense that her desire-set is brought to exhibit maximal coherence and
unity. The process of justification among desires that Smith envisions is akin to Rawls’s
description of the method for achieving a reflective equilibrium among one’s beliefs
(1971/1999: 40-46): we begin with our actual stock of desires and then add and subtract
desires until we reach a set of desires that is maximally coherent and unified. Call an
agent fully rational iff her desires are systematically justified, she has no false beliefs,
and she has all relevant true beliefs. Smith’s view is that an agent has an internal reason
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to perform φ in circumstance C “if and only if, if she were fully rational, she would desire
that she φs in C” (1995: 112). Importantly, Smith believes that, under conditions of full
rationality, “all possible rational creatures would desire alike as regards what is to be
done in the various circumstances they might face…” (ibid. 118). If he is right, then his
account allows for a form of absolutism about internal reasons. An implication of this
account is that there will be no variation among possible agents with respect to the matter
of which standard of right-action they have internal reason to accept.8 It would seem,
then, that BMS can evade the threat of moral nihilism if we incorporate an absolutist
version of internal reasons into our reading of IJ.
The trouble with this strategy is that it can be effective only if, in fact, there really
would be a convergence in the desires of all possible fully rational creatures. I do not
share Smith’s optimism that such a convergence is forthcoming. It strikes me as a
genuine possibility that there could be a moral agent whose informed desires achieve
maximal coherence and yet they are different from the desires of other fully rational
moral agents with respect to matters of moral importance. If it is a genuine possibility
that there be one such agent, then I see little reason to deny that it is a genuine possibility
that there could be an entire planet populated with billions of similar agents.9 If this is
possible, then the internalist reading of IJ entails that there is no standard of right action
8

Perhaps I am being too generous towards BMS. Even granting Smith’s absolutist internalist account of
normative reasons, it does not follow that all agents will have normative reason to accept the same moral
standard. This is because Smith’s account still relativizes the reasons an agent has to her circumstances.
(What make it absolutist, nevertheless, is that she has reason to φ only if all ideal agents would agree in
their desire that, given her circumstances, she φs). It is compatible with Smith’s account that, given
differences in the circumstances faced by Earthlings and Twin Earthlings, members of each group
respectively have reason to accept a different standard of right-action.
9
Horgan and Timmons press this point themselves in their own critique of Smith’s theory of reasons
(1996b: 210-211). They note that a defender of Smith’s account must reject such a possibility as
“misdescribed” or, in any case, illusory. For what it’s worth, in a review of Thomas Carson’s The Status of
Morality, Brink raises what is essentially the same objection against Carson’s ideal observer theory of
moral facts that I am raising against Smith here (1986: 146).
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that is interpersonally justifiable for all moral agents. Once again, the internalist theory
of normative reasons conjoins with BMS to entail moral nihilism.

4.4.3. Internal reasons and the stance-dependence of normative facts.
To avoid the present difficulty, the naturalist moral realist must insist that the agents I
have just described are not genuinely possible. A reply along these lines might have
some plausibility if there were a “normative reality” existing independently of the desires
we actually have or would come to have via the method of reflective equilibrium. If
there were a single, independent, normative reality, then the naturalist could argued that,
for every possible agent, contact with this reality constrains and guides the process of
systematically justifying her desires. Because each agent’s process of desire-justification
is guided by a single normative reality, it may be argued further that, insofar as the
process of justification is properly implemented by each agent, it is reasonable to believe
that all agents would converge in their ideal desires. If all of this could be maintained,
then I am ready to grant that there would at least be some grounds for dismissing as
mistaken the intuition that it is possible that there be a fully rational agent whose desires
are importantly different from those of other fully rational agents.
Whatever the merits of the defense just sketched, it is not available to a proponent
of reasons internalism. For Smith, as for other defenders of reasons internalism, there
simply is no antecedently existing normative reality to guide the process of desirejustification undertaken by any given agent. Instead, the facts about what there is
normative reason for an agent to do are constituted by facts about which set of desires she
would have, were she successfully to complete the process of systematic justification
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among her fully informed desires (along with the non-normative facts about which
actions would satisfy those desires). The trouble for the absolutist version of reasons
internalism, then, is that in the absence of an independently existing normative reality, it
is hard to see a reason to accept that it is a necessary truth that all moral agents who
subject their desires to the process of justification that Smith describes end up desiring
exactly alike.
The preceding observations prepare us for the second major problem that arises
for BMS when IJ is given an internalist reading: If, as reasons internalists claim, facts
about what an agent has normative reason to do are themselves partly constituted by facts
about what that agent would desire, were she fully rational, then having a normative
reason must be regarded as a stance-dependent kind of fact. Because of this, reasons
internalism must be classified as a form of constructivist anti-realism about normative
facts. In and of itself, this need not entail constructivism about moral facts, since one
might deny that moral facts are a species of normative facts. However, because,
according to BMS, facts about which natural properties are morally right-making are
determined by facts about which moral standards agents have normative reason to accept,
the stance-dependence of the normative facts spreads to the moral facts themselves. Let
me try to spell out more clearly why this is.
When the internalist reading of IJ is conjoined with BMS, the matter of which
property ‘morally right’ expresses is made dependent upon facts about which standard of
right action all moral agents would desire that they accept, were they fully rational.
Because of this, the standard that rational agents would accept is ipso facto the true firstorder theory of moral rightness. This is because this very standard determines which
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natural property is expressed by ‘morally right’ and thus, which natural property makes
right acts right. For example, given this reading of BMS, the property of maximizing
utility will make right acts right if (and only if) all agents would desire that they accept
act-utilitarianism as their moral standard, were they fully rational; and, as a result, AUh
would be the true theory in the normative ethics of behavior. On the other hand, if all
agents would desire that they accept a form of Kantianism, were they fully rational, then
(something like) the property of treating no one as a mere means would make right acts
right instead; and in that case, CI-2 would be the true theory in the normative ethics of
behavior.
It should be obvious that the internal reasons way of understanding BMS has put
us in a situation in which the moral standard that fixes the facts about which acts are
morally right is made true in virtue of its being ratified from within the perspective of
hypothetical, fully rational agents. In other words, moral facts fail to be stanceindependent on this account.10 Consequently, BMS, when combined with an internal
reasons reading of IJ, cannot be deployed in defense of naturalistic moral realism. Under
the most optimistic assumptions, the most robust metaethic that it can support is an
absolutist version of moral constructivism.

4.5. Second Horn: External Reasons.
4.5.1. BMS, IJ, and external reasons.
In light of the troubles raised in the previous section, it looks like a successful defense of
ethical naturalism using BMS will have to adopt an external reasons interpretation of IJ.
On this interpretation, an act is interpersonally justifiable iff it is permitted by a standard
10

The stance-independence requirement was discussed above, in §1.2.1.
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of right-action that every moral agent has external reason to accept. An agent’s external
reasons, recall, are roughly those normative reasons that an agent has independently of
her desires (be they actual desires or idealized desires).11 Because of this independence,
the version of BMS that incorporates an external reasons interpretation of IJ is not
obviously vulnerable to the charge that it renders moral facts stance-dependent. In this
respect, the reasons externalist version of BMS looks to be compatible with moral
realism.
Unfortunately, by committing BMS to the existence of external reasons, this
interpretation of IJ raises troubles of its own. Note first that the internalist account of
reasons considered in §4.4 is a reductive view: facts about what there is internal
normative reason to do reduce to facts about what agents would desire under actual or
counterfactual circumstances. Provided that desires and modal facts are open to
empirical investigation, facts about what there is internal reason to do are natural facts.12
By contrast, few have claimed that facts about what there is external reason to do are
similarly reducible.13 It seems, then, that a commitment to external reasons requires us to
expand our ontology in a way that a commitment to internal reasons does not. The
worry, however, is that a commitment to irreducible external reasons expands our
11

More precisely, an agent’s external reasons are reasons she has that are not constituted by anyone’s
actual or ideal desires. Strictly speaking, a reasons externalist can allow that some external reasons have a
certain kind of dependence on desires: we may have external reasons to perform actions that would
disappear if we lost certain desires. For instance, it may be that Beth has a reason to see a horror film, but
only if she desires to see a horror film. If she loses her desire to view the film, she loses her reason to view
it as well. Even so, this reason can still be external insofar as it is grounded in an even more fundamental
external reason. For example, it may be that every agent has external reason to fulfill her own desires.
Notice that this latter reason need not be thought of as dependent upon the agent’s desires: we might have
reason to fulfill our desires even if we would not (ideally) desire that we fulfill our desires.
12
I expect that some readers will be unsympathetic to the idea that modal facts are open to empirical
investigation. I cannot address this concern here; nor is there need to address it here. If the modal facts
that underwrite internal reasons cannot be made to fit within an empirical epistemology—either by being
shown to be analytic or else knowable via inference to the best a posteriori explanations—then so much the
worse for ethical naturalists.
13
Nevertheless, in §4.5.3 I consider the prospects for BMS given a reductive view of external reasons.
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ontology beyond what can be discovered by solely empirical means. If so, then external
reasons cannot be accommodated within a naturalistic ontology. In that case, BMS will
have purchased the stance-independence of moral facts at the price of abandoning ethical
naturalism.

4.5.2. Naturalism and external reasons.
Is there anything to the worry that irreducible external reasons cannot be naturalized? I
think there is. Recall the account of natural propertyhood from §1.3.1:
NP: a property, P, is natural just in case a synthetic proposition to the effect that
an individual instantiates P can be known only by way of empirical investigation,
if it can be known at all.
In light of NP, the property of being an external reason is a natural property only if
knowledge that some consideration is an external reason can be acquired and justified
using solely empirical methods (assuming, of course, that any such knowledge can be
attained at all).
How plausible is it that knowledge of external reasons is empirical? I think it is
not very plausible. In the first place, it is obvious that we do not detect external reasons
through direct sensory perception. (To put the same point more carefully: we do not
detect that some considerations [i.e. states of affairs] are external normative reasons
through the use of our five faculties of sense-perception—sight, hearing, touch, taste, and
smell). It may be worth noting a feature of reasons-talk that is apt to cause confusion on
this point. The thing that we often identify as the normative reason to φ often is
something (in particular, a state of affairs) that is empirically knowable. For instance, we
might identify the fact that Carl is drowning as the reason I ought to throw him a life

111

preserver. Here, the fact that Carl is drowning may plausibly be thought of as something
we can observe with our senses.14 But the fact that Carl is drowning is not the sort of fact
that we are concerned with presently. What is at issue, rather, is how we come to
recognize the observed fact that Carl is drowning as a reason to throw the life preserver.
To put it another way: we are interested to discover how we come to know that Carl’s
drowning makes it the case that we (pro-tanto) ought to throw him the life preserver. I
contend that we do not discover this sort of fact by way of sensory perception.
Moreover, because we do not perceive instances of something’s being an external
reason, it should be obvious that we cannot arrive at the judgment that we have reason to
φ by way of enumerative induction from our sensory observations. The only remaining
empirical way of discovering which states of affairs are external reasons, then, is by way
of an inference to the best explanation of our empirical observations (i.e., abduction).15
But what sorts of observable phenomena might external reasons help to explain?
Certainly, such reasons are of no use in explaining phenomena such as planetary motion,
geological processes, the life-cycles of plants and bacteria, the behavior of subatomic
particles, etc.; or, more precisely, external reasons are no part of any plausible
explanation of such phenomena unless those phenomena are themselves caused by the
behavior of intentional agents. (Note that to deny this would be effectively to accept a
teleological view of the natural world.) In fact, I believe that the only sort of phenomena
14

Of course, as with any case of perception, the ability to observe that someone is drowning is theory
laden. In this case the perception presupposes background knowledge of mammals, respiration, mortality,
etc.
15
I have not said anything about a priori conceptual analysis. Some might contend that conceptual analysis
is an empirical way of knowing; and so, it might be thought that I ought to address whether we can come to
know what we have external reason to do by this method. This sort of complaint misses the mark. Our
present question is how we come to know the existence of irreducible external normative reasons. Thus,
the possibility that we could naturalize a certain kind of external reason by conceptually reducing it to some
kind of less problematic phenomena is not relevant here. (I consider the prospects for BMS given a
reductive account of external reasons in §4.5.3 below).
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for which it is even remotely plausible that external reasons play an explanatory role are
the beliefs and intentional actions of agents.
Before considering the prospects of explaining beliefs and actions by appeal to
external reasons, I want to take a moment to point out that this task is of double
importance for the project of naturalizing external reasons. Presently, we are pursuing
the question of whether knowledge of the (putative) external reasons that we have is
empirical knowledge. An affirmative answer is needed if we are to construe external
reasons as natural properties, in accordance with NP. But finding ineliminable work for
external reasons to perform in our best a posteriori explanations is also important for the
naturalist’s project because of his commitment to the ontological criterion EC, presented
in §1.3.2:
EC: posit the existence of an entity (or a kind of entity) if and only if reference to
that (kind of) entity is needed in our best available a posteriori explanations of
observable phenomena.
Unless it can be successfully argued that irreducible external reasons play an ineliminable
role in the best explanation of the beliefs and intentional actions of agents, then, reasons
externalism will fail ethical naturalism twice over.
But are external reasons needed in the best explanations of our beliefs and
intentional actions? To simplify, we can set aside discussion of intentional actions and
focus on whether external reasons are needed to explain certain beliefs we hold—in
particular, whether they are needed to explain those beliefs whose contents are
propositions to the effect that there are external reasons to perform certain actions (call
beliefs of this sort, normative beliefs). The reason I say this is because paradigmatic
cases in which an external reason plausibly forms part of the explanation of an agent’s
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intentional act of φ-ing will be cases in which an agent φed because she believed that she
had external reason to φ (or, what amounts to roughly the same thing, because she
believed that she ought to φ). This is not to insist that there couldn’t be cases in which an
external reason bypasses an agent’s beliefs and by some subconscious process causes her
to intend to φ. But it seems to me that if external reasons are never part of a conscious
process that results in an agent forming an intention to act, it is doubtful that we will find
compelling examples of actions where no better explanation can be found than ones that
posit external reasons operating subconsciously. In addition, we should expect that false
external reasons beliefs can bring about intentional action just as effectively as true
external reasons beliefs. If so, then all we can learn from an agent’s action is that she
believed herself to have a reason; but it does not follow from this that she really did have
a reason.
The present challenge facing the naturalist is to show that external reasons are
part of the best a posteriori explanations of our (or anyone’s) normative beliefs. Above, I
argued that knowledge of external reasons—if any such thing is to be had—does not arise
from direct perception; nor does it arise from inductive inference; nor does it arise by
way of abductive inference from observations of inanimate objects. As we saw, the only
remaining phenomena that might be explained by external reasons are agent’s normative
beliefs (and the actions they give rise to). So perhaps it can be argued that we come to
know the existence of external reasons because we must posit them in order to explain
the normative beliefs of agents. But with this, we have returned to our original question;
we have made no progress.
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I think the conclusion to draw here is that our normative beliefs do not have their
source in any empirical knowledge-gathering processes. On the face of it, this would
seem to decertify external reasons as natural properties or facts in light of NP. But
perhaps this is too quick. Even if our normative beliefs do not have their source in
empirical processes, it may still be the case that they can be epistemically justified using
empirical methods (cf. Devitt 1999: 46). If so, then a non-empirical etiology for
normative beliefs need not be incompatible with the commitments of ethical naturalism.
If our normative beliefs do not have their source in empirical processes, then
where do they come from? Two answers suggest themselves. First, it may be that we
arrive at our normative beliefs by some kind of synthetic, a priori intuition through which
we “grasp” that some considerations are external reasons for acting. Such a process, so
described, is incompatible with naturalism, as it renders external reasons non-natural
according to NP. A more promising answer for the naturalist is that normative beliefs are
innate. As far as I am aware, the only plausible account of innate beliefs that is
compatible with naturalism is an evolutionary account.16 According to an account of this
sort, a disposition to make normative (external reason) judgments arose in our species by
way of natural selection. Presumably, those who press this account must argue that
having a normative sensibility (i.e., a disposition to make normative judgments) enhanced
the reproductive fitness of our ancestors.17

16

Examples of competing hypotheses that are not so compatible with naturalism include the hypothesis that
God implants these beliefs in us and the Platonic hypothesis that we recollect these truths from past lives.
17
Another possibility is that the disposition for normative judgment is a “spandrel,” a mere accidental byproduct of some different trait that was selected for. But notice that if this disposition is a spandrel, then
there isn’t any reason to suppose that real external reasons played a role in shaping its development; and if
that is so, then external reasons are not needed in order to best explain the development of our innate
disposition to make normative judgments and have normative beliefs. Since external reasons aren’t needed
to explain anything else, this fact along with EC implies that naturalists ought to deny their existence.
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I contend that even if normative beliefs are innate, this hypothesis does not bode
well for the claim that external reasons are natural facts. In Chapter 6, I discuss an
evolutionary account of moral judgment in some depth. According to that account,
putative moral facts play no ineliminable role in the best explanation of our making the
sorts of moral judgments that we make. The very same account can also be extended to
offer an explanation of our normative, external reason judgments in general. I refer those
looking for a more detailed discussion of the evolution of normative judgment to that
chapter (see especially, §§6.3.2 - 6.3.4). Here, I will briefly indicate why the
evolutionary account of external reason judgments will not be of any help for naturalists
looking to justify their acceptance of external reasons.
The trouble is that external reasons themselves (if there are any such things) play
no ineliminable role in the most plausible evolutionary account of normative judgment.
Normative beliefs need not be accurate—that is, they need not accurately represent some
putative normative reality populated with external reasons—in order to enhance the
reproductive fitness of creatures that make such judgments. Let me explain. To begin
with, any plausible evolutionary account of normative judgment will have to suppose that
there is a very strong (even if contingent) connection between judging that one has a
reason to φ and being motivated to φ. Without an assumption of this sort, the making of
normative judgments (be they accurate or inaccurate judgments) may not be able to
influence behavior to a great enough extent that it enhances reproductive fitness. Now
consider a human (or at least, a hominid) that is disposed to judge that the fact that
something is her offspring is a strong reason to feed and care for it. It is more plausible
than not that, in the sort of environment in which our ancestors lived, the disposition to
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make this sort of judgment (and to have one’s actions be guided by it) enhanced the
reproductive fitness of the creatures that had it. By contrast, we would expect to find a
lower degree of reproductive fitness for a similar human who instead judges the fact that
something is her offspring to be a reason to ignore it. Notice, however, that we would
expect the first creature to enjoy greater reproductive fitness than the second even if it
were not true that something’s being one’s offspring is a strong reason to feed and care
for it.
The upshot, then, is that a creature’s normative beliefs can influence her to behave
in fitness-enhancing ways even if those beliefs are inaccurate. Because of this, it is hard
to see what ineliminable role external reasons can play in the story of how our ancestors
evolved to have innate normative beliefs.
To conclude, irreducible external reasons cannot be accommodated by ethical
naturalists. In the first place, there is no credible account of our knowledge of such
reasons that is compatible with a commitment to empiricism. Consequently, external
reasons fail to be natural properties given NP. In addition, external reasons explain no
observable phenomena; nor do they even explain the fact that we have beliefs with
external reasons as part of their content. Thus, given the naturalist’s ontological criterion,
EC, naturalists cannot countenance irreducible external reasons. Because of this, the
irreducible external reasons reading of IJ cannot be combined with BMS to yield a
semantics that honors the naturalistic metaphysical commitments of SEN.
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4.5.3. Reductive accounts of external reasons.
What are the prospects for BMS if we incorporate a reductive account of external
reasons? To examine the prospects of a reductivist maneuver, we will need some sample
reductions of normative reasons. Those reductivists who favor a hedonistic version of
rational egoism might be inclined to accept something like the following reductive
account:
(REh) the property of an agent’s having external reason to φ = the property of φ
maximizing its agent’s hedonic utility.
I grant that REh renders external reasons acceptable from the point of view of
metaphysical naturalism. I am also ready to grant that REh satisfies (or could be made to
satisfy) the stance-independence requirement. Consequently, I accept (or at any rate, I do
not deny) that REh could serve as a robustly realist, naturalistic account of normative
reasons.
Although I have several misgivings about reductive accounts along the lines of
REh, I will mention only one. The naturalist who advances REh owes us a semantics of
the predicate ‘has a normative reason.’ If that semantics is a version of descriptivism,
then it will be easy to devise a “Normative Twin Earth” thought experiment that will
reveal that naturalism is now committed to a chauvinistic conceptual relativism about
‘has a normative reason.’ We need to imagine only that Earthlings subscribe to a
hedonistic form of rational egoism while Twin Earthlings subscribe to a perfectionist
form of rational egoism. A similar result arises if it is suggested that we adopt a causal
semantics for normative terms instead. In that case, we could imagine a scenario in
which Earthling uses of ‘has a normative reason’ are causally regulated by the property
maximizing the agent’s hedonic utility, while Twin Earthling uses of ‘has a normative
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reason’ are causally regulated by the property maximizes the degree of perfection of the
agent’s essence. Once again, Boyd’s causal semantics entails chauvinistic conceptual
relativism.
To deal with this difficulty, we might try to mimic Brink’s moral semantics here
and say that the content of ‘has a normative reason’ is fixed in virtue of speakers’ using
this predicate with the intention of picking out a natural property that plays an important
role in personal justification for all possible agents. But here we are again faced with the
worry that there may not be any such property, in which case, normative nihilism results.
Moreover, even if there is such a natural property, we now need a metaethical account of
judgments about personal justification. But this puts us back where we started. Even if
‘personal justification’ successfully denotes a real property, that property could turn out
to be incompatible with metaphysical naturalism, or it may turn out to combine with the
new normative semantics in such a way as to yield constructivism about normative
reasons. In fact, I believe that this semantics for ‘having a normative reason’ faces
exactly the same dilemma faced by BMS. In short, a reductive account of external
reasons does not answer the worries facing BMS; at best, it merely pushes them back
another step.

4.6. Conclusion.
Brink has proposed a moral semantics whereby the content of a predicate such as
‘morally right’ is fixed according to whichever standard of conduct moral agents can and
should accept. This semantics promises to avoid the problem of chauvinistic conceptual
relativism while preserving an account of moral facts and properties that is both realist
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and naturalist. I have argued that Brink’s proposal cannot satisfy all three desiderata at
once. If the reasons we have for accepting a standard of conduct are internal reasons,
then the moral metaphysics that results from Brink’s semantics is at best a form of moral
constructivism and at worst a form of moral nihilism. On the other hand, if the reasons
we have for accepting a standard of conduct are external reasons, ethical naturalism
cannot be sustained. I conclude that Brink’s externalist moral semantics fails to supply
naturalistic moral realism with a satisfactory answer to the problem of chauvinistic
conceptual relativism.
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CHAPTER 5
IS GOODNESS A HOMEOSTATIC PROPERTY CLUSTER?
5. Chapter.
5.1. Introduction.
In Chapter 1, we saw that synthetic ethical naturalists adopt an externalist semantics for
moral predicates in order to respond to a battery of objections to traditional versions of
naturalistic moral realism. The primary benefit of this kind of moral semantics is that it
makes it possible to view naturalistic definitions of moral predicates (and statements of
identity between moral and natural properties) as expressing putative synthetic, a
posteriori necessities. In Chapter 2, I presented Horgan and Timmons’ Moral Twin Earth
argument against moral semantic externalism. There, and in Chapters 3 and 4, I defended
their argument from a number of important replies. If my defense has been successful,
then we appear to be justified in concluding that the MTE argument refutes moral
semantic externalism and SEN along with it.
Suppose, however, that the MTE argument falls short of a total refutation of SEN.
Even in that case, I would insist at the very least that the MTE argument changes the
dialectical situation with respect to SEN. In the past, when confronted with misgivings
about the supposed analyticity of moral identity claims, ethical naturalists have thought it
sufficient simply to note the existence of non-analytic, a posteriori identities and
definitions that are related to natural kinds and natural kind terms that fall within the
purview of the natural sciences. It was presumed that, if it is an a posteriori matter that
being water is identical with being H2O, there is no reason to deny that it is an a
posteriori matter that moral rightness is identical with (e.g.) maximizing hedonic utility. I
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believe that the Moral Twin Earth argument shows that this presumption is mistaken: the
proponents of ethical naturalism need to offer compelling, independent reasons for
thinking that the semantics and epistemology appropriate for natural kinds and natural
kind terms ought to be extended to moral properties and moral predicates.1
In “How to Be a Moral Realist,” Boyd offers a novel account of moral properties
that has the potential to provide some of the independent justification that is needed for a
defense of externalist moral semantics and SEN. He suggests that some moral properties
have the same metaphysical structure as properties that define natural kinds. In
particular, he proposes that moral goodness is constituted by a “homeostatic property
cluster” (HPC). As we will see below, the properties in an HPC are unified by
nomological necessity, not by conceptual necessity. Because of this, if an HPC serves as
a kind’s essence, then the question of which properties belong to that kind’s essence can
be answered only by discovering which properties exhibit the right nomological
connection to the rest of the clustered properties. This, however, is an a posteriori
question, not to be answered by way of a priori conceptual analysis. Thus, Boyd writes:
“If the good is defined by a homeostatic phenomenon the details of which we still do not
entirely know, then it is a paradigm case of a property whose ‘essence’ is given by a
natural [i.e., a posteriori real] rather than a stipulative [i.e., analytic or nominal]
definition” (Boyd 1988: 210). In this way, Boyd’s HPC conception of moral goodness, if
viable, promises an important independent justification for the central semantic and
epistemological claims of SEN.
1

At least one ethical naturalist seems to agree that independent justification is needed. Boyd writes that, if
the naturalistic moral realist is to legitimately make use of the epistemological and semantic claims
characteristic of synthetic ethical naturalism, then there needs to be “good reasons to think that moral terms
must possess natural [i.e. non-analytic, a posteriori] rather than stipulative [i.e., analytic or nominal]
definitions” (1988: 210, cf. 201).
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In this chapter, I argue that Boyd’s hypothesis is false: moral goodness is not an
HPC. In §5.2, I present Boyd’s account of HPC kinds. In §5.3, I present his proposal
that moral goodness is constituted by an HPC (and thus demarcates an HPC kind). In
§5.4, I advance two arguments against this proposal. The first is a moral argument. The
second points to suspicious structural features of THE MORAL GOOD2 that are not shared by
paradigmatic HPC kinds. In §5.5, I offer two further arguments to the effect that
reference to THE MORAL GOOD does not support reliable inductive inference in the way
that it should were it an HPC kind. In §5.6, I anticipate a reply that might be made on
behalf of the HPC conception of moral goodness.

5.2. Boyd’s Homeostatic Property Cluster Kinds
5.2.1. Homeostatic Property Clusters.
Since Mill’s A System of Logic, philosophers have witnessed an intimate connection
between natural kinds, on the one hand, and induction and explanation on the other hand
(Mill 1867: 434; cf. Boyd 1999b: 81; Dupré 1981: 68; Kitcher 1984: 315n; LaPorte 2004:
19; Quine 1969: 126; Russell 1948: 318). Boyd writes: “One of the defining features of
natural kinds generally…is that reference to natural kinds facilitates induction and
explanation with respect to a wide variety of issues” (1999b: 81). Hilary Kornblith adds:
“It is precisely because the world has the causal structure required for the existence of
natural kinds that inductive knowledge is even possible” (1993: 35; cf. Millikan 2000:
15-32).

2

In this chapter, I employ a convention of using small caps for terms referring to kinds and continue to use
italics for terms referring to properties. I have found that treating properties as distinct from the kinds
whose membership they define helps in the exposition of Boyd’s view. Nothing I say in this chapter
depends upon kinds and properties actually being distinct sorts of entities, however.
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Boyd’s HPC account of natural kinds is intended to explain, among other things,
how it is that certain natural kinds ground induction and explanation. The key idea is
that, for many natural kinds, the essence of the kind is constituted by a group of
properties that, although logically independent of one another, are “clustered in nature in
the sense that they co-occur in an important number of cases” (Boyd 1988: 197). The
clustering is the result of a certain nomological relationship among the properties. Boyd
describes this relationship as a “sort of homeostasis.” He offers a disjunctive account of
what is involved in this kind of homeostasis for a family of properties, F:
Either the presence of some of the properties in F tends (under appropriate
conditions) to favor the presence of the others, or there are underlying
mechanisms or processes that tend to maintain the presence of the properties in F,
or both (ibid.).
Two things deserve mention here. First, it is plausible to read the phrase ‘tends to
favor’ as meaning “makes more likely.” Making this substitution naturally raises the
question of just how much more likely need the presence of some of the properties make
the presence of the others in order for there to be a homeostatic clustering of properties.
Would any increase in likelihood, however slight, suffice for a group of properties to
count as homeostatically clustered? Although Boyd does not explicitly set a lower bound
on how much of an increase in likelihood is required for a group of properties to count as
homeostatically clustered, he does make it clear that, where HPC kinds are concerned, the
homeostatic clustering of properties should be “causally important.” This suggests that,
at least with respect to HPC kinds, we should expect that the presence of some properties
in the relevant group raises to a considerable degree the likelihood of the others being
present. (Indeed, if this were not so, then it would be hard to see how HPC kinds could
fulfill their role in facilitating reliable inductive inference.) Of course, even if this is
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accepted, we are still left with a good deal of imprecision in the account of property
homeostasis. Although I cannot attempt to sharpen the account any further, I should note
that this imprecision is relevant to the discussion in §5.6 below.
The second item worthy of mention is this: The passage quoted above suggests
that the mechanisms responsible for the homeostasis among a family of properties should
be thought of as “underlying” in some sense. However, in other writings, Boyd makes it
clear that, in some cases, (some of) the relevant mechanisms responsible for property
homeostasis are external to the individual members of the HPC kind (Boyd 1999b: 79).
With this in mind, I propose that we drop the word ‘underlying’ from Boyd’s account of
property homeostasis.
In light of these considerations, I take the following as my official statement of
Boyd’s account of property homeostasis:
PH: A family of properties, F, is homeostatically clustered if and only if either:
(i) (under appropriate conditions) the presence of some of the properties in
F makes more likely the presence of the other properties in F, or
(ii) there exist mechanisms or processes that make more likely the continued
presence of the properties in F, or
(iii) both i. and ii.
5.2.2. Homeostatic Property Cluster Kinds.
For Boyd, some HPCs constitute the real essences3 of certain natural kinds.4 Call such
kinds ‘HPC kinds.’ In their capacity as essences, HPCs (along with the mechanisms that

3

The real essences of kinds are contrasted with “nominal” essences. Roughly, the nominal essence of a
kind, K, is something like an analytic definition that speakers conventionally associate with the predicate or
kind term that corresponds to K. If a kind has only a nominal definition, then its membership conditions
depend solely upon linguistic conventions and are discoverable by a priori conceptual analysis. By
contrast, the real essence of a kind determines that kind’s membership conditions independently of
linguistic conventions and thus cannot be discovered by mere conceptual analysis (cf. Boyd 1988: 194f;
1999a: 142, 146; Ellis 2001: 32). (Note that Boyd uses ‘real essence’ interchangeably with ‘natural
definition’ and ‘a posteriori definition’.).
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bind them together) supply the membership conditions of HPC kinds. As I understand
Boyd, an individual, x, is a member of an HPC kind K just in case (a) x instantiates the
properties in the HPC that defines K and (b) the co-instantiation of these properties in x is
brought about or maintained (at least in part) by the homeostatic mechanisms definitive
of K (if there are any such mechanisms).5
Homeostatic property cluster kinds are well suited to satisfy the inductive and
explanatory role that is associated with natural kinds. Because the defining properties of
an HPC kind are homeostatically unified, the members of a given HPC kind will exhibit a
significant degree of uniformity. In turn, this uniformity facilitates reliable inductive
inferences and explanations. This sort of uniformity is readily seen, for example, in
biological species. For an individual member of a given species, its manifest properties
flow from underlying mechanisms. Because these mechanisms are shared by every (or

4

In comments on an earlier version of this chapter, an anonymous editor for Ethics recommended a
different reading of Boyd with respect to the relationship between HPCs and the essences of natural kinds.
On this alternative reading, HPCs are not themselves to be identified with the essences of natural kinds.
Instead, the HPC correlated with a natural kind constitutes something like its “operational definition” that
can be used to pick out some other property that is the kind’s genuine a posteriori essence (or “natural
definition”). While there are some passages in Boyd (1988) that prima facie permit this alternative
interpretation, other passages—especially in Boyd’s later writings—strongly favor my preferred
interpretation according to which the HPC just is the essence or natural definition of the relevant natural
kind. For instance, Boyd writes: “I conclude that individual species have (homeostatic property cluster)
essences, so that a form of ‘essentialism’ is true for species…” (1999a: 142); “…there are a number of
scientifically important kinds…, biological species among them, whose natural definitions are very much
like the property-cluster definitions postulated by ordinary-language philosophers except that the unity of
the properties in the defining cluster is mainly causal rather than conceptual” (1999c: 67; cf. 1988: 196);
“Species are defined, according to the HPC conception, by those shared [phenotypic] properties and by the
mechanisms…which sustain their homeostasis” (1999b: 81, emphasis in the original). For additional
passages that favor my interpretation see note 12 below.
5
The notion that natural kinds are defined by clusters of properties can be found in Mill (1867) and Russell
(1948). Russell’s own account strikingly anticipates Boyd’s. Russell writes: “The essence of a natural
kind is that it is a class of objects all of which possess a number of properties that are not known to be
logically interconnected” (1948: 317). His claim that the defining properties are not known to be logically
interconnected suggests that he recognizes that their belonging to the kind’s essence is not a matter of our
linguistic conventions but rather is a matter of a nomological connection. Furthermore, Russell backs away
from the claim that every member of a kind needs to share all of the kind-defining properties. Like Boyd,
he accepts indeterminacy in the extensions of natural kind terms: “Assuming evolution, there must have
been outlying members so aberrant that we should hardly know whether to regard them as part of the
[intension] or not” (ibid., 443).
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nearly every) member of the same species, conspecifics are uniform with respect to very
many manifest properties. As a result of this uniformity, when we observe that all
observed samples of a species exhibit a property G, we can often reliably infer that all
unobserved samples will exhibit G as well. This remains true even when our original
sample is relatively small (Boyd 1999b: 82; Kornblith 1993: 92ff; Russell 1948: 318).
For example, biologists were no doubt able to infer (with a high degree of epistemic
warrant) that all female platypuses are egg layers upon observing only a few specimens
that laid eggs.
Traditionally, the essence of a natural kind is thought of as a property or a
collection of properties whose exemplification by a given individual is both necessary
and sufficient for that individual to count as a member of the kind. This sort of view is
reflected in the claim that necessarily something is a quantity of WATER if and only if it
has the property being H2O, where being H2O is understood to be the essence of WATER.
Boyd relaxes this requirement so that an individual may belong to an HPC kind even if it
fails to instantiate some of the properties in the kind’s HPC essence.6 He writes:
“Imperfect homeostasis is nomologically possible or actual: some thing may display
some but not all of the properties in [the property cluster] F; some but not all of the
relevant underlying homeostatic mechanisms may be present” (1988: 197; 1999a: 143).
As long as the individual instantiates “enough” of the “important” properties in F, where
these properties are unified by “enough” of the relevant mechanisms, it is properly
classified as a member of the kind whose essence is constituted by F and F’s homeostatic

6

Boyd’s HPC conception of natural kind real essences also departs from more traditional views insofar as
it denies that the essences of natural kinds must be (i) “unchanging” and (ii) composed only of properties
that are both “ahistorical” and (iii) intrinsic to the kind’s members (Boyd 1999a: 146f, 153-157; cf. Ellis
2001: 19-23).
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mechanisms. This feature of Boyd’s view allows us to class certain anomalies, such as
mutants, within the species to which they intuitively belong. Moreover, it permits cases
of indeterminacy where there are
…things that display some but not all of the properties in F (and/or in which some
but not all of the relevant homeostatic mechanisms operate) such that no rational
considerations dictate whether or not they are to be classed under [natural kind
term] t, assuming that a dichotomous choice is to be made (1988: 197).
If biological species are to count as HPC kinds, then this relaxed understanding of natural
kind essences must be accepted. Because of the gradual nature of evolution, there are
bound to be cases in which it is indeterminate whether some particular individual is a
member of a given species.7

5.2.3. Two Examples of HPC Kinds.
Boyd offers biological species as paradigmatic examples of HPC kinds. He also suggests
that certain chemical kinds are examples of HPC kinds. To illustrate the HPC conception
of kinds, I will consider an example from each of these domains. Although Boyd is most
emphatic that biological species are HPC kinds, I find it helpful to begin with an example
from the domain of chemistry.
Boyd seems to accept that chemical elements such as GOLD and compounds such
as WATER are natural kinds with real essences that conform to the more traditional (nonHPC) conception of essences: their essences identify fully necessary and sufficient

7

Not only is the possibility of imperfect homeostasis and extensional indeterminacy important for the
plausibility of HPC definitions of biological species, it also plays a role in Boyd’s defense of moral realism.
Some have thought that the existence of actions whose moral status is irresolvable is best explained by the
hypothesis that there are no moral facts (see, e.g., Mackie 1977: 37). Boyd’s HPC account of moral
properties makes an alternative explanation possible. If moral terms designate HPC phenomena, then, as
with species, we should expect instances where it is indeterminate whether or not an individual action or
state of affairs falls within the extension of a given moral term. Thus, not only are such indeterminate cases
not an embarrassment to an HPC conception of moral properties, they are predicted by it (Boyd 1988: 213).
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conditions for membership in these respective kinds. Still, he suggests that other, more
general, chemical classifications may mark HPC kinds. One example of a chemical HPC
kind that Boyd offers is METAL (1999b: 83f). He proposes that the cluster of properties
that define METAL includes (among other properties) conductivity, ductility, malleability,
and the property of having an inverse relationship between conductivity and temperature.
These properties (and others) are regularly co-instantiated in distinct individual quantities
of substance. Boyd does not say what things serve as the homeostatic mechanisms that
unite these properties in samples of METAL. A plausible candidate for such a mechanism
is something like the property of being composed of atoms that donate electrons.8 In
virtue of their homeostatic relationship, the aforementioned collection of properties
satisfies PH and thus constitutes an HPC. Boyd’s suggestion is that this HPC, along with
its homeostatic mechanisms, constitutes the a posteriori real essence of the kind METAL: a
portion of substance is a piece of METAL when and only when it instantiates enough of
these properties (weighted for importance) where their co-instantiation is due (at least in
part) to mechanisms such as (e.g.) being composed of atoms that donate electrons.
Consider next the biological species TIGER. Any individual tiger instantiates
innumerably many common morphological, physiological and behavioral properties.
Among these are properties corresponding to its particular skeletal structure, the
arrangements of its organs, its behavioral dispositions etc. For an individual tiger, its
particular genotype is a plausible candidate for the (most central) underlying mechanism
that causes and sustains the co-instantiation of its (intrinsic) properties. However, when
8

Here and elsewhere I treat the relevant homeostatic mechanisms as properties. I do so in this case because
the mechanism associated with the kind METAL is evidently something that has multiple instances.
Although Boyd is not explicit about what the ontological status of the homeostatic mechanisms is supposed
to be, his own examples are also of things that admit of multiple instantiations. In any case, nothing much
here turns on whether we understand homeostatic mechanisms as properties rather than individuals.

129

we turn our attention to the biological species TIGER itself (as opposed to its individual
members), discerning the defining homeostatic mechanisms is somewhat trickier than it
is for chemical kinds. We might be tempted to suppose that the TIGER genotype is the
sole homeostatic mechanism in the definition of the kind TIGER; but this is not Boyd’s
view. If I understand him correctly, one reason for rejecting such a view is this: without
additional mechanisms, such as “gene exchange between certain populations and
reproductive isolation from others,”9 the properties that define TIGER might fall out of
homeostasis in a relatively short period of time. For instance, if tigers were not
reproductively isolated from other biological species, they might interbreed with them
and bring new genes into the TIGER gene pool. In turn, some of the manifest properties
found in the defining cluster may be quickly lost. For example, tigers might lose their
stripes or their tails if a new dominant gene were to spread throughout their population.
What this illustration shows is that some of the mechanisms responsible for the
homeostatic unity of the properties that define the kind TIGER are extrinsic and external to
individual tigers.10 These mechanisms (both internal and external ones), along with the
morphological, physiological, and behavioral properties that are produced, maintained,
and unified by them, constitute the HPC essence of the kind TIGER (cf. 1999a: 142;
1999b: 81). An individual is a tiger just in case it instantiates enough of these properties

9

Boyd offers these and other examples of homeostatic mechanisms unifying the properties of biological
species in his (1999a: 165; cf. Mayr 1996). I have added italics in keeping with my convention of
italicizing property-referring terms.
10
Of course, given the evolution of biological species, the homeostatic unity of certain property clusters is
bound to be disturbed over a long enough period of time. This implies that the constituents of a biological
kind’s HPC definition change over time. Boyd recognizes and accepts this consequence of his view. He
writes, “…the properties which determine the explanatory definition of a species (and, thus, the conditions
for membership in it) may vary over time (or space), while it continues to have numerically the same
definition” (1999c: 68).
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(weighted for importance) where their co-instantiation is due (at least in part) to the
above-mentioned mechanisms.

5.3. Homeostatic Consequentialism: THE MORAL GOOD as an HPC Kind.
Boyd proposes that THE MORAL GOOD, like METAL and THE TIGER, is an HPC kind. On
this view, the property moral goodness11 is itself constituted by a cluster of properties
that are homeostatically unified.12 The properties that compose goodness correspond to
“things which satisfy important human needs” (Boyd 1988: 203). Here, Boyd gestures
toward what those needs are:
Some of these needs are physical or medical. Others are psychological and social;
these (probably) include the need for love and friendship, the need to engage in
cooperative efforts, the need to exercise control over one’s own life, the need for
intellectual and artistic appreciation and expression, the need for physical
recreation, etc. (ibid.).
Boyd does not say which properties in fact correspond to the satisfactions of these needs.
The following seems like a plausible (though perhaps not exhaustive) list of properties
whose instances are the satisfactions of the human needs Boyd adumbrates above: being
educated, being physically healthy, sharing friendship, sharing love, enjoying leisure,
engaging in physical recreation, engaging in cooperative efforts, creating and
appreciating art, and being autonomous.13 As I understand Boyd, these properties (along

11

From here on, I will typically drop the adjective ‘moral’ from ‘moral goodness’ and ‘the moral good.’
Unless otherwise indicated, ‘goodness’ and ‘the good’ should be taken to refer to moral goodness and THE
MORAL GOOD.
12
As evidence that Boyd means to identify moral goodness with an HPC of the sort that I am about to
introduce, note that Boyd explicitly writes “…the term ‘good’ in its moral uses refers to the homeostatic
cluster property…” (1988: 205). Note also that my reading of Boyd as identifying goodness with an HPC
also accords with the way Nicholas Sturgeon—himself a supporter of the HPC conception of goodness—
understands Boyd. He writes that Boyd thinks of “…moral properties such as intrinsic goodness as
homeostatic clusters of various natural features…” (Sturgeon 2003: 550).
13
It should be clear from this list that I understand the properties that putatively compose goodness to be
properties whose instances satisfy the various human needs (where, for example, instances of being in love
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with certain homeostatic mechanisms to be mentioned shortly) are constitutive of
goodness. They are also constitutive of the essence and definition of THE GOOD. Thus,
we should think of the property being physically healthy as playing a role in the HPC that
defines THE GOOD that is analogous to the role that (e.g.) malleability plays in the HPC
that defines METAL and analogous to the role that (e.g.) being quadrupedal plays in the
HPC that defines THE TIGER. Following Boyd, I will refer to the properties that are
constitutive of goodness as ‘the human goods’ (ibid.).
If the human goods are to constitute an HPC essence, they must be
homeostatically clustered. That is to say, they must satisfy one of the three disjuncts on
the right-hand side of PH. Boyd’s view seems to be that they satisfy the last disjunct of
PH (i.e., the conjunction of clause i and clause ii):
Under a wide variety of (actual and possible) circumstances these human goods
(or rather instances of the satisfaction of them) are homeostatically clustered. In
part they are clustered because these goods themselves are—when present in
balance or moderation—mutually supporting. There are in addition psychological
and social mechanisms which when, and to the extent to which, they are present
contribute to the homeostasis. They probably include cultivated attitudes of
mutual respect, political democracy, egalitarian social relations, various rituals,
customs, and rules of courtesy, ready access to education and information, etc. It
is a complex and difficult question in psychology and social theory just what
these mechanisms are and how they work (1988: 203).
If Boyd is right, then the human goods can be said to constitute an HPC. It is natural to
suppose that this means that something like the following is true: under suitable social
and psychological conditions, whenever an individual person is (e.g.) happy and enjoys
leisure, an education, autonomy, and cooperative efforts, there is an increased likelihood
that that same individual is also physically healthy, engages in physical recreation, shares
satisfy the need for love). One might be tempted to read Boyd as claiming instead that the properties that
compose goodness are instances a broader property, viz., having a need satisfied. I do not think such a
reading could be correct. If it were, then there would be a single property that composes goodness: viz., the
property having a need satisfied. In that case, goodness could not be thought of as a cluster of properties.
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friendship and love, and appreciates art. Boyd, however, is anxious to point out that the
homeostasis between instances of the human goods need not involve their all being
possessed by one and the same individual. He writes: “The properties in homeostasis are
to be thought of as instances of the satisfaction of particular human needs among people
generally, rather than [merely] within the life of a single individual” (1988: 204n). His
idea seems to be that, when the relevant homeostatic mechanisms (e.g., democracy, social
equality, etc.) are in place, there is a causally sustained tendency for the having of some
goods by one or more individuals to bring about or sustain the having of these and other
goods by other individuals as well. For example, under the proper social conditions,
Bob’s engaging in artistic activity and physical recreation (etc.) will bring about, sustain,
or otherwise enhance Carol’s appreciation for art, her education, and her own
engagement in physical recreation (etc.).
Boyd’s central claim is that (something like)14 this HPC and the mechanisms that
unify it define THE MORAL GOOD:
[THE MORAL GOOD]15 is defined by this cluster of goods and the homeostatic
mechanisms which unify them. Actions, policies, character traits, etc. are morally
good to the extent to which they tend to foster the realization of these goods or to
develop and sustain the homeostatic mechanisms upon which their unity depends
(1988: 203).

14

It should be acknowledged that Boyd presents his particular account of the human goods and the
homeostatic mechanisms that unify them as speculation. He is careful to note that the question of exactly
which properties and mechanisms belong to the cluster that defines THE GOOD is a matter for empirical
inquiry. The success of the HPC conception of goodness does not depend upon the correctness of precisely
this list of goods and mechanisms (although Boyd believes that his characterization of the HPC is “close to
the truth” [1988: 202]). With the exception of the argument I offer in §5.5.2, my arguments against Boyd’s
view can be directed against other HPC proposals of goodness with little or no modification.
15
In the original text, Boyd uses ‘moral goodness’ where I use ‘the moral good.’ I have modified this
passage in order to preserve the symmetry between moral HPC kinds and biological and chemical HPC
kinds. Thus, although he writes that moral goodness is defined by the cluster of goods and their
homeostatic mechanisms, I take him to mean that the property moral goodness is constituted by this cluster
and its mechanisms. In turn, the HPC moral goodness defines the kind THE MORAL GOOD.
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Although what Boyd proposes here is a theory of value and not a theory of right action, I
will follow him in calling this account of THE GOOD homeostatic consequentialism.16
If THE GOOD is defined by the cluster of human goods and its homeostatic
mechanisms, then it is natural to suppose that something (e.g. a state of affairs) is good—
i.e., is an instance of goodness—just in case it instantiates the cluster of human goods
(where these goods are unified by the relevant mechanisms). Let’s call this proposal
“HC1”:
HC1: A state of affairs, P, is non-instrumentally17 morally good if and only if P
instantiates the HPC of human goods.
The second sentence in the last passage quoted might be thought to be in tension with
HC1. That sentence suggests that an entity can be good even if it does not itself
instantiate the cluster. All that is needed is that the entity “tends to foster the realization”
of the cluster. This would be a very surprising possibility if THE GOOD were an HPC
kind. After all, we do not say that some policy that tends to foster the realization of
tigerhood (e.g., a policy of breeding tigers or protecting them from hunting) is itself a
tiger (i.e., an instance of tigerhood). Only those entities that instantiate the cluster of
16

Boyd evidently thinks of homeostatic consequentialism proper as a broader moral theory that includes
the present HPC account of goodness as just one component. This larger view would presumably include a
consequentialist account of moral obligation alongside the HPC conception of value. (Boyd discusses his
consequentialist view of right action in greater depth in his [2003b: 24-47].) However, since he does not
offer a distinct name for the theory of value he proposes, it will be convenient for our purposes to use
‘homeostatic consequentialism’ to denote only the HPC theory of value.
17
Just below, I explain why making a distinction between non-instrumental goodness and instrumental
goodness is desirable for the homeostatic consequentialist. Although Boyd does not himself acknowledge
the distinction in his (1988), fellow homeostatic consequentialist Nicholas Sturgeon attributes to Boyd the
view that homeostatic consequentialism is an account of intrinsic goodness (Sturgeon 2003: 550).
However, Sturgeon suggests that the kind of intrinsic goodness he has in mind is not “a property that
depends only on the intrinsic, nonrelational properties of the things that have it” (ibid.). Because intrinsic
goodness is sometimes thought to be just the sort of goodness that a thing has in virtue of its intrinsic, nonrelational properties, I prefer to label the sort of goodness that Sturgeon describes as “non-instrumental.” I
cannot here attempt a precise account of the distinction between instrumental and non-instrumental
goodness. Perhaps a slogan will suffice: “a thing is non-instrumentally good if and only if it is good as an
end, rather than good merely as a means to some other good thing.” For a useful discussion, see Kagan
(1998). (Note, however, that Kagan takes the label ‘intrinsic goodness’ to apply both to non-instrumental
goodness and to the kind of goodness a thing has in virtue of its intrinsic, nonrelational properties.)
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properties that defines the kind TIGER are tigers. For this reason, I think it is best to read
the second sentence in the last quoted passage as describing a phenomenon that is distinct
from moral goodness or THE MORAL GOOD. We might call this phenomenon
“instrumental moral goodness.”18 Roughly, something is instrumentally morally good on
this view just in case it tends to foster the realization of the HPC that defines THE GOOD.
My focus will be on homeostatic consequentialism as an account of non-instrumental
moral goodness.

5.4. The Case against Homeostatic Consequentialism.
5.4.1. Isolated goods.
Although homeostatic consequentialism is presented foremost as a metaethical view, it
has substantive moral implications. Consider the following scenario. There is a hermit,
alone in the woods. Although it is a relatively cool day, the sun peeks out from behind
the clouds and warms the hermit’s back. The hermit finds this sensation pleasurable.
Suppose, however, that this pleasure contributes neither to his nor anyone else’s having
friends. Nor does it contribute to his appreciation of art, his engagement in cooperative
efforts, his sharing love, etc. In short, the hermit’s experience of pleasure causally

18

Here are two additional considerations in support of this exegetical decision: First, as we saw earlier,
Boyd represents himself as claiming that “…the term ‘good’ in its moral uses refers to the homeostatic
cluster property just described…” (1988: 205). This way of representing homeostatic consequentialism is
hard to square with the view that an act is good just in case it “tends to foster” the HPC of human goods.
For if that were Boyd’s view, he should have said that ‘good’ (or better, ‘goodness’) refers to the property
of tending to foster the HPC just described. A second consideration concerns the sorts of items that Boyd
cites as bearers of moral goodness in the passage cited above. The three kinds of items he cites are actions,
policies, and character traits. However, on a standard consequentialist conception of morality, only states
of affairs are taken to be the fundamental bearers of non-instrumental (or intrinsic) value; actions, policies,
and character traits are typically understood to have only instrumental (or extrinsic) value. This gives us
yet more reason to treat the passage cited above as describing instrumental moral goodness, a property that
is distinct from the more fundamental non-instrumental moral goodness.

135

contributes to the realization of very few, if any, of the human goods.19 It follows that the
hermit’s being pleased does not instantiate the HPC that putatively constitutes goodness.
Even if we thought that the property being pleased is itself a human good, the
instantiation of only one property in a cluster is not the same thing as the instantiation of
the cluster itself.20 Because the hermit’s being pleased fails to instantiate the HPC that
putatively constitutes goodness (and, moreover, fails to contribute to the realization of
that HPC), HC1 implies that the hermit’s experience of pleasure is not good. It follows
that the world in which the hermit experiences this particular episode of pleasure is no
better than a world that is otherwise identical except that the hermit does not experience
this pleasure. This consequence of HC1 is surely counterintuitive. The world in which
the hermit experiences the additional pleasure is the better world. If so, we must reject
HC1. Let us call this objection to homeostatic consequentialism the problem of isolated
goods.
(While I have taken the property being pleased as my example of an isolated
good, it should not be thought that the objection depends upon this choice. For those who
are not inclined to view being pleased as a good-making property, we can modify the
hermit example so that the relevant state of affairs realizes some other putative goodmaking property in causal isolation from the rest of the human goods. For example, we
might imagine instead a state of affairs in which the hermit has a preference satisfied—or
appreciates the beauty of some landscape or contemplates some magnificent truth, etc.—
19

There is probably some correlation between experiences of pleasure and a person’s physical health. So
we may have to grant that this particular episode of pleasure makes a causal contribution to the hermit’s
health, however slight.
20
In light of the discussion of §5.2.2, it should be observed that an HPC “as a whole” may be instantiated
by an individual even when some of the cluster’s constituent properties are not instantiated by that
individual. Even so, it should also be clear that an HPC itself is not instantiated in an individual that
instantiates only one of its constituent properties, e.g. an individual’s being striped is not sufficient for it to
be properly classified as a TIGER.
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where this state of affairs fails to causally contribute to the realization of other human
goods.)

5.4.2. An alternative formulation.
Hitherto, I have taken HC1 to express the core thesis of homeostatic consequentialism.
However, there may be a different way to understand the view:
HC2: A state of affairs, P, is non-instrumentally morally good if and only if P
instantiates at least one of the human goods in the HPC of human goods.
One benefit of HC2 is that, by allowing there to be a plurality of non-instrumental goodmaking properties, it brings homeostatic consequentialism closer to more traditional
forms of axiological pluralism. More important, however, it promises an answer to the
problem of isolated goods. Here is how. Suppose that being pleased is a human good.
Although the state of affairs in which the hermit is pleased does not instantiate the entire
cluster of human goods, it does instantiate at least one human good that is part of the
cluster. Given HC2, this is sufficient for it to be true that the hermit’s being pleased is
non-instrumentally good.
Unfortunately, the problem of isolated goods returns in a slightly different form to
threaten even HC2. Consider a possible world, W, in which the homeostatic mechanisms
that putatively unify the human goods in our world are absent. In W, the socio-political
conditions are such that it is not true that the presence of some of the human goods raises
the likelihood that the others will be present. (We might imagine that the human social
environment in W is something like a Hobbesian state of nature.) From this assumption,
it follows that the human goods are not homeostatically clustered in W. Next, imagine
that the sunbathing hermit is in W. Once again, his pleasure neither instantiates nor
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contributes to the instantiation of a larger cluster of human goods. More important,
however, because the hermit is in W, his pleasure does not instantiate a property that is
homeostatically clustered with other human goods. From this, it follows that, even on
HC2, this hermit’s pleasure is not good. As before, this consequence of HC2 clashes
with considered moral judgment.21 (And again, the objection could be restated mutatis
mutandis with some other putative good-making property in place of being pleased.)
At this point, the homeostatic consequentialist might appeal to something like the
idea of rigid designation in order to answer the “revived” problem of isolated goods. The
strategy is roughly this: Let us grant that there is a homeostatically unified cluster of
human goods here in the actual world. The predicate ‘non-instrumentally good’ applies
to any instance of one (or more) of those human goods. This predicate should be
understood to apply “rigidly.” A predicate is a rigid applier, according to this strategy,
just in case, if it applies to all instances of a property F in the actual world, it applies to all
instances of F in every possible world.22 Since ‘non-instrumentally good’ presumably

21

There is some indication that a homeostatic consequentialist would be willing to bite the bullet here.
Sturgeon allows that “nothing would have a property such as intrinsic goodness at all, given a radical
enough breakdown” in a certain part of the HPC that constitutes goodness (Sturgeon 2003: 550). Since the
Hobbesian world exhibits a breakdown of the HPC that constitutes goodness, it would appear that Sturgeon
is willing to accept that the hermit’s being pleased is not an instance of goodness. (On the other hand,
Sturgeon is here speaking of a breakdown only in a specific part of the HPC. In particular, he is
considering the breakdown in the part of the cluster that involves “the existence of purposive, valuing
creatures somewhat like us” [ibid.]. The claim that a world without purposive, valuing creatures contains
no goodness strikes me as far less controversial than the claim that a world that included such creatures
would nevertheless fail to contain intrinsic or non-instrumental value, if there were a lack of homeostasis
between the human goods.)
22
I do not claim that this is the best or most useful conception of rigid application. It is, however, the
conception that the defender of HC2 needs in order to avoid the revised problem of isolated goods. As will
be seen below, I think this conception of rigid application is defective. An arguably better conception can
be found in Devitt (2005). Unfortunately, Devitt’s conception is of no help to HC2. Furthermore, I doubt
that the more traditional notion of rigid designation could be deployed in the service of HC2 without
making questionable assumptions. On the traditional view, a term, t, rigidly designates an entity, e, if and
only if t designates e in every possible world in which e exists, and t designates no other entities (Kripke
1971: 78, 79). As an initial difficulty, it isn’t clear that predicates are the sort of items that can be rigid
designators: if predicates (be they natural kind predicates or nominal kind predicates) designate their
extensions, then none are rigid, since their extensions are different at different possible worlds. If they
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applies to all instances of being pleased in the actual world, as a rigid applier it also
applies all instances of being pleased in every possible world. As a result, it is consistent
with HC2 to ascribe non-instrumental goodness to the hermit’s being pleased in the
Hobbesian world. This is so despite the fact that the human goods are not
homeostatically clustered in that world.
It is doubtful that this conception of rigid application is defensible, at least if it is
supposed to capture some semantic property common to natural kind terms. Suppose
that ‘cordate’ is a rigidly applying term. It applies to all actual instances of the property
of being a creature with a heart. As a rigid applier, it also applies to all possible
instances of being a creature with a heart. The trouble begins when we notice that
‘cordate’ also applies to all actual instances of the property being a creature with a
kidney. From this, along with the assumption that ‘cordate’ is a rigid applier, it follows
that ‘cordate’ applies to all possible instances of being a creature with a kidney. But this
is false.
I think that this shows that this conception of rigid application is defective. If I
am right, then the homeostatic consequentialist will not be able to appeal to it in his
designate properties, then every meaningful predicate is a rigid designator. In that case, rigid designation
marks no interesting distinction among predicates. This last consequence might be avoided if we suppose
that only those predicates that designate sparse properties (or universals) rigidly designate. Assuming this
restriction were defensible, it would still require some maneuvering to get this conception of rigid
designation to do the work HC2 needs of it. For one thing, given the pluralistic assumptions of HC2, there
is no one property that ‘good’ designates; there is a plurality. Thus, it is not true of ‘good’ that it designates
an entity in every possible world in which that entity exists and designates no other entities. One solution
is to suppose that ‘good’ designates the conjunctive property made up of all the different good-making
properties. But now HC2 has no reply to the problem of isolated goods. As we saw, the hermit’s episode
of pleasure does not instantiate a conjunctive property that includes all the other putative good-making
properties as constituents. What is needed instead is an account where ‘good’ designates a disjunctive
property. Here we face more trouble. We have had to assume that rigidly designating predicates designate
only sparse properties. However, on familiar conceptions of sparse properties, disjunctive properties do not
qualify as sparse (Armstrong 1978: 19-23). Perhaps there is more that can be said that would make it
plausible that rigid designation can do the work that HC2 needs it to do. I hope to have said enough to
make it clear that rigid designation does not provide a quick or easy solution to the problem of isolated
goods.

139

response to the revised problem of isolated goods. However, it might be thought that the
argument of the previous paragraph shows only that it was wrong to assume that
‘cordate’ is a rigid applier. This is a desperate tack. As a biological kind term, ‘cordate’
is a good candidate for a natural kind term (and possibly even an HPC kind term). But if
‘cordate’ is a natural kind term, then some explanation is required for why it fails to be a
rigid applier whereas a supposed (HPC) natural kind predicate like ‘good’ succeeds.

5.4.3. Two structural disanalogies.
Even if HC2 could avoid the revived problem of isolated goods, the move from HC1 to
HC2 is suspiciously ad hoc; there is no precedent for a view like HC2 in the general
theory of HPC kinds. Let me explain.
Given HC2, each of the individual properties (i.e., human goods) that compose
the HPC that putatively defines THE GOOD is such that it is proper to predicate noninstrumental moral goodness of its instances. For example, it is proper to say of John’s
being in love with Mary that it is morally good. Likewise, we can say that Sam’s
creating and appreciating art at some particular time is morally good. Moreover, we can
say that Rachel’s being healthy is morally good.
No paradigmatic HPC kind is like THE GOOD in this respect. Consider the
properties that define TIGER. We do not say of a particular tiger that its being
quadrupedal is a tiger. Nor do we say that its stalking behavior is a tiger. Nor do we say
that its being warm blooded is a tiger. In general, the property of being a tiger does not
belong to the instances of the individual properties that define TIGER.23 The same

23

Of course an instance of a property like being quadrupedal might be a part of a larger state of affairs that
constitutes some individual’s being a tiger. But this does not mean that the state of affairs consisting in a
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observation holds for other biological kinds as well as for chemical kinds (e.g., the
malleability of this piece of metal is not itself an instance of METAL).24
What this shows is that, as it is characterized by HC2, goodness is structurally
unlike the property clusters that define paradigm HPC kinds. Goodness is a property
exemplified by instances of the individual properties that (putatively) constitute it.
Paradigmatic natural kinds like species and chemical substances do not share this feature.
This ought to make us suspicious of HC2. If goodness really were constituted by an
HPC, we would expect it to have the same metaphysical structure as the HPCs that define
paradigmatic HPC kinds. Unless there is a convincing precedent for an HPC that
functions as goodness does according to HC2, the move to HC2 would appear to be ad
hoc.25 As far as I can see, the only motivation for HC2 is its promise to solve the first
version of the problem of isolated goods.
Since both HC1 and HC2 are vulnerable to the problem of isolated goods, this
most recent objection to HC2 would seem to make HC1 the more attractive statement of
homeostatic consequentialism. Unfortunately, there is another structural feature of
paradigmatic HPC kinds that simply cannot be extended to THE GOOD without absurdity.
(This feature creates trouble for homeostatic consequentialism on either of its
formulations.)
given individual being quadrupedal itself has the property of being a tiger. In such a case, we should say
instead that one and the same individual has the property of being quadrupedal and has the property of
being a tiger.
24
In §5.5.4 I introduce putative examples of HPC social kinds. It should be noted here that even those
kinds behave like the paradigm HPC kinds and not like THE GOOD. For instance, suppose that the property
of keeping kosher is part of the cluster of properties that defines the social kind HASIDIC JEW. Some
particular man’s keeping kosher does not have the property of being a Hasidic Jew.
25
Boyd suggests that the predicates ‘healthy’ and ‘is healthier than’ express HPC phenomena (1988: 198).
It may be that my challenge (to find a paradigmatic example of an HPC that shares the structural features of
goodness as understood by HC2) could be answered by developing a plausible HPC account of HEALTH.
Unfortunately, Boyd says very little about what sorts of properties might compose the HPC that defines
HEALTH. In the absence of a more detailed account, it is difficult to tell whether or not the example of
HEALTH will help the homeostatic consequentialist meet the present challenge.
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For paradigmatic HPC kinds, most (though perhaps not all) of the properties that
are part of the kind’s definition are properties had by individual members of the kind.
For example, just as ferociousness and being quadrupedal are part of the HPC definition
of the kind TIGER, individual tigers are themselves ferocious and quadrupedal. Likewise,
just as malleability and conductivity are part of the definition of METAL, individual pieces
of metal are malleable and conductive.
By contrast, the properties that putatively define THE GOOD are not had by
individual members of THE GOOD: no good state of affairs is pleased, educated, enjoys
leisure, or shares love etc.26 To predicate one of these properties of a good state of affairs
is to commit a category mistake. Once again, we are presented with a way in which the
cluster of properties that putatively defines THE GOOD fails to behave like the property
clusters that define paradigmatic examples of HPC kinds. This provides yet another
reason to doubt that THE GOOD is an HPC kind.

5.4.4. An alternative cluster of properties.
Both of the structural disanalogies just described might be avoided if we take a rather
different collection of properties to constitute the cluster that putatively defines THE
GOOD.

Consider the following list of properties: being pursued by rational beings, being

worthy of being loved, meriting realization, being approved of by ideal observers, being
fitting, and deserving appreciation. If properties of this sort were taken to compose the

26

Of course, individual persons that are constituents of these states of affairs might have these properties.
However, because states of affairs are the primary basic bearers of goodness, this is of little help. The
current difficulty might be avoided by noting that persons themselves may reasonably be taken to be
bearers of moral goodness. This reply helps if we are advancing some sort of HPC account of virtue. Still,
I presume that Boyd and other homeostatic consequentialists want to say that things other than persons may
be non-instrumentally morally good. If so, they are faced with the present difficulty.
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cluster that defines THE GOOD, then the structural dissimilarities between the good and
other HPC kinds would be avoided. With respect to the first disanalogy noted above, it is
arguably not a serious defect if we could not properly say of a particular state of affairs
that the fact that it merits realization is (non-instrumentally) good. With respect to the
second disanalogy, we make no category mistake when we say that a particular good
state of affairs merits realization, is fitting, or is deserving of appreciation, etc. Perhaps,
then, a collection of properties such as this could serve as the cornerstone of a different
proposal for an HPC definition of goodness (one that would replace Boyd’s own
proposal).
There are at least two reasons for thinking that this maneuver will not be
successful for the homeostatic consequentialist. First, all of the aforementioned
properties contain at least one unabashedly normative property as a constituent:
worthiness, merit, fittingness, desert, being ideal, and being rational. An HPC definition
of moral goodness that includes such properties does nothing to advance the naturalistic
accommodation of moral properties that Boyd and other naturalist moral realists are
pursuing. After all, it is the putative normativity of moral properties that has led so many
philosophers to think that such properties cannot be accommodated within a naturalistic
metaphysic (Ayer 1952: 105; Blackburn 1984: 187ff; Hare 1952: 91; Mackie 1977: 38ff;
Stevenson 1944: 336).27 Without a further naturalistic account of these normative
properties, homeostatic consequentialism will have accomplished very little, if anything,
in the way of showing that goodness can be admitted into a naturalistic ontology.

27

In fact, in selecting these particular properties as potentially definitive of THE GOOD, I was inspired by
various non-naturalist and constructivist analyses of ‘good.’
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A second worry is this: to the extent that properties like being fitting, deserving
appreciation, and being worthy of being loved (etc.) are clustered in nature, their
clustering does not seem to be a matter of causal connection. In the first place, several of
these properties may well be identical. It may be, for example, that the property
designated by ‘meriting realization’ is identical to the property designated by ‘being
fitting.’ Second, even where distinct properties are designated by these terms, the
connection between these properties appears to be conceptual or metaphysical rather than
causal or nomological. It strikes me as a conceptual truth that an ideal observer is one
who approves of all and only that which merits realization or deserves appreciation. To
my ears, the claim that there is an ideal (moral) observer who, nevertheless, approves of
that which does not deserve appreciation sounds incoherent.28 At any rate, even if the
necessity involved is not conceptual, it is doubtful that the laws of nature could have been
different in such a way that there exist ideal observers who approve of that which does
not deserve appreciation or that which does not merit realization. If so, the necessity
binding these properties is stronger than mere nomological necessity; it is better
characterized as a metaphysical necessity. My point here is that a property cluster in
which these new properties (being fitting, being deserving of appreciation, etc.) were
given significant definitional weight would not fit Boyd’s characterization of an HPC.
The property cluster under consideration appears to be, in most cases at least, unified by
conceptual or metaphysical necessity.29 By contrast, the necessity that unifies the
28

A. C. Ewing expresses roughly the same thought. He suggests that the claim that what is good or right is
what an impartial spectator would approve of “is equivalent to saying that something is good or right when
it is approved by somebody who only approves what is really good or right” (Ewing 1953: 85).
29
Of the properties I have recommended for this alternative HPC proposal, the one exception seems to be
the property of being pursued by rational beings. If one takes a Humean or instrumentalist view of
rationality, then it will be at best a metaphysically contingent fact that rational beings pursue, e.g., fitting
states of affairs. Thus, being pursued by rational beings may well be nomologically linked to the other
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properties of an HPC is causal or nomological. Thus, even on this alternative proposal, it
would not be true that moral goodness is an HPC.

5.5. Inductive Inference and THE GOOD.
5.5.1. Outline of the Argument.
In §5.2.1, we saw that Boyd takes natural kinds to provide the metaphysical ground for
successful induction and explanation. His HPC conception of natural kinds is meant to
account, in part, for how it is that (some) natural kinds play this role. In §5.2.2, I
explained that the homeostatic clustering of properties makes the instances of an HPC
kind fairly uniform with respect to their manifest properties. In turn, this uniformity
makes reliable inductive inference possible. If this is so, and if THE GOOD is an HPC
kind, then we should expect that THE GOOD (and goodness) will ground significant
reliable inductive inferences. To the extent that this expectation is not fulfilled, we have
reason to think that THE GOOD is not an HPC kind. In the next two sections I argue that
there is, in fact, reason to think that goodness does not facilitate significant reliable
inductive inferences. If I am right, then we have even more reason to doubt that THE
GOOD

is an HPC kind. (As far as I can tell, my arguments remain cogent regardless of

whether homeostatic consequentialism is understood as HC1 or understood as HC2. Still,
it may aid the reader to know that the following sections were written with HC1 in mind.)
properties mentioned. I doubt that this one exception can give the homeostatic consequentialist what he
needs to get past the present worry. However, if more properties of this sort could be found, and if there
were a compelling case to be made that these other properties are indeed contingently clustered, then this
worry could be put to rest. But new difficulties are likely to arise. My suspicion is that the sorts of
properties that are needed here would consist primarily in various sorts of characteristic human responses to
good states of affairs. If I am right about this, then an alternative HPC definition of THE GOOD that
incorporated these properties would raise its own problems for Boyd’s larger project of defending
naturalistic moral realism. Briefly, a cluster definition involving such properties threatens to make moral
goodness a response-dependent property. Response-dependent accounts of moral properties, however, are
at odds with the robust sort of moral realism that Boyd means to defend.
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In arguing that moral goodness does not ground significant reliable inductive
inferences, I will be relying on anecdotal evidence. For my argument to be conclusive,
empirical research would be required. In the absence of such research, I must state the
conclusion of my argument modestly. Here I aim to show that, pending the needed
empirical research, we ought to be pessimistic as to whether homeostatic
consequentialism can make good on its empirical commitments.

5.5.2. Biological kinds versus moral kinds, part I.
For comparison, consider the sorts of reliable inductive inferences that are afforded by
biological kinds. While walking in the woods, you see something poking up from behind
a log. They are two pieces of furry flesh, about four inches in length, standing straight
up. You recognize them as nearly morphologically identical with the ears of some
rabbits you have seen. Before you move any closer, you already have a pretty good idea
of what you will find as you approach: a furry creature, with short front legs and
powerful, kangaroo-like hind legs. The creature will also have whiskers and a short
fluffy tail. If you get close enough, you will likely see its nose making a “sniffing”
motion. If you get too close, it will rapidly scurry away. In addition to all this, you have
a rough idea of what you would find if you were to catch it and cut it open. The
background knowledge needed to make these inferences could be culled from having
seen only a handful of rabbits in the wild (supplemented with one or two observations of
mammalian internal anatomy). On the basis of only a few previous observations, you are
able to reliably infer an impressive amount of information about a particular individual
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by observing just a pair of ears.30 Notice, too, that, in this case, you are able to infer the
presence of a vast number of properties in the individual from observing comparatively
few.
Now consider a putatively moral case. Suppose that, while walking through the
park, you observe four young persons playing a game of two-on-two basketball. You
observe that each pair is engaged in a cooperative effort and that they are enjoying
physical recreation as well as leisure. Each individual appears to be friends with his or
her own teammate and, furthermore, all appear to be in good health. Let us grant that all
these observations are in fact true. On the basis of these observations, which reveal the
instantiation of five out of the nine human goods sketched above (in §5.3), what else can
you reliably infer? Well, very likely someone is happy or pleased, as basketball is an
enjoyable game. As for some of the other human goods in the proposed cluster, it is
anybody’s guess. There is no reason to think the game makes any contribution to
anyone’s education, artistic development, or ability to engage in a loving relationship. I
doubt that we can even reliably infer whether playing the game has any impact on
anyone’s personal autonomy (perhaps two of the players had to be nagged into joining
the game). It is worth adding that we do not appear to be warranted in inferring that the
state of affairs in which these young people are playing basketball is (all things
considered) morally good. In fact, given our evidence, it is not too improbable that the
young people are doing something that is, all things considered, bad: perhaps they have

30

Of course, the reliability of this inference requires the support of some contingent features of the
observer’s environment as well. For instance, there must not be too many things that look like rabbit ears
but are neither attached to rabbits nor creatures that share many (but not too many) properties that are
characteristic of rabbits. (Keep in mind, however, that in my example what you infer is not that this thing
is a rabbit but rather that it has such and such morphology, anatomy, behavior, etc. If the creature should
turn out to be a hare, these conclusions are every bit as correct as if it turns out to be a rabbit).
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all neglected their university studies in order to play; perhaps they have unfairly excluded
others from joining their game; perhaps one team is in the process of hustling the other
team out of their paychecks. If the basketball game exhibits any of these features, then it
may well generate enough harm that, on balance, it contributes negative non-instrumental
value to the world. What these considerations suggest is that, in fact, the observation of
the properties in the cluster that putatively defines THE GOOD does not afford us much, if
any, inductive knowledge. In this respect, THE GOOD is nothing like a paradigmatic HPC
kind such as THE RABBIT.31
Now, if the example just offered is to support the conclusion I want to draw, then
it must be generalizable. It will be of no use if I have simply called attention to one of
the infrequent cases where some of the properties defining THE GOOD are present but the
rest are not. (After all, we sometimes witness small, furry, ear-like things, and they turn
out not to be attached to small timid mammals.) What I need to show, then, is that cases
in which a number of human goods are present but the others are not constitute the norm
rather than the exception. Since I cannot here continue to produce examples of this sort, I
will offer a pair of cases of a somewhat different sort to compare. I believe the
implications of the following cases are generalizable. They differ from the first pair in
that, here, the epistemic agent does not see the individual but is merely told that a given
unseen individual belongs to a certain kind. I then consider what sort of information he
or she can reliably infer from this (let us grant) accurate testimony about the individual.

31

To make matters worse, even if we could inductively infer the presence of some of these goods from
others, it is not clear that it is reference to THE MORAL GOOD that facilitates these inferences. Our
inductions may well turn out to be grounded by the properties that cluster around sporting activities qua
sporting activities.
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5.5.3. Biological kinds versus moral kinds, part II.
If a person is competent at recognizing members of a natural kind, then she should be
able to reliably infer the presence of many properties had by an unseen individual solely
by being (truthfully) told that the individual is a member the kind in question. For
example, I have seen only a handful of scorpions (real and images thereof); I have also
learned several facts about them through the testimony of experts. This relatively small
number of encounters has been enough for me to acquire competence in recognizing
members of the kind SCORPION. Simply by being told that Snippy is a scorpion, I can
reliably infer that Snippy is an insect-like creature, three or four inches long from head to
the start of the tail. His tail is roughly the same length as his body and is equipped with a
stinger and a pouch full of venom. Moreover, affixed to the front of his body are
“lobster-like” claws. In addition to these morphological features, I can reliably infer
some behavioral properties: for example, Snippy would eat an insect if it were available;
if a person were to agitate Snippy properly, Snippy would sting her. I know all this about
Snippy only by being told that he is a member of the kind SCORPION.
Contrast the scorpion case with a case in which we are truthfully informed that a
state of affairs, P, that has just taken place is non-instrumentally morally good. We are
given no further information concerning P’s characteristics. Given our background
knowledge of non-instrumentally good things, what inductive inferences would we be
justified in making? One might be tempted to infer that P exemplifies whatever property
one’s favorite axiological theory entails is non-instrumentally good-making. Perhaps,
then, P involves the satisfaction of a preference, or someone’s being pleased, or both. On
the face of it, this hardly seems like an example of inductive inference. Still, if the
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homeostatic consequentialist is granted his favored account of moral theorizing, it may
well count as a case of inductive inference. Let us suppose, then, that these two
inferences concerning P are examples of epistemically justified inductions.
If THE GOOD is an HPC kind, we should expect that we can reliably infer more
than this. Unfortunately, I doubt that we can. Consider the human goods listed in §5.3.
Surely, the information we have been given about P does not justify us to infer that P
involves someone’s being in love, engaging in cooperative efforts, or appreciating art,
etc. Even a convinced axiological pluralist must recognize that the mere knowledge that
P is good does not justify us in inferring which of the good-making properties P realizes.
Even less does our information justify us to infer that all (or nearly all) of these human
goods are realized in P. This is bad news. If the human goods really are homeostatically
clustered and constitutive of non-instrumental goodness, we should expect this stronger
inference (that nearly all the human goods are realized in P) to be justified. Perhaps there
is empirical research that can be conducted that would show that such inferences are
reliable. In the absence of this research, however, we have no reason to believe that such
a strong inference is epistemically justified. If this is right, then we ought to be skeptical
of the claim that goodness is constituted by an HPC.
So far, I have been considering the relationship between non-instrumental moral
goodness and inductive inference. It might be thought, however, that instrumental moral
goodness is more promising as a ground of reliable inductive inference. Let’s consider,
then, what we may justifiably infer from the news that Jane has just performed an
instrumentally morally good action. I am inclined to think that matters are not much
different than before. I suspect that we are justified in inferring that someone was
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pleased and had a preference satisfied as a result of Jane’s act. I suppose we would be
also be justified in inferring that, if anyone’s preferences were frustrated as a result of
Jane’s act (or if anyone was pained by it), this frustration was outweighed by the
preferences satisfied (or the quantity of pleasure it brought about). Once again, however,
I doubt that we would be justified in inferring that her act causally contributed to the
realization of love, friendship, cooperation, physical health, and artistic appreciation, etc.
As often as instrumentally good actions contribute to the realization of these properties,
they contribute to their frustration. And again, even if we are in a position to infer that
Jane’s act contributes to the realization of some of these human goods, we are not in a
position to infer which of these it contributes to. Still less are we justified in inferring
that it contributes to the realization of nearly all of them.
We might be encouraged to take a long-term view of Jane’s action. While her
good action might have immediately involved breaking a friendship, ending a love affair,
sacrificing someone’s autonomy, etc., it may be that, in the long run, her act will
contribute to the realization of all these things. If so, then her act does contribute to the
cluster of human goods after all. But even if all this turns out to be true of Jane’s act, we
are surely in no position now to infer this with any kind of confidence. Such an inference
may signal an admirable sort of optimism, but it is surely not an example of justified
reliable inductive inference. If I am right, then even non-instrumental goodness is of
little value in grounding significant reliable inductive inference.
To summarize, it is doubtful that the human goods sketched in §5.3 enjoy the sort
of homeostatic relationship shared by the properties that define chemical and biological
kinds. If the human goods did share such a nomological bond, we would expect to be
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able to make a significant number of reliable inductive inferences upon observing that
some (at least half) of the properties in the cluster are instantiated by some state of
affairs. Furthermore, we would expect that the knowledge that a given state of affairs is
good will permit us to reliably infer a significant number of further facts about it. I have
argued that neither of these expectations are met. Reference to THE GOOD does not
facilitate significant reliable inductions. In this respect, THE GOOD is very much unlike
paradigmatic HPC kinds. Consequently, we have yet more reason to doubt that THE
GOOD

is itself an HPC kind.
It is worth recalling that one of the appeals of Boyd’s HPC account of natural

kinds is that it purports to explain how such kinds are able to fulfill the inductive and
explanatory roles they are alleged to play. In light of this, these observations concerning
THE GOOD

are no small blow to homeostatic consequentialism. THE GOOD lacks the very

feature of natural kinds that the HPC view is meant to account for.

5.5.4. Social kinds.
It might be objected that it is much too demanding to ask that moral kinds ground as
numerous and reliable inductions as chemical and biological kinds do. This is a
reasonable objection. A fairer comparison might contrast moral kinds with kinds that
make up the subject matter of social sciences like psychology or sociology. I take
examples of social kinds to include THE STATE, RELIGION, NATIVE AMERICAN, JEW,
PSYCHOPATH, HOMOSEXUAL, FOREIGNER, BACHELOR

and ECONOMIC DEPRESSION.32 Boyd

suggests that at least some social kinds are HPC kinds.33 It is reasonable to suppose that,

32
33

The first five examples are culled from Richard Miller (2000).
He offers CAPITALISM as an example of a HPC social kind in Boyd (1999b: 83).
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if there are HPC social kinds, such kinds support significantly fewer and less reliable
inductive inferences than biological and chemical kinds support. Consequently, if social
kind terms can be shown to designate HPC kinds, and if reference to THE GOOD facilitates
nearly as many reliable inductive inferences as does reference to social kinds, then the
arguments of §5.5.2 and §5.5.3 could be answered.
The first challenge facing an objection along these lines is to establish that there
are, in fact, plausible examples of social kinds whose extensions are defined by HPCs.
At least some of the kinds listed in the previous paragraph seem to resist a posteriori
HPC definitions. BACHELOR, for instance, has a fairly straightforward analytic
definition; even if there turns out to be some properties that contingently cluster around
bachelors (qua bachelors)—e.g., having an active night life—it is doubtful that such
properties are part of the definition of BACHELOR. Still, I think HPC social kinds may
well exist. At any rate, it seems to me that there exist social kinds that ground interesting
reliable inductions where it can be plausibly maintained that the essential properties of
these kinds are discoverable only a posteriori. The trouble is that these social kinds seem
to license a far greater number of reliable inductive inferences than THE GOOD does. In
the previous section, I counted only two inductive inferences that seemed to be licensed
by the proposition that some particular state of affairs (or action) is good. Contrast this
with the inductive inferences afforded by the proposition that some particular individual
is a member of the social kind HASIDIC JEW (HASIDUM). Upon being told that Jacob is an
adult male Hasidic Jew, we (or at least, those of us somewhat familiar with HASIDUM)
can reliably infer that he has a beard and payas (long curls of hair growing from the
temples). His typical attire includes a black hat, a black suit with a white button down
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shirt, and, on certain occasions, tallis (a prayer shawl) worn under his coat. We can also
reliably infer several things about Jacob’s weekly activities: he keeps kosher, does not
work or drive on the Sabbath, and regularly studies the Torah. Likewise, we can infer
that Jacob believes (or at least purports to believe) that the Torah gives a literally true
account of historical events.34
What this example shows is that, by observing the practices of only several
Hasidic Jews, an epistemic agent could safely infer that these practices are shared by
nearly all other Hasidic Jews (at least those belonging to the same sect).35 If I am right,
then a social kind such as HASIDIC JEW provides us with an impressive metaphysical
ground for inductive inference. These inferences seem to be much nearer in quantity and
reliability to inferences afforded by biological and chemical kinds than they are to a kind
like THE MORAL GOOD. Consequently, appeal to the existence of HPC social kinds fails to
help the case for homeostatic consequentialism.
At this point, two complaints might be raised about my example. First, it might
be complained that Hasidic Jews make up an unusually uniform social kind. According
to this objection, the norms governing Hasidic life are more far reaching and pervasive
than those governing other social groups. A more typical social kind would be much

34

I am here offering these sample inferences after having done only a minimum of research. They are
based on my own limited casual observations of Hasidic Jews (along with bits of testimony from others).
No doubt, some of these observations need refinement or correction (for instance, I have not said—because
I do not know—on which occasions tallis is worn). In any case, there can be little doubt that it would
require only a modest amount of sociological research to extend both the number and the reliability of
inductive inferences that can be made about Jacob in his capacity as a Hasidic Jew.
35
It should be recognized that we should expect inferences to be reliable only when they concern properties
that are homeostatically clustered. Suppose that my sample of Hasidic men was small, consisting of only
five men. Suppose further that I observed that all five men have gray beards. I might be tempted to infer
that Jacob’s beard will be gray as well. It should be clear, however, that, even if this conclusion were to
turn out to be true, this inference is not epistemically warranted. What this observation suggests is that, if
our practice of making inductive inferences from a small sample is to be practical, then we had better have
some skill at detecting which properties of an individual are essential to its kind. (For a defense of the
claim that human beings really do possess such a skill, see Kornblith [1993: 83-107]).
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nearer to THE MORAL GOOD in its (weak) grounding of induction. A second possible
objection is that the uniformity among male Hasidum is artificial since it results from
behaviors that individuals consciously undertake in order to remain members of the
group. A genuine HPC social kind would not be unified by such an artificial mechanism.
Now, for those who subscribe to Boyd’s HPC account of kinds, the “artificiality”
of the homeostatic mechanism ought to be beside the point. After all, Boyd includes
human artifacts like THE 1969 PLYMOUTH VALIANT as examples of HPC kinds (1999b:
68).36 Nevertheless, I will offer one more illustration of a potential HPC social kind.
The kind I will cite grounds a number of reliable inductive inferences but is not open to
either of the above complaints. Its members are significantly less uniform than members
of HASIDUM and do not (as far as I know) engage in their kind-typical behaviors for the
express purpose of maintaining their membership within it. Consider, then, the social
kind designated by the term ‘hippy.’ When we learn that Bill is a hippy we can reliably
infer the following propositions: Bill owns at least one tie-dyed shirt and at least one pair
of sandals; he listens to (or at least can appreciate) the music of The Grateful Dead and
Phish; he has smoked marijuana and supports its legalization; in politics he opposes
aggressive foreign policy and socially conservative domestic policies. To be sure, the
reliability of these inferences will be much weaker than the inferences involving
biological kinds; there are certainly many more hippies that do not enjoy the music of
Phish than there are scorpions without claws. Still, I suspect these inferences are reliable

36

It is worth adding here that Ron Mallon (2003) defends an HPC conception of certain social kinds where
the homeostatic mechanisms include the members’ own recognition of themselves as members of a kind. .
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enough to meet the threshold for epistemic warrant. We see, then, that even a social kind
like HIPPY grounds significant inductive inference where THE GOOD does not.37
The comparison of THE GOOD with plausible examples of HPC social kinds
reveals once again that THE GOOD supplies us with a very weak metaphysical ground for
reliable inductive inferences. Since one of the most notable features of HPC kinds (and
natural kinds more generally) is supposed to be the role they play in grounding reliable
inductive inferences, this observation supports the conclusion that THE GOOD is not itself
an HPC kind.
Of course, I have cited only two examples of HPC social kinds. The homeostatic
consequentialist may hold out in the hope that some social kind will be found that both
(a) weakly grounds inductive inference and (b) is a convincing example of an HPC kind.
(Perhaps it will be thought that one of the other social kinds I list at the start of this
section can fit the bill.) I think such a hope is misplaced. Conditions a and b are in
tension with one another. To the extent that a kind grounds inductive inference only very
weakly, there will be good reason to doubt it is an HPC kind. If so, then we should not
expect to find any convincing examples of an HPC social kind that grounds inductive
inference as weakly as THE GOOD does.

37

Some might object that the inferences about Bill are not inductive at all. It may be that ‘hippy’ has an
analytic cluster definition where the properties I have attributed to Bill are just those that are analytically
associated with ‘hippy.’ I am not inclined protest very loudly against this objection. But note that this
should be of no comfort to the homeostatic consequentialist. After all, the same objection may be raised
against any (supposedly) inductive inference involving THE GOOD (i.e., it might be objected that such
inferences are not examples of a posteriori inductions at all, but are, instead, examples of the analytic a
priori). In any case, unless a clear case of a HPC social kind that weakly grounds inductive inference can
be found, the homeostatic consequentialist cannot appeal to a comparison with social kinds in order to
answer the arguments of §5.5.2 and §5.5.3.
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5.6. An Anticipated Rebuttal.
In a more recent presentation of his ethical views, Boyd suggests that the HPC that
constitutes goodness is currently “fragmented” (2003b: 34-38). It might be thought that
this claim provides the homeostatic consequentialist with a reply to the arguments of
§5.5. In this section, I consider the prospects for such a reply.
As we saw in §5.3, Boyd suggests that several of the mechanisms that hold the
human goods in a homeostatic relationship are socio-political. They include democratic
institutions, social egalitarianism, certain customs etc. In different social environments,
these mechanisms may be stronger, weaker, or even completely absent. Boyd’s view is
that as these mechanisms are made stronger—as a society becomes more democratic,
more egalitarian, etc.—the human goods will become more strongly homeostatically
unified (ibid.). As I understand it, this amounts to the claim that, as the relevant
homeostatic mechanisms are strengthened, there will be an even greater increase in the
likelihood than before that, when some of the human goods are instantiated, the other
goods are instantiated as well.
Boyd submits that, at present, the sorts of mechanisms expected to produce
homeostatic unity among the human goods are not nearly as strong as they could be:
So far we have always operated morally within social structures which lacked the
resources (technical or social or economic or political) to achieve the sort of
(homeostatic) unity of [goodness]38 towards which our moral concerns aim, and
which possessed lots of features “designed” as it were (often literally designed) to
prevent the emergence of such resources (2003b: 36).
He goes on to suggest that, because of the poor present state of the relevant social
institutions, the HPC that constitutes goodness is “not now very unified” (ibid.). This
claim might be thought to supply homeostatic consequentialism with a reply to the
38

Boyd uses ‘the good’ here.
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arguments of §5.5. Here is how. If goodness is constituted by a weakly or partially
unified HPC, then we should expect that the presence of some of the goods only slightly
raises the likelihood that the others are present. In that case, however, we should not
expect to find that reference to THE GOOD facilitates many reliable inductive inferences.
These considerations show that it is possible that goodness is an HPC even though it fails
to ground the sorts of reliable inductive inferences that are characteristic of HPC kinds.
In light of this possibility, it might be argued that we are unjustified in concluding that
goodness is not an HPC from the fact that it fails to ground significant inductive
inferences.
It is difficult to assess this reply without a more detailed account of property
homeostasis and of what sorts of characteristics a property cluster must have in order to
serve as the real essence of a natural kind. It is not obvious that just any amount of
homeostatic clustering among a group of properties is sufficient to make that group suited
for the role of natural kind’s real essence. Indeed, as we saw in §5.2, Boyd takes it to be
characteristic of HPC kinds that the clustering of their defining properties is “causally
important.” However, to the extent that the purported clustering of the human goods fails
to make a noticeable difference to the inductive inferences we are licensed to draw, it
would seem that such clustering is not all that causally important. In addition, it should
be recalled that Boyd himself takes it to be a defining feature of natural kinds (and so,
HPC natural kinds) that reference to such kinds facilitates explanation and inductive
inference. If he is right, then the fact that reference to THE GOOD fails to ground inductive
inference in any interesting way should be thought to give us very strong grounds for
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denying that it is itself an HPC kind even if it should so happen that the human goods are
weakly unified.
Suppose, however, that we grant that a weakly unified cluster of properties is
capable of playing the role of a natural kind essence. It still remains the case that the lack
of interesting reliable inductions yielded by reference to THE GOOD leaves us with no
assurance that the human goods, or any other collection of properties suitably related to
the predicate ‘morally good,’ really are in fact weakly unified. This lack of assurance
might not worry the homeostatic consequentialist. While he cannot confirm his empirical
hypothesis (that the goods are weakly unified), he might suppose that the burden of proof
is on his detractors to show that this empirical hypothesis is false. I think this stance
would be a mistake. To see why, we need to revisit the dialectic.
In “How to Be a Moral Realist,” Boyd raises the possibility that the human goods
are homeostatically clustered and that this cluster can be identified with the property
moral goodness. This hypothesis is meant to keep alive the possibility that some
naturalistic version of moral realism is true despite a battery of anti-realist and nonnaturalist objections. I take the arguments of §5.4 above to show that, even if the human
goods that Boyd cites really do form an HPC, we should not identify this HPC with
moral goodness itself. My own view is that the arguments of §5.4 are sufficient to refute
homeostatic consequentialism outright. More cautiously, however, I would insist that
those arguments at least deprive the theory of any presumption of innocence it might
have enjoyed and give us at least some positive reason to think it false. At this point in
the dialectic, then, the balance of reasons is against the hypothesis that moral goodness is
an HPC.
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Perhaps the best evidence that could be adduced in favor of homeostatic
consequentialism would be an observation to the effect that reference to goodness or THE
GOOD

facilitates reliable inductive inference. Unfortunately, the arguments of §5.5 show

that there is at present little reason to believe that reference to goodness or the good does
in fact facilitate reliable inductive inference. This finding constitutes more than a mere
failure to uncover exculpating evidence in favor of homeostatic consequentialism. In
light of Boyd’s claim that it is definitive of natural kinds (and thus, HPC kinds) that such
kinds ground inductive inferences, the findings of §5.5 give us additional evidence for the
denial of the proposition that goodness is an HPC. As I see it, then, the score is now (at
least) 2 to 0 against homeostatic consequentialism.
It is at this point that the hypothesis that the HPC of human goods is weakly
unified becomes relevant. This hypothesis promises to explain why it would be that
goodness, though an HPC, fails to ground reliable inductive inference. If this hypothesis
turns out to be consistent with the general theory of HPC kinds, and if we allow that our
current evidence does not rule out this hypothesis, then the conclusion of §5.5 must be
weakened. We could no longer take the lack of reliable inductive inferences afforded by
reference to the good as positive evidence for the denial of the claim that goodness is an
HPC. Instead, the observations of §5.5 should be taken to show merely an absence of
evidence in favor of the affirmation of that claim. But this is too little too late. At best,
the homeostatic consequentialist gets to turn the scoreboard back to 1 to 0; but he is still
losing. In light of the arguments of §5.4, the balance of reasons still favors the denial of
the proposition that goodness is constituted by an HPC.
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5.7. Conclusion.
I have argued that the homeostatic property cluster account of goodness is false. First, it
fails to account for the value of “causally isolated” human goods. Next, the relationship
between THE GOOD and its defining properties is suspiciously unlike the relationship
between paradigmatic HPC kinds and their defining properties. Finally, reference to THE
GOOD

does not support inductive inference nearly as well as would be expected if it were

an HPC kind. For these reasons, we should conclude that goodness is not an HPC and
that THE GOOD is not an HPC kind. As it stands, then, ethical naturalists remain without
justification for adopting moral semantic externalism.
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CHAPTER 6
THE EXPLANATORY IMPOTENCE OF MORAL FACTS
6. Chapter.
6.1. Introduction.
In Chapter 1 we saw that the main proponents of SEN endorse the method of reflective
equilibrium as the proper way to conduct moral inquiry. This method directs an
epistemic agent to make modifications to her moral beliefs about particular cases, general
moral principles and theories, and non-moral background beliefs until these three
elements exhibit maximal coherence. When these elements do exhibit maximal
coherence, the agent’s moral beliefs can be said to be in reflective equilibrium. In this
state, her beliefs enjoy maximal epistemic justification. Call the moral theory that would
survive the method of reflective equilibrium for an agent (or a group of agents), S, S’s
best moral theory.
Among those who endorse the method of reflective equilibrium for moral inquiry,
there is disagreement about the metaphysical commitments of our best moral theory. On
the one hand, there are those, such as the defenders of SEN, who embrace a realist
construal of moral theory (Boyd 1988; Brink 1989; Daniels 1979; Sturgeon 2002). For
the moral realist, our best moral theory should be thought of as stance-independently true.
Moral anti-realists, by contrast, deny that our best moral theory should be thought of as
stance-independently true. Some anti-realists deny that our best moral theory should be
thought of as true at all. They argue, instead, that we should think of our best theory
merely as a useful fiction (Mackie 1977: ch. 5; Joyce 2001; Nolan et al. 2005). Other
moral anti-realists suggest that our best theory should be thought of, not as true, but as
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“reasonable for us to accept” (Rawls 1980: 570). Still other moral anti-realists are
willing to view our best moral theory as true, but maintain, contra realists, that that the
theory’s truth is stance-dependent. Anti-realists of this stripe hold that the truth of our
best moral theory consists in the fact that it is the theory that we would accept, were our
beliefs in reflective equilibrium (Rawls 1980: 519). This kind of metaethical view
amounts to the adoption of a coherence theory of truth for moral claims.
What sorts of considerations might help us decide between the moral realist’s
construal of reflective equilibrium and the moral anti-realist’s construal? On the one
hand, it may seem as though phenomenological considerations favor moral realism.
When we engage in moral deliberation, it typically seems to us as though there is a
correct answer, independent of what we happen to believe, that we are trying to arrive at.
Furthermore, it seems to us as though our best efforts might fail to yield the correct
answer. More specifically, it seems to us logically possible that we achieve reflective
equilibrium among our beliefs and yet the moral theory that we accept is false while
some other moral theory that we reject is true (Brink 1989: 31-36).
Anti-realists have countered that the phenomenological evidence for a realist
construal of moral inquiry is defeated by the “explanatory impotence” of would-be moral
facts, where a fact is explanatorily impotent just in case it is not needed in the best a
posteriori explanations of our observations (Harman 1977: 3-23). Indeed, the putative
explanatory impotence of moral facts is taken not only to defeat the presumptive
evidence in favor of moral realism, but also—in light of Ockham’s razor-type
considerations of ontological parsimony—to constitute positive evidence against a
realistic construal of moral inquiry.
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Against the argument from explanatory impotence, some moral realists have
objected that it begs the question against moral realism to suppose that moral facts must
play a role in our a posteriori explanations. Nagel writes, “The claim that certain [e.g.
moral] reasons exist is a normative claim, not a claim about the best causal explanation of
anything” (Nagel 1986: 144; cf. Quinn 1986; Shafer-Landau 2003: 98-114; 2006).
Whatever the merits of this line of reply, it is not available to proponents of synthetic
ethical naturalism. Recall from Chapter 1 that metaphysical naturalists accept the
following explanatory criterion of ontological commitment:
EC: Posit the existence of an entity (or a kind of entity) if and only if reference to
that (kind of) entity is needed in our best available a posteriori explanations of
observable phenomena.
If stance-independent moral facts are to be a welcomed part of the metaphysical
naturalist’s ontology, then reference to such facts had better be needed in our best
available a posteriori explanations. In light of their commitment to EC, it is not
surprising to find that synthetic ethical naturalists respond to the argument from
explanatory impotence by insisting that, contrary to what anti-realists have claimed,
moral facts really do figure in our best a posteriori explanations (Boyd 1988; Brink 1989:
182-197; Sturgeon 1985a).1
In this chapter, I defend the moral anti-realist’s argument from explanatory
impotence against the naturalists’ rebuttal. In §6.2 below, I present Gilbert Harman’s
argument from explanatory impotence along with Nicolas Sturgeon’s tu quoque reply to
it on behalf of SEN. In §6.3, I outline a revised version of the argument from explanatory
impotence that I believe to be invulnerable to Sturgeon’s objections. In §6.4, I consider
1

Although Brink unequivocally affirms that moral facts explain our observations, it should be noted that he
expresses some ambivalence about whether they really must do so in order to be a legitimate part of the
naturalist’s ontology (Brink 1989: 182f).
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several replies to the revised argument from explanatory impotence. I pay special
attention to another tu quoque-style argument to the effect that the reasoning behind the
explanatory impotence argument against moral realism, if cogent, would commit us to the
rejection of scientific realism. In §6.5, I argue that scientific realism is not vulnerable in
this respect. (In the next chapter, I go on to show that the sort of argument discussed in
§6.5 here, which protects scientific realism from explanatory impotence worries, cannot
be extended to defend moral realism in a similar fashion.)

6.2. The Harman-Sturgeon Exchange.
6.2.1. Harman’s opening salvo.
The contemporary locus classicus for the argument from explanatory impotence is
Gilbert Harman’s The Nature of Morality (1977). There, he argues that putative moral
facts are not needed in order to explain why we have the moral beliefs that we do. To
illustrate, he has his readers imagine a case in which they observe “a group of young
hoodlums pour gasoline on a cat and ignite it.” Upon making this observation, we are to
imagine that we (the observers of the act) form an immediate judgment that the
hoodlums’ act is morally wrong. Harman asks whether we need to suppose that the act of
igniting the cat really does have the property of being morally wrong in order to explain
the fact that we made this moral judgment. He answers in the negative:
…[A]n assumption about moral facts would seem to be totally irrelevant to the
explanation of your making the judgment that you make. It would seem that all
we need to assume is that you have certain more or less well articulated moral
principles that are reflected in the judgments you make, based on your moral
sensibility. It seems to be completely irrelevant to our explanation whether your
intuitive immediate judgment is true or false (Harman 1977: 7).
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To explain our judging the hoodlums’ act to be morally wrong, we need to cite only: (a)
our non-moral beliefs about the relevant act-token (e.g., the fact that we believe these
young people to be lighting the cat on fire, that they have done this merely for their own
amusement, and that it is causing the cat to experience a great amount of pain) and (b) the
fact that we (perhaps tacitly) accept a moral principle according to which acts of causing
suffering for mere amusement are morally wrong. I suspect, in addition, that in order to
adequately explain our having the non-moral beliefs that we do about the action, we will
also need to cite (c) the non-moral facts about the act-token itself (e.g. the fact that there
really are young people lighting a cat on fire). The conjunction of these three items
forms what is at least a plausible and satisfying explanation of why we judge the act of
lighting the cat on fire to be morally wrong.
Some might object that an even better explanation would describe these same
items at a more fundamental level of reality, perhaps at the level of physical particles; but
this objection is quite compatible with the general outlines of Harman’s argument. What
is most important for the success of the explanatory impotence argument is that the
explanation of our moral judgment would not be improved by expanding it to include a
claim to the effect that the act of lighting the cat on fire really is morally wrong. Since an
explanation that omits reference to moral facts or properties has the theoretical virtue of
being more ontologically parsimonious than any explanation that does make such a
reference, Harman’s non-moral explanation of our judgment would seem to be ceteris
paribus better than any competing moral explanation (i.e., an explanation that makes
ineliminable use of moral vocabulary). Unless there is some reason to think that nonmoral explanations of our moral beliefs are inferior to moral explanations in some other
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respect, a non-moral explanation of the sort described above would seem to be the best
available to us. Harman’s view is that moral explanations are not superior to non-moral
explanations in any significant respect.
It appears, then, that moral facts are not needed in the best explanations of our
making this or that particular moral judgment. If we are metaphysical naturalists, and,
thus, we accept a principle like EC, then it would seem to follow that we should not
believe in the existence of stance-independent moral facts. The upshot is that
metaphysical naturalists should deny moral realism.

6.2.2. Sturgeon’s reply to Harman.
Over the course of several papers, Nicholas Sturgeon mounts a defense of naturalistic
moral realism against Harman’s explanatory impotence argument.2 There are two major
components of Sturgeon’s defense. First, Sturgeon presents several cases in which a
moral explanation of a non-moral fact appears to be both plausible and not obviously
inferior to any available rival explanation.3 He suggests, for instance, that the fact that
Hitler was morally depraved forms part of a good explanation for why we believe that he
was depraved. Not only does Sturgeon claim that moral facts sometimes figure in (what
are potentially) the best explanations of our moral beliefs, he argues that they also figure
in the (potentially) best explanations of non-doxastic events or states of affairs, such as
the fact that a given person has performed a particular action. So, for example, Sturgeon
suggests that the fact that Hitler was depraved forms part of a reasonable (and potentially
2

Sturgeon’s most direct replies to appear in his (1985a) and (1986a). Other Sturgeon papers that are
relevant to the moral explanations debate are his (1992), (1998), and (2006).
3
In his (1985a: 56), Sturgeon’s stated goals are modest. He does not claim show that moral facts are in fact
needed in our best a posteriori explanations, but only that we do not now know that they are not (or will not
be) needed.
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best) explanation of why Hitler performed the sorts of actions for which he is commonly
reviled, such as ordering the extermination of European Jews.
I want to delay an in-depth examination of this component of Sturgeon’s defense
until Chapter 7 (see especially §7.6). Here, I will mention one reason that the latter Hitler
example is not very compelling as a potentially best explanation of non-moral facts.
There are a number of natural properties that could realize the property of being morally
depraved: e.g., being homicidal, being dishonest, being sadistic, being a pedophile,
lacking empathy, etc. The proposition that Hitler is morally depraved does not, by itself,
inform us as to which of these putative depravity-making properties he has. In light of
this, it is doubtful that Hitler’s being depraved helps in explaining his actions. If Hitler’s
depravity had been realized by, say, his being a pedophile, rather than by his being
homicidal, or being sadistic, or lacking empathy, it is not likely that he still would have
ordered the extermination of European Jews (even assuming that he would be in a
position of power to do so).4 In light of this, it would seem that a satisfactory explanation
of Hitler’s actions cannot simply cite the fact that he was morally depraved; rather, it
must ascribe to him a particular depravity-making natural property. However, since true
ascriptions of these latter sorts of properties (e.g., being homicidal, being sadistic, etc.)
are compatible with the falsity of all moral theories, it would seem that the best
explanation of Hitler’s actions in terms of his character traits need not make reference to

4

One might complain that, the social-political situation of Germany being what it was in the 1930’s, even a
non-homicidal, non-sadistic Hitler with normal powers of empathy would have ordered the final solution
anyway. But if that is true, then the natural thing to conclude is that Hitler’s depravity played no role in
causing his notorious actions. But this conclusion, of course, is exactly the contradictory of what the
naturalist is trying to establish.

168

any distinctly moral properties or facts; or, to put a linguistic spin on what is essentially
the same point: such explanations can be expressed without using moral vocabulary.5

6.2.3. Sturgeon’s tu quoque reply.
To my mind, Sturgeon’s second response to Harman’s explanatory impotence argument
is more promising. Sturgeon observes that an argument parallel to Harman’s can be
constructed to support an anti-realist construal of scientific theories. In his original
presentation, Harman contrasts the explanation of an observer’s moral beliefs with a case
involving another observer forming a scientific belief. In this contrasting case, a
physicist observes a vapor trail in a cloud chamber. Upon making this observation, the
physicist forms the belief that a proton has just passed through the chamber. Harman
contends that, in contrast to the moral case, the fact that a proton passed through the
cloud chamber really does constitute part of the best available explanation of the
physicist’s belief. This contrast between the moral and scientific case is meant to
highlight the trouble with moral facts: whereas we need to assume the existence of
theoretical facts (e.g., the fact that a proton has passed through the chamber) in order to
explain the physicist’s judgment, we do not need to assume the existence of moral facts
in order to explain our making a moral judgment about the torturing of the cat.
5

The reason it may be better to speak of explanations that do not use moral vocabulary, as opposed to
explanations that do not make reference to moral facts, is that the latter way of speaking leaves the antirealist vulnerable to the charge of begging the question against the ethical naturalist. Intuitively, an
explanation making ineliminable reference to a natural property like maximizing the balance of pleasure
over pain should not be counted as a moral explanation (ceteris paribus). But ethical naturalists like Brink
and Sturgeon have claimed that it may well turn out that this natural property is identical with moral
rightness. If such an identity claim were true, it would follow via Leibniz’ Law that the explanation in
question needs to make reference to a moral property after all (viz., the moral property maximizing the
balance of pleasure over pain). In that case, we could not say, without begging the question against the
naturalist, that the relevant explanation makes no reference to moral properties or facts. To avoid the
charge of begging the question, then, it may be more appropriate to speak of moral facts as being
explanatorily impotent in the sense that the best explanations of our observations can be stated without the
use of moral vocabulary.
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Against this, Sturgeon notes that an analogue of Harman’s explanatory impotence
argument would show that the proton is not needed to explain the physicist’s belief after
all:
Given her training and the theory that she has internalized, the physicist would
have thought, “There’s a proton,” at the sight of a vapor trail, whether the trail had
been produced by a proton or not: so it looks like assumptions about the proton
are not needed, after all, to explain her observational judgment (2006a: 245f; cf.
Sturgeon 1985a: 68-71; Brink 1989: 184-186).
With respect to Harman’s physicist example, then, it would seem that we can explain the
fact that the physicist believes that a proton has passed through the chamber simply by
citing (a) the physicist’s non-theoretical, observational beliefs (e.g. her belief that there is
a vapor trail in the cloud chamber), (b) the fact that she accepts a physical theory
according to which vapor trails indicate protons under these conditions, and, perhaps, (c)
the fact that there actually was a vapor trail in the cloud chamber (this explains her
observational belief).6 If Harman’s argument from explanatory impotence is sufficient to
motivate the rejection of moral realism, then the availability of this non-theoretical
explanation of the physicist’s belief ought to be sufficient to motivate the rejection of
realism about protons. Since, however, all parties to this debate accept realism about
theoretical entities like protons, the availability of this parallel argument shows that
Harman’s argument against moral realism must be defective somehow. It would seem,
6

Some have raised the question of whether the third item, c, is really necessary in order to explain the
physicist’s belief. After all, given the theory that she accepts, the physicist would have judged that a proton
passed through the chamber even if she had only experienced a visual experience of a vapor trail, but no
real vapor trail was present. Perhaps this is right. Whatever the case may be, it isn’t of great importance
for the point being made. Nevertheless, it seems to me that, if the physicist did have a visual experience of
a vapor trail, this is something that cries out for explanation. One possible explanation is that she is a brain
in a vat and that the computer generating her visual images has run a program that caused her to experience
an appearance of a vapor trail. Another possible hypothesis is that, due to spending long nights
overworking at the lab, she has simply suffered a hallucination of a vapor trail. Above, I recommend the
hypothesis that there really is a vapor trail because this seems to me the most plausible explanation for the
majority of actual-world cases in which a physicist has a visual experience of a vapor trail. But again,
whether or not a real vapor trail turns out to be part of the best explanation for her belief, the point being
made stands.
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then, that the explanatory impotence argument must be rejected (at least by any
philosopher who accepts scientific realism, such as me).
With respect to this particular exchange, I am inclined to think that Sturgeon
comes out on top. But, as we will see, there is still good reason to doubt that that moral
realism is safe from the charge that putative moral facts are explanatorily impotent.

6.2.4. Lessons of the Harman and Sturgeon exchange.
In his initial presentation of the argument from explanatory impotence, Harman selects an
individual’s arriving at a particular moral judgment as the explanandum for which moral
facts are potential explanans. It is this choice that makes his argument vulnerable to
Sturgeon’s tu quoque reply. Harman is right to think that the best proximate explanation
of why some moral appraiser arrives at a particular moral judgment about an action will
need to make reference only to facts about the moral theory she accepts along with other,
non-moral facts about the case. As we saw, however, similar things are true mutatis
mutandis of the proximate explanations of why a physicist arrives at the judgment that a
proton has passed through a cloud chamber: the best proximate explanation of her
judgment will need to cite only facts about what scientific theory she accepts along with
other, non-theoretical facts about the case (e.g., that she observed a vapor trail, etc.).
The lesson for the moral anti-realist is that a successful explanatory challenge to
moral realism will have to investigate more ultimate explanations of our moral
judgments. The question that needs to be asked is not whether moral facts figure
ineliminably in the best explanation of our having made this or that particular moral
judgment, but rather, whether moral facts figure in the best available explanations of our
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having the moral sensibility that we have.7 In this context, we can think of a person’s
moral sensibility as a (usually inchoate and tacitly held) moral theory or standard that she
accepts.8 If moral realism is true, and if we possess approximate moral knowledge, then
we should expect that stance-independent moral facts play an important role in the best
explanation of our having the moral sensibility that we currently have. If moral facts are
not needed in such explanations, then we should either reject moral realism or else accept
the skeptical view that we have no moral knowledge.
Notice that naturalistic moral realists themselves acknowledge this challenge, or
something like it. Boyd, Brink, and Sturgeon all acknowledge that, if the method of
reflective equilibrium is to be thought of as a reliable method that guides us towards true
moral belief, then it had better be the case that our initial stock of pre-theoretical moral
beliefs are at least “approximately true”:
If a dialectical process [of moral reasoning] that takes common or considered
moral judgments as a significant part of the input is to have moral knowledge as
output, then there ought to be reason to think that the judgments of commonsense
7

Sturgeon appears to recognize that this is the location of an important challenge to moral realism when he
writes, “…I think the main problem [for moral realism] arises only when we take a moral global view of
the history of moral and scientific thought” (1986a: 70f; cf. 1992: 101; 2006: 254f; cf. Quinn 1986). In
some places, Sturgeon suggests that this challenge is related to worries about the existence of deep moral
disagreement and the difficulty of settling such disagreements (see, for instance, his 1985a: 49). I think
there is something to this. But it is important to see that the present challenge could be posed even if it so
happened that everyone in the world shared approximately the same moral beliefs. Even if there were such
agreement, we could still ask whether stance-independent moral facts constitute an ineliminable part of the
explanation for the convergence in moral sensibility (cf. Williams 1985: Ch 8). Suppose, for example,
convergence in moral sensibility has been achieved, not through argument and presentation of evidence,
but rather, through the repression and extermination of those with dissenting moral sensibilities. If this
were our own situation, I suspect that most would agree the fact that the people agree in their moral
sensibilities constitutes very little evidence in favor of moral realism. (Certainly, we would not think it
good evidence for the truth of some religion, R, if the entire population of the world came to accept R
unanimously as a result of coercion and extermination of dissenters.)
8
It might be helpful to follow Simon Blackburn and think of a person’s moral sensibility roughly as a
function that takes non-moral observations or non-moralized descriptions of actions, states of affairs, (etc.)
as input and yields moral judgments as output (Blackburn 1998: 5). Note that, just as a speaker of a
language easily obeys grammatical rules that she may be unable to articulate, a moral appraiser need not be
in a position to articulate the moral theory or standard that underwrites her moral sensibility (assuming,
contra particularists, that there even is such a standard). In short, an appraiser may (indeed, will) often lack
easy introspective access to the contents of her moral sensibility.
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morality are sufficiently close to the truth. Dialectical inquiry can identify and
correct various sorts of errors, even very significant and far-reaching errors, but it
appears unable to identify or correct systematic error, because the grounds and
direction for correction must emerge from reflection on the beliefs with which
cognizers start. Do we have any reason to think that the considered moral
convictions of commonsense morality are generally reliable or at least not
systematically seriously mistaken? (Brink 1999: 207; cf. Boyd 1988: 201, 207;
Brink 1989: 299; Sturgeon 1986a: 67; 2006a: 254f.)
If moral facts themselves do not figure in the best explanations of our (past or present)
moral sensibility then it is hard to see how we can answer Brink’s question affirmatively.
In that case, we should conclude either that moral skepticism is true (i.e., that we have no
moral knowledge), or else that some form of moral anti-realism is true. Of course, an
argument from explanatory impotence refocused in this way will represent an
improvement over Harman’s original version only if it is not vulnerable—or, at any rate,
significantly less vulnerable—to another tu quoque reply.9 After presenting a refocused
version of the explanatory impotence argument against moral realism in §6.3 below, I
will go on to argue in §6.4 and §6.5 that this argument is indeed much less vulnerable to a
tu quoque reply. Before turning to these matters, however, I need to address a worry that
my argument neglects a possible avenue open to naturalist moral realists.

6.2.5. Moral explanations of non-doxastic phenomena.
Above, I suggested that the central question for the moral explanations debate is whether
moral facts are needed in the best explanations of our having the moral sensibility that we
have. It might be thought that this neglects another possibility: perhaps moral facts are
needed to best explain something other than our moral sensibility or moral beliefs. If

9

The sort of tu quoque reply that I have in mind would involve presenting a parallel argument to the effect
that theoretical facts play no needed role in the best explanations of why we accept the scientific theories
that we currently accept.
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so—if moral facts are needed in the best explanations of some non-doxastic
phenomena—then by EC, metaphysical naturalists will be permitted (indeed, required) to
accept the existence of moral facts even if they are not needed to explain our moral
sensibility. Consequently, even if a good case can be made that moral facts do not
explain our moral sensibility, it can be argued that it would be too hasty to conclude on
the basis of EC that we should not posit their existence.
This line of defense can promise only cold comfort to moral realists, and perhaps
not even that. In the first place, if moral facts do not figure in the best explanations of
our moral sensibility and moral beliefs, then, given some fairly orthodox epistemological
assumptions (e.g., an anti-luck condition on epistemic warrant), it follows that we have
no moral knowledge. This skeptical conclusion follows even if it should happen that
moral facts really do figure in the best explanations of some non-doxastic phenomena
somewhere in the universe.
Now, moral skepticism (the view that we have no moral knowledge) is not
logically incompatible with moral realism as I have formulated it in §1.2.1: it is coherent
to suppose that there exist stance-independent moral facts and that human beings have no
knowledge of these facts. Still, a commitment to moral skepticism would surely be a
disappointment to the general metaethical outlook of moral realists; realism is typically
presented as part of a non-skeptical view of morality. Indeed, in their own formulations
of moral realism, both Sturgeon and Boyd include an anti-skeptical epistemological
condition. Sturgeon, for example, writes that a “core thesis” of moral realism that “…our
ordinary methods of arriving at moral judgments provide us with at least some
approximate knowledge of moral truths” (Sturgeon, 1986b: 117; cf. Boyd 1988: 182).
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A commitment to moral skepticism threatens more than mere disappointment to
moral realists, however. If we have no moral knowledge, then it is doubtful that we
currently know that there are phenomena that moral facts are needed to explain—for if
we did know this, then presumably we would have some moral knowledge. But if we are
aware that we do not know that there are phenomena that moral facts are needed to
explain, then, if we accept EC, we are not within our rights to posit the existence of moral
facts. Thus, even if our evidence fails to entail that moral realism is false, the fact that we
lack moral knowledge does seem to entail (at least, when conjoined with EC) that we
ought not now accept moral realism.
In addition to these worries, there is also the problem of finding plausible nondoxastic explanatory work for moral facts to do. If moral facts do not explain our moral
beliefs and moral sensibility, what other phenomena might there be left for them to
explain? One plausible suggestion is that moral facts explain human actions. Indeed, we
do sometimes say of a philanthropist, for example, that she donates to charity because it
is the morally right thing to do. However, in paradigmatic cases of this sort, we expect
that the putative moral fact will move the agent to act only if she believes that fact. More
concretely, we expect that the fact that donating to charity is morally obligatory will
move the philanthropist to act only insofar as the philanthropist believes that donating to
charity is morally obligatory.10 Thus, even if moral facts explain human actions, such
explanations will be plausible only if those facts also explain our moral beliefs and
sensibility. So we are still in search of non-doxastic phenomena that moral facts might
10

It is not out of the question that moral facts could influence an agent to act by some kind of subconscious
process, bypassing her beliefs and moral attitudes. But surely this would not be an attractive hypothesis if
we had no evidence that moral facts ever cause an agent to act because she consciously apprehends that
such a fact. It would be very strange indeed if moral facts exert a causal influence on our actions but only
through subconscious processes.
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plausibly explain. Unfortunately, outside of human beliefs and human actions, there just
aren’t any phenomena remaining for which facts about what is morally right or wrong,
good or bad, etc., might plausibly be needed to explain: moral facts of these sorts are
certainly not needed to explain planetary motion, plate tectonics, weather patterns, the
behavior of atomic particles, etc. If this is right, then assuming EC, the case for
naturalistic moral realism really does hang on the question of whether putative moral
facts are needed in the best explanations of our moral beliefs and moral sensibility.

6.3. Anti-Realist Explanations of Moral Theory.
6.3.1. Non-moral explanations.
I have suggested that a better version of the moral anti-realists’ argument from
explanatory impotence would focus on explanations of our having the sort of moral
sensibility that we have, rather than on proximate explanations of our making this or that
particular moral judgment. (It will be useful to speak of an entire community as having a
moral sensibility or accepting a moral theory. Presumably, the matter of which moral
theory a community accepts is some kind of function of facts about which moral theory
[or moral theories] its individual members accept.)11 The anti-realist’s task is to advance
a non-moral explanation of our accepting the moral theory that we accept. In this
context, an explanation counts as non-moral if it does not make reference to stance-

11

This idea of a community having a moral sensibility cries out for more elaboration. A natural question to
ask, for instance, is what percent of a community’s population must accept theory T in order for T to count
as giving the content of that community’s moral sensibility? What should we say when a community that
accepts T is a sub-community of a larger community, the majority of which accepts a different,
incompatible moral theory T′? What should we say if the moral experts in a community accept T, while
laypersons accept T′? I must leave these questions unanswered, since I simply do not know how best to
answer them. My hope is that the notion of a community’s accepting a moral theory is intuitive enough to
utilize anyway. In an effort to avoid some of these difficulties, I recommend that we confine our attention
to the moral sensibility that characterizes secular members of post-industrial, Western countries.
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independent moral facts—or, at least, if it makes no use of moral vocabulary. If a nonmoral explanation of this kind is to play a role in an argument against moral realism, then
it must be superior to all realism-friendly moral explanations of moral theory that are on
offer. That is, it must be superior to all competing explanations that make ineliminable
reference to moral facts (or that make ineliminable use of moral vocabulary).
There are a number of anti-realist, non-moral explanations of moral theory that
have been proposed. Some have long pedigrees. In the first place, there is an old line
according to which the moral theory that is current in any given society is a mere
reflection of the interests or preferences of the powerful in that society. This sort of view
makes an early appearance in the mouth of Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic:
…[T]he just is nothing else than the advantage of the stronger. […] …[E]ach
government makes laws to its own advantage: democracy makes democratic laws,
a despotism makes despotic laws, and so with the others, and when they have
made these laws they declare this to be just for their subjects, that is, their own
advantage, and they punish him who transgresses the laws as lawless and unjust
(Plato 1974: 13 [338c-e]).
Although Thrasymachus identifies the property of being a just law with the property of
being a law that is to the advantage of the strong, the thesis that is of interest here is his
claim that the content of any polity’s principles of justice is determined by whatever
considerations the powerful in that polity deem to be to their own advantage. (Note that
accepting this latter claim does not commit one to Thrasymacus’s identity claim.) The
same kind of view is also advanced by Marx and Engels’ in The German Ideology:
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class
which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling
intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its
disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so
that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental
production are subject to it. […] For each new class which puts itself in the place
of the one ruling before it, it is compelled, merely in order to carry through its
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aim, to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of society,
that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the form of universality,
and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones (1933/1978: 172,
174, emphasis in the original).
The sort of picture suggested by Marx and Engels is one in which the moral standard
propagated by the thinkers of a given society is the standard that best (or, at least, largely)
serves the interests of their social class. Since only those thinkers that belong to the
ruling class are in a position to propagate these ideas on a large scale, the moral standard
that is accepted by a given society will always be reflective of the interests of the ruling
class. It is not clear whether Marx and Engels suppose that the adoption of a standard by
thinkers is a cynical plot. A more plausible story would have it that their selection of
these principles is sincere, a mere result of their projecting their personal interests as they
understand them onto the rest of their compatriots or onto their country as a unified
whole.
If, as Thrasymachus and Marx and Engels suggest, the content of the moral
principles or the tacit moral theory that we accept really is fixed by whatever happens to
be in the interests of the powerful in our society, then it would seem to be unnecessary for
us to invoke stance-independent moral facts in the explanation of why we accept those
principles. This is so, at least, provided that there is no problem with the supposition that
the thinkers of a society project their interests into putatively universally applicable moral
rules.
A similar (although perhaps less crude) kind of non non-moral explanation of
moral sensibility can be found in the writings of Freud and Nietzsche (Leiter 2001: 8385). On the Freudian picture, roughly, each person’s moral conscience (i.e., moral
sensibility) arises as a result of her internalizing both the rules and expectations that her
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parents (or some other external authority) imposes upon her, and the punishments
expected as a result of breaking these rules (cf. Freud 1931/1961: 83-96; 1933/1965: 71100; cf. Nietzsche 1887/1967: 84f). Again, genuine moral facts are not needed in this
picture. Thus, if the Freudian explanation of moral sensibility is the best available, then
by EC we ought to deny the existence of stance-independent moral facts.

6.3.2. A Darwinian account of moral sensibility.
Whatever the merits of the aforementioned anti-realist explanations of moral sensibilities,
it seems to me that the most promising kind of non-moral explanation is of a different
sort. In recent years, a number of philosophers have looked to Darwinian natural
selection in order to explain the content of our moral sensibility. It should be noted at the
outset that this sort of explanation is quite compatible with the claim that the sorts of
considerations mentioned above exert an important influence the content of our moral
sensibility. One advantage of the Darwinian account that is worth noting, however, is
that it offers a plausible explanation not only of the content of our moral sensibility, but
also of the origin of our concept of moral obligation. In the remainder of this section, I
offer a brief sketch of a kind of Darwinian account of our moral sensibility.
To start, it must be observed that individual organisms can enhance their
reproductive fitness12 by cooperating with other individuals. This is readily evident with
respect to predatory species that hunt prey that is too strong, too quick, or too endurant
for a single predator to capture. Under certain circumstances, predators that cooperate
12

There is some disagreement among philosophers of biology concerning how the term ‘fitness’ should be
understood. For our purposes, Alan Gibbard’s rough definition should suffice: “An organism’s fitness is its
expected degree of reproductive success, given its characteristics and its environment”, where “[a]n
organism’s reproductive success is roughly the number of descendants it has in the distant future” (Gibbard
1990: 62).
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will tend to be significantly more successful on hunts than their more solitary
conspecifics. Greater success in hunting leads to greater access to nutrition and to a
greater likelihood of survival. In turn, this gives the predator more time to breed, and a
superior ability to provide nutrition for offspring; and these lead to a greater likelihood of
leaving behind more surviving progeny than would otherwise be possible. Assuming that
tendencies to behave cooperatively are heritable, we can expect that the genes responsible
for cooperative behavior will be even more widely represented in each subsequent
generation of this predatory species.
Two of the mechanisms most commonly cited in evolutionary explanations of
cooperation are kin selection and reciprocal altruism. In cases of kin selection,
cooperative behaviors (and even “self-sacrificing”13 behaviors) are directed at closely
related family members. To the extent that such behaviors result in a number of closely
related family members enjoying greater reproductive fitness, the genes of the sacrificing
individual will be passed on in greater numbers than would be the case if the individual
had refrained from cooperating (Hamilton 1964a; 1964b; Ruse 1986/1998: 220). Where
a tendency to cooperate arises between non-kin, it is standard to explain this by appeal to
the mechanism of reciprocal altruism. In cases of reciprocal altruism, roughly,
individuals help others at a cost to themselves, but with an “expectation”14 that
beneficiaries will reciprocate when the tables are turned (Trivers 1971). The
reproductive benefits of cooperation accrue to those altruists who limit their helping only
13

‘self-sacrificing’ is in scare quotes here because, from a biological perspective anyway, it is not entirely
clear that behavior of this sort constitutes a genuine sacrifice. A parent who dies protecting her young from
predation, assuming her efforts succeed and her young go on to reproduce themselves, has arguably
sacrificed nothing from the point of view of reproductive fitness (assuming she could not have lived long
enough to replace the young that would have perished but for her efforts).
14
In lower animals, we need not think of the individual’s “expectation” of reciprocity as a propositional
attitude had by that individual. What is important is that the individual has a behavioral disposition to
discontinue behaving altruistically when the altruism is not reciprocated.
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to reciprocating individuals. Because cooperating with cheaters (individuals who do not
reciprocate) imposes a cost in fitness to altruistic individuals, natural selection favors
those altruists with an ability to detect and exclude (and even punish) such cheaters.
Note that, according to the account being sketched here, the proximate
mechanisms eliciting altruistic behavior in non-human organisms are affective or
conative states. At least, this is so in those organisms sophisticated enough to count as
capable of having such states. What natural selection gives to these organisms, then, is
something like a desire to care for one’s kin or to cooperate with those who have helped
in the past.
So far, I have discussed the evolution of cooperative behavior. I have not said
anything about the emergence of a genuine moral sensibility. How might this
evolutionary account be extended to explain the fact that we make moral judgments and
accept moral principles? Several philosophers advancing evolutionary explanations of
moral thought have suggested that distinctly moral sensibilities evolved in large part as a
solution for combating the individuals’ temptation to defect from cooperation (Kitcher
1998: 302ff; Joyce 2006: ch. 4; Ruse 1986/1998: 221ff). The background for this
suggestion is this: Even individuals who are generally cooperative have egoistic desires
that compete with their altruistic desires and concerns. Presumably, this is because an
individual with a mixture of altruistic and egoistic desires and dispositions enjoys an even
greater reproductive fitness than individuals who behave in a purely altruistic way in all
circumstances (Kitcher 1998: 299-302). However, the existence of egoistic desires in an
individual will sometimes tempt her away from reciprocating, even in those
circumstances in which it would be to her disadvantage to defect and act selfishly.

181

Indeed, an individual’s failure to reciprocate could be quite costly to her as it may trigger
nearby altruistic conspecifics to exclude her from future cooperative ventures and, in
some cases, lead them to form an alliance against her.15 Moreover, in groups in which
defections from cooperation are common, the cooperative scheme will be less stable than
that of groups whose members more reliably toe the party line. This instability both
limits the size of workable cooperating groups and also results in a need for members to
invest a large amount of time and effort into peacemaking (Kitcher 1998: 302f).
Consequently, members of these groups lose out on advantages in reproductive fitness
that could be theirs, but for a more effective cooperative scheme.
According to the evolutionary account of moral judgment, in order to combat
failures to cooperate in the appropriate circumstances, our hominid ancestors evolved a
moral sensibility. On this picture, an individual with a moral sensibility sees certain
situations as demanding a certain response. To judge that one morally ought to cooperate
is not simply to feel an inclination or desire to cooperate (as might be the case with nonmoralizing altruistic animals); it is to see cooperation as something that is required of
oneself irrespective of what one may happen to desire (Joyce 2006: ch. 2). In addition, it
also involves seeing transgressors of moral rules as deserving condemnation or
punishment (even if that transgressor is oneself). Important for the account being
sketched here is the assumption that there is a strong link between the moral judgments
that an individual makes and her motivation to perform (or refrain from) actions that are
the subject of such judgments (Blackburn 1988: 363; Gibbard 1990: 76-80; Joyce 2006:
15

Some of the philosophers who propose this style of evolutionary story point to studies of chimpanzee
behavior for clues about the behavior of our primate ancestors. To the extent that present day chimp
behavior really can give us some insight into the behavior of our ancestors, Frans de Waal’s research
provides us with evidence that our pre-moralizing ancestors formed cooperative alliances (see de Waal
1982).
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108-118; Street 2006: 157n13).16 What is being claimed, then, is that by seeing certain
kinds of behavior as morally obligatory, individuals with moral sensibilities turn out to be
more effective and reliable cooperators than non-moralizers; and, as a result, they enjoy
greater reproductive fitness.
Something needs to be said now about what this account implies about the content
of our moral sensibilities. What does this account imply about the matter of which tacit
moral theory or principles we accept? No one who advances this evolutionary picture
claims that the content of our moral sensibilities is wholly determined by natural
selection. Most proponents do, however, claim that natural selection has influenced that
content to a significant extent (Joyce 2006: 140; Ruse 1986/1998: 235-247; Street 2006:
113-121).17 To begin with, note that, by this picture, altruistic and cooperative behavior
develops before moral sensibilities emerge. As we saw, moral sensibility and moral
judgment evolve as a way of making individuals more effective cooperators. In light of
this developmental order, we should expect that the contents of the moral sensibilities of
the earliest moralizers reflected the cooperative tendencies and preferences that were
already prevalent among non-moralizing ancestors. For example, whereas our non-moral
ancestors felt a strong desire or urge to feed and defend their young, our moralizing
ancestors would, in addition, judge themselves to be under a moral obligation to do these
things; they would see such actions as demanded by the situation; and they would see
16

This need not—indeed, should not—be read as an assumption of the truth of moral judgment internalism.
According to (one version of) moral judgment internalism, it is a necessary truth that any agent who judges
herself to have a moral obligation to φ is to some extent motivated to φ. I am not assuming anything so
strong here. All that is needed for the evolutionary story is the much weaker claim that normal moralizing
agents, under normal conditions, are to a fairly strong extent motivated to perform the acts they judge
themselves morally obligated to perform. Even naturalists who famously deny moral judgment internalism
have seen fit to grant something like this weaker assumption (e.g., Boyd 1988: 215f; Brink 1989: 49).
17
One outlier is Kitcher, who writes, “I have made no explicit claims about the emergence of morality from
proto-morality, but it seems to me overwhelmingly plausible that this history has been guided mainly, if not
exclusively, by forces of cultural, rather than natural selection” (1998: 305).
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their own failure to comply with this demand as deserving condemnation. To the extent
that non-moralized cooperative dispositions and behaviors were the result of natural
selection, then, it is plausible to suppose that the content of the moral sensibilities of our
earliest moralizing ancestors were greatly influenced by natural selection as well. Indeed,
it should be observed that the basic contours of our own moral sensibility seem to favor
kinds of behavior that would likely have enhanced the reproductive fitness of early
humans, if not ourselves. To extend the previous example, we tend to judge that our
moral obligations to aid our own children are much more stringent than our obligations to
aid the children of strangers. It is not hard to see how agents who incorporate this
judgment into their sensibility are likely to have greater reproductive success than those
who do not.18
It is worth reiterating that this evolutionary account of the origin of our moral
sensibility does not preclude the claim that other factors, such as cultural forces and the
sorts of factors mentioned in §6.3.1, have exerted an influence its content as well. The
evolutionary account, for example, is consistent with Philip Kitcher’s proposal that the
content of our moral sensibility has been largely shaped by a process of cultural
evolution (as opposed to evolution by natural selection):
During at least fifteen thousand years, different lineages of our Paleolithic and
Neolithic ancestors explored virtually all the systems of rules and ideals for
regulating conduct that have figured in the every day conduct of most people
(including most contemporary people). Many of these systems did badly in
cultural competition: the groups that adopted them were not very good at
transmitting their ideas to contemporaries and descendants. The systems that
survived were absorbed in later moral practices and figured in the codes that
emerge in the Mesopotamian and Egyptian texts. Cultural evolution continued as

18

I borrow this example from Ruse (1986/1998: 238-242) and Street (2006: 115). For more examples of
moral judgments that appear likely to enhance the reproductive fitness of individuals who tend to make or
subscribe to them, see Street’s paper.
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the central themes are transmitted to the Hebrews and Greeks (Kitcher 2005:
174).19
Note also that the evolutionary account is compatible with the claim that content of our
current moral sensibility has been greatly influenced by the kind of coherence reasoning
favored by many contemporary ethicists (such as Boyd [1988], Brink [1989], Daniels
[1979], Sturgeon [2002], and Rawls [1971/1999]). This is consistent with the
evolutionary account insofar as it is allowed that the content of the moral sensibility had
by our earliest moralizing ancestors serves as the starting point from which coherence
reasoning (thought of as a collective social enterprise) began.

6.3.3. From the Darwinian account to moral anti-realism.
Most importantly, it should be observed that in the evolutionary account sketched above,
no mention is made of genuine, stance-independent moral facts (Blackburn 1988: 363;
Gibbard 1990: ch. 6; Joyce 2006: ch. 6; Kitcher 2005: 175; Ruse 1986/1998: 250-256;
Street 2006: 125-135). According to this account, the capacity for moral judgment did
not confer advantages on our ancestors because it allowed them to detect important facts
about their environment that were awaiting discovery; rather, the advantages were reaped
because of the effect that this capacity had on restraining certain behaviors that were
maladaptive or otherwise risky from the point of view of reproductive fitness. The moral
sensibilities of our ancestors could fulfill this function (of motivating adaptive behaviors)
even if there were no facts that their sensibilities represented. Because this evolutionary
explanation of our moral sensibility and its contents does not require that we posit the

19

Another proponent of cultural evolution as a mechanism for shaping moral norms is Shaun Nichols. In
his (2002), he argues that moral (and other) norms that prohibit actions that tend to elicit negative emotions
have a higher likelihood of surviving to later generations than those that do not.
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existence of stance-independent moral facts, it follows that, if it offers the best available
explanation of our moral sensibility, and if we accept EC, then we must accept an antirealist construal of moral inquiry.

6.3.4. Evidence favoring the Darwinian explanation of moral theory.
Of course, the account I have sketched here is speculative. It is also coarse-grained and
incomplete. Why believe that it, or something sufficiently close to it, is correct? A fully
satisfactory answer to this question would require a comparison with competing
hypotheses about the origin and content of our moral sensibility. Unfortunately, there
isn’t the space to pursue such a task here, at least with respect to all the competing nonmoral explanations of moral sensibility that might be adduced. I will, however, address
one realist hypothesis below in §6.4.1. But before turning to that hypothesis, I want to
indicate several considerations that reflect favorably on the present hypothesis, even if
they fall far short of confirming it.
In the first place, as Richard Joyce observes, the tendency to make moral
judgments “exists in all human societies we have ever heard of” and “exists in virtually
every human individual,” and develops within “virtually every human
individual…without formal instruction, with no deliberate effort, and with no conscious
awareness of its special features” (2006: 134, 135). According to Joyce, these
observations “strongly suggest that the tendency to make moral judgments is innate”
(ibid. 137). The evolutionary account nicely explains how such an innate tendency might
arise. Indeed, it is hard to see how anything other than a Darwinian account even could
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plausibly explain the innateness of this (or any other) tendency, given a commitment to
metaphysical naturalism.20
A second consideration favoring the evolutionary hypothesis is this: According to
this account, human moral sensibility developed out of the conative states of our premoral ancestors. If it should turn out that our own moral judgments are driven largely by
emotion, this would seem to favor the evolutionary account over those accounts that
suggest that our moral sensibilities developed as a matter of detecting stance-independent
facts (Joyce 2006: 128, 130). As it happens, the psychological evidence seems to
indicate that emotion is the driving force behind moral judgment (see, for example, Haidt
2001).
Finally, the evidence from primatology seems to favor the evolutionary story.
Present-day chimpanzees exhibit an impressive array of altruistic and cooperative
behaviors (de Waal 1982). This fact gives us some reason to expect that our nonmoralizing hominid ancestors had affective dispositions that produced altruistic behavior.
If so, it is hard to see why we should doubt that these dispositions have survived in us and
have exerted an influence on our present-day moral and evaluative judgments.
I believe that the considerations mentioned above give us reason to conclude that
the evolutionary account, or something relevantly like it, is (at the very least) a contender
for the title of best available explanation of our current moral sensibility (at least, when
this account is supplemented with a description of further cultural influences, including
20

I can think of only two competing hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that God implants these tendencies
in our minds at birth. The second is something like a Platonic theory of recollection: these tendencies were
acquired in past lives and are merely “recollected” by each living human. Setting aside the question of
whether these hypotheses are plausible (it is not at all clear how one could recollect a tendency, as opposed
to a proposition), neither seem compatible with naturalism, at least granting widely held assumptions that
many naturalists accept (viz., that neither God nor past lives are needed in the best explanations of our
observations).
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our engaging in coherence moral reasoning). It should be noted that, because it does not
require that we posit the existence of moral facts, this evolutionary explanation is very
likely to be more parsimonious than any explanation of our moral sensibility that would
be more congenial to moral realism. Consequently, even if the realist is able to produce
an account that is equally plausible, the evolutionary story would retain a theoretical
advantage since it requires us to posit fewer kinds of entities than a realism-friendly
explanation would require. In that case, the best explanation of our moral sensibility
would not require that we posit the existence of stance-independent moral facts; and so,
in accordance with EC, we should reject moral realism.

6.4. Return of the Tu Quoque?
6.4.1. Tracking accounts of moral sensibility.
How might a moral realist reply to this revised argument from explanatory impotence?
He could reject EC, of course. But as we saw in §6.1, this maneuver is not available to
ethical naturalists.21 Another line of reply would deny that the evolutionary account
sketched above offers the best available explanation of the origin and content of our
moral sensibility. For this strategy to be persuasive, the realist needs to offer his own
competing account of the development of our moral sensibility. Such a story must have it
that our ancestors’ moral sensibilities (or proto-moral sensibilities) were shaped by and

21

But even if a realist rejects EC and accepts ethical non-naturalism, it is far from clear that the threat
posed by the evolutionary account of moral sensibility has been defused. The non-naturalist would still
owe an account of the epistemic processes or mechanisms by which we transcend the influences of
evolution on our moral sensibilities in order to grasp the non-natural moral facts. The non-naturalist cannot
simply allow that our present moral knowledge is merely the result of our subjecting our innate moral
sensibility to coherence reasoning. For, in that case, we would have no reason to think that our moral
beliefs accurately represent the non-natural facts. Thus, while the evolutionary account of moral inquiry is
not per se incompatible with non-naturalistic realism, it certainly seems to encourage moral skepticism.
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responsive to stance-independent moral facts. Following Sharon Street (2006), we can
call accounts of this sort tracking accounts of moral sensibility.
There are at least two salient forms that tracking accounts of moral sensibility
might take. In one form, it is conceded that humans and their ancestors have innate moral
sensibilities. Such an account, presumably, would take the form of an alternative
evolutionary story. According to this kind of story, the ability to detect moral facts
conferred a reproductive advantage on our ancestors and, thus, developed as a result of
natural selection. A tracking account need not suppose that humans evolved an innate
moral sensibility, however. One might argue, instead, that we are able to detect—and,
thus, track—moral facts using the same cognitive equipment that we use to detect nonmoral facts. According to this kind of tracking account, we are able to perceive moral
facts either through direct observation, or else by abductively inferring them from our
observations.
With respect to tracking accounts of the latter sort, I take it that there is little hope
that our moral sensibilities could have arisen by way of direct perception of moral facts.22
The more promising question to pursue is whether we might have arrived at our current
moral sensibility by way of abductive inference from our observations of non-moral
facts. To ask this, in essence, is to ask whether moral facts are needed in the best
explanations of observable phenomena—where the phenomena in question are something
other than the mere fact that we have a moral sensibility.23 I will consider whether there
22

Even if we allow that there are cases of moral perception, as Sturgeon notes, those perceptions would
depend upon the existence of a background moral theory (perhaps tacitly) held by the agent (1985a; Boyd
1988). But in that case, the perceptions of moral facts cannot be the explanation for the development of our
moral sensibility; the existence of the sensibility is ontologically prior to our supposed moral perceptions.
23
The reason for this exclusion is that the very purpose of our search for explanandum is in order to show
that moral facts figure in the best explanation of our sensibility. If we include the existence and content of
our sensibility among the possible explanandum, the tracking account that emerges will be circular. The
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is any serious abductive work for moral facts to do in Chapter 7. My discussion there
centers on the question of whether moral theories yield interesting empirical predictions;
nevertheless, the very same putative predictions double as examples of phenomena that
are potentially best explained by moral facts.
Let us turn our attention, then, to the innate sensibility version of the tracking
account. The trouble for this kind of account is that there does not yet exist a plausible
story of how the capacity to detect stance-independent moral facts (and to recognize them
as moral facts)24 might have conferred a reproductive advantage on organisms. Nor is it
easy to see how an illuminating story of this kind might go. But even if we were
confident that one could be given, it must be noted that it would have to be noticeably
superior in certain respects to the anti-realist’s account sketched in §6.3. As we saw, the
anti-realist’s explanation does not require that we posit the existence of moral facts.
Because of this, it is more parsimonious than any tracking account of moral sensibility
that might be offered. Consequently, a viable tracking account will need to be superior to
the anti-realist account in some other respect, if it is to lay claim to the title of the best
explanation of our moral sensibility.25

account would say, in essence, that the evidence for holding that moral facts are needed to best explain our
moral sensibility is the fact that we need to posit such facts in the best explanation of our sensibility.
24
This qualification is needed because, again, some naturalists identify moral properties with natural
properties such as maximizing the balance of pleasure over pain. I contend that it is not enough that a
tracking account provides some story about how the ability to detect whether something maximizes the
balance of pleasure over pain yields a reproductive advantage. A creature with no moral sensibility
whatsoever could be a flawless detector of this kind of fact. Because of this, it should be clear that an
explanation merely of how we detect natural properties of this sort will not suffice to explain how our
ancestors developed their moral sensibility. What is needed is a story about how the supposed fact that a
natural property of this sort is identical with moral rightness played a role in the evolution of our supposed
ability to recognize this property “under the guise” of rightness. The question, then, is this: “how and why
did the ability to see a property such as maximizing the balance of pleasure over pain as right-making
increase the reproductive fitness of creatures with this ability?”
25
Street makes the same point in her (2006: 129)
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In light of the high bar of theoretical success that any tracking account of moral
sensibility must meet, it seems that, while we await the development of such an account,
we are justified in being pessimistic about its prospects for success. Let us turn our
attention, then, to a different kind of response to the revised argument from explanatory
impotence.

6.4.2. Debunking explanations of scientific thought.
As we saw in §6.2.3, Harman’s original argument from explanatory impotence is
vulnerable to a tu quoque reply. I have suggested that the revised argument from
explanatory impotence, which incorporates an evolutionary explanation of moral
sensibility, is not vulnerable to this sort of reply on behalf of moral realism: whereas the
revised explanatory impotence argument shows that moral facts are not needed in the best
a posteriori explanations of our moral sensibility, a similar line of reasoning cannot be
used to show that scientific or theoretical facts (e.g., facts about the existence and nature
of theoretical entities such as protons, electrons, quarks, etc.) are not needed in our best a
posteriori explanations of our accepting the scientific theories that we accept. But
perhaps this is not so. Perhaps the same kind of argument could be employed in the
service of scientific anti-realism. If it could, this would show that the argument from
explanatory impotence cannot be wielded against moral realism by philosophers such as
Harman and me, who accept scientific realism (i.e., realism about the sorts of facts and
entities posited by our best scientific theories).
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6.4.3. Railton’s evolutionary tu quoque.
In response to evolutionary explanatory impotence arguments of the kind that I sketched
in §6.3, Peter Railton writes:
…[T]his seemingly hard-headed argument is really more of a threat to itself than
to morality. For it presupposes a normative premise that it tends by its own
reasoning to undercut. Why is it ‘facing facts’ to force moralists to confront
theories of natural selection? – Because these theories are epistemically well
confirmed. Who confirmed them, and how? – Humans did, by using scientific
methods. But this assumes that humans are psychologically and socially equipped
to carry out scientific inquiry, to produce and test hypotheses in ways that yield
impartial epistemic justification, despite the fact that our perceptual, cognitive,
linguistic, and deliberative capacities have all been shaped by a process of natural
selection in which opportunism—not impartiality, warrant or truth—rules. Why,
then, isn’t human epistemic pretense illusory? The hard-headed argument
hammers itself into the same ground into which it had previously pounded
morality (2000: 57).
This counter to the evolutionary explanatory impotence argument fails. There is no doubt
that Railton is correct that our perceptual, cognitive, linguistic, and deliberative capacities
have been shaped by natural selection. The trouble is that, unlike the case of moral
thought, there is simply no plausible story to tell about the evolution of these capacities
according to which they enhanced reproductive fitness without delivering (or at least
facilitating) a roughly accurate representation of reality to the organisms that have them.
This is most obvious in the case of perception. The capacity to experience perceptual
representations of a prey animal in location L won’t enhance a predator’s reproductive
fitness much unless this perception regularly correlates with a prey’s actually being in L.
This example suggests that the best evolutionary explanation of our perceptual faculties
will be a tracking account. Indeed, it is hard to see how any non-tracking explanation
could even be plausible.
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A similar thing can be said of our basic inferential capacities. Assuming that our
basic inferential capacities were formed by a process of natural selection, we need some
explanation of how it is that these capacities enhanced the reproductive fitness of our
evolutionary ancestors.26 It seems to me that there is reason for optimism about tracking
accounts on this front as well. To begin with, it is at the very least doubtful that a
tendency to make mostly false inductive inferences could have enhanced reproductive
fitness. It is almost certain that such a tendency would instead diminish a creature’s
fitness. Quine is surely correct when he writes, “Creatures inveterately wrong in their
inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing for their
kind” (Quine 1969: 126). If this is right, then to the extent that natural selection explains
our having the inferential tendencies that we have, it is most likely the evolutionary
pressure has been directed towards producing largely accurate or cogent inductive
inferences.27
Richard Joyce, responding to the same passage from Railton, makes a similar
point with respect to basic arithmetical beliefs. Suppose that simple arithmetical beliefs,
such as 1 + 1 = 2 are innate, and thus, are likely the result of natural selection.28 Even if

26

It is possible, of course, that our inferential capacities are a “spandrel”, a mere by-product of some
different trait that was selected for. All I want to suggest below, however, is that, to the extent that a
capacity to make inferences is fitness-enhancing, the most likely account will be one in which the degree to
which this capacity is fitness-enhancing is positively correlated with the degree to which it produces
accurate conclusions.
27
To avoid misunderstanding, note that I am not suggesting that natural selection has produced (or must
produce) in us perfectly accurate inferential tendencies that are reliable no matter what sort of physical
environment we may find ourselves in. Indeed, it is well known that human beings have a number of
inferential habits that are unreliable in many contexts. But this should not discourage us from thinking that
that our inferences are often fairly reliable—or at any rate, that they are not “inveterately wrong.” (For a
discussion of human inferential failures, see Nisbett and Ross [1980]).
28
Although Joyce cites evidence for the view that “natural selection has provided humans with an inbuilt
faculty for simple arithmetic,” he does not claim that the belief that 1 + 1 =2 in particular is innate. The
innateness of this belief is assumed merely for the purposes of illustration (Joyce 2006: 182).
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we conclude that these beliefs really have come to us via natural selection, Joyce argues,
it does not follow that we have reason to doubt their accuracy:
…[W]e have no grasp of how this belief might have been selected for, how it
might have enhanced reproductive fitness, independent of its truth. False
mathematical beliefs just aren’t going to be very useful. Suppose you are being
chased by three lions, you observe two quit the chase, and you conclude that it is
now safe to slow down (Joyce 2006:182).
Joyce does not treat his readers to an ending to this little illustration, but his point is
obvious: the creature that fails to conclude that three lions in pursuit minus two leaves
one lion still giving chase does not live another day to reproduce. The upshot here is that,
if basic mathematical beliefs come to us via natural selection, then any plausible
genealogy of those beliefs will be a tracking account. It is hard to see how a tendency to
draw largely false mathematical beliefs would enhance the reproductive fitness of
organisms.
I conclude then, that in the absence of further argument, the fact that the cognitive
capacities grounding our scientific practices have been shaped by natural selection gives
us no reason to worry that these capacities fail to deliver a roughly accurate picture of
reality. Furthermore, the fact that these capacities have an evolutionary genealogy gives
us no reason to worry that the scientific practices we have built on top of them are not
truth-conducive.

6.4.4. The social-historical case against scientific realism.
Moral realists looking for debunking arguments against scientific realism to use in a tu
quoque reply to the moral anti-realist revised argument from explanatory impotence
might expect more success by co-opting the arguments that scientific anti-realists have
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themselves offered. Recall that the revised argument from explanatory impotence rests
on the fact that the best explanation of how we arrived at our current moral sensibility is
one that does not require the positing of stance-independent moral facts; the forces
shaping our moral sensibility do not in any obvious way depend upon—nor do they seem
to be responsive to—supposed moral facts themselves. Some opponents of scientific
realism have made a similar charge about our current scientific theories: the best
explanations of how we arrived at our present day scientific theories do not require that
we posit the existence of mind-independent theoretical facts and entities. Because of this,
it is argued that we are unjustified in believing that our current scientific theories are
stance-independently true.
The scientific anti-realist’s argument begins with the claim that the choice of
which theory to accept from a range of alternatives is underdetermined by our
observational evidence. For any theory T1 that accurately accounts for the observable
data, it is possible to construct another theory T2 that accounts for the same data but
avoids a commitment to the unobservable entities posited by T1. Because of this, our
acceptance of a given theory out of a range of possible alternatives must always rest on
something beyond that theory’s mere success in conforming to the observable data. The
anti-realist argues that the sorts of factors that lead us to accept of a given theory over its
“empirically equivalent” rivals—that is, over rival theories that issue the same predictions
about observable phenomena29—are epistemically irrelevant: they fail to justify us in
thinking that our preferred theory, rather than its empirically equivalent rivals, is stanceindependently true. In this vein, Thomas Kuhn writes,

29

I draw this definition of ‘empirical equivalence’ from Boyd (1983: 46; cf. Boyd 1982: 618).
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Observation and experience can and must drastically restrict the range of
admissible scientific belief, else there would be no science. But they cannot alone
determine a particular body of such belief. An apparently arbitrary element,
compounded of personal and historical accident, is always a formative ingredient
of the beliefs espoused by a given scientific community at a given time.”
(1962/1996: 4).
What sorts of arbitrary and accidental factors might have influenced the
acceptance of our scientific theories? In the most extreme formulation of this kind of
argument, the anti-realist claims that the major factors determining theory acceptance are
political, ideological, and/or personal. Convincing examples in which some area of
scientific research and its conclusions is driven by these considerations are not hard to
find. It hardly comes as a surprise to us that environmental research funded by petroleum
companies or right-wing think tanks tend to conclude either that global warming is not
anthropogenic, or else that it is not as serious a threat to the interests of mankind as other
scientists claim. It is plausible to suppose that these conclusions have more to do with
the financial interests of petroleum companies and the political ideology of right-wing
think tanks than they have to do with stance-independent facts about the real trajectory
and causes of global warming. (Or perhaps this example gets it backwards. Some on the
right contend that environmental research in the academy is driven less by the quest for
truth than by the desire of left-wing academics to provide a rationale against unfettered
capitalism.)30 Another putative example of this phenomenon is provided by evolutionary
psychology. Critics argue that the conclusions arrived at by evolutionary psychologists—
namely, claims to the effect that certain psychological traits are innate and the result of
natural selection—are little more than an attempt to justify existing power structures.

30

Thus, Ayn Rand writes, “The immediate goal [of environmentalists] is obvious: the destruction of the
remnants of capitalism in today’s mixed economy, and the establishment of a global dictatorship” (Rand
1971/1999: 280).
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Along these lines, the Sociobiology Study Group writes, “It is not surprising that the
model of society that turns out to be ‘natural’ bears a remarkable resemblance to the
institutions of modern market society, since the theorists who produce these models are
themselves privileged members of just such a society” (1977: 133).
In general, the greater the role that ideological considerations of these sorts play
in the best explanations of our collective acceptance of current scientific theories, the less
of a need there is to posit the approximate truth of these theories in order to explain our
acceptance.
Other putatively non-epistemic factors that influence the acceptance of scientific
theories make for a somewhat less cynical case against scientific realism. Among the
factors that determine theory acceptance, according to Kuhn, are “aesthetic” (or
“pragmatic”) considerations. For example, we change our allegiance from one theory to
another because we judge the new theory to be “simpler” or more “elegant.” Citing
factors of this sort is especially needed to explain theory acceptance in cases where a
scientist must choose between two or more empirically equivalent theories. The trouble
that this phenomenon poses for the scientific realist is that, according to his anti-realist
opponents, the aesthetic or pragmatic features of a theory are of no epistemic
significance:
In so far as they go beyond consistency, empirical adequacy, and empirical
strength, [pragmatic considerations] do not concern the relation between the
theory and the world, but rather the use and usefulness of the theory; they provide
reasons to prefer the theory independently of questions of truth (van Fraassen
1980: 88).
More than this, judgments about which theory is simpler or more elegant are sometimes
held to be subjective, admitting of no single correct standard. Because choices about
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which theory to accept are made by appeal to these subjective aesthetic standards, there
are no grounds for saying that one scientist’s favorite theory has a greater claim to being
correct than another scientist’s favorite theory, at least where those theories are
empirically equivalent. Because of this, Kuhn writes, “There is no neutral algorithm for
theory choice, no systematic decision procedure which, properly applied, must lead each
individual in the group to the same decision” (1969/1996: 200, cf. 184ff).
For the scientific anti-realist of this stripe, then, the best explanation of why we
currently accept the scientific theories that we do does not require that we understand
those theories to be approximately stance-independently true. The best explanation of
why we accept a theory T1 over its empirically equivalent rivals must cite primarily
aesthetic, personal, or political factors. However, these factors could motivate our
adoption of T1 even while some other theory T2 is true (where T2 has different
ontological commitments from T1). Because of this, have no reason to suppose that the
entities posited by T1 are part of the best explanation of our accepting T1. Thus, in light
of EC, we are not justified in positing the existence of the theoretical entities that our
current scientific theories apparently commit us to (e.g., protons, quarks, electromagnetic
fields, etc.). If this kind of argument is no less compelling than the argument of §6.3,
then we must conclude that the revised explanatory impotence argument against moral
realism fails to avoid the realist’s tu quoque complaint. Either the moral anti-realist must
also reject scientific realism—which he is loath to do—or else he must concede that the
revised explanatory impotence argument against moral realism is a failure.
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6.5. Breaking the Tu Quoque: The Case for Scientific Realism.
6.5.1. Overview.
Are the anti-realists’ explanations of our current scientific theory really the best
available? According to one standard argument in favor of scientific realism, they are
not: anti-realists cannot provide satisfactory explanations of the “success” of scientific
theories and scientific practice. The scientific realist contends that the best explanation
for the success of science is that our current scientific theories are approximately true and
that the putative entities to which theoretical terms putatively refer really exist. This
argument—the so-called “ultimate argument” for scientific realism—has been advanced,
in one form or another, by Boyd (1982), Kitcher (2001), Jarrett Leplin (1997), Alan
Musgrave (1988), Hilary Putnam (1975c), and J.J.C. Smart (1963), among others. If
successful, this argument would block the tu quoque reply to the revised argument from
explanatory impotence against moral realism. In §6.5.2 and §6.5.3 I present what could
be called the standard version of this argument for scientific realism. In §6.5.4 I go on to
present Boyd’s own particular version the argument. In §6.5.5 I consider the prospects
for the revised explanatory impotence argument against moral realism, should all forms
of the ultimate argument for scientific realism fail.

6.5.2. The standard case for scientific realism.
Scientific realism can be understood roughly as the view that there are theoretical facts
(e.g., facts about unobservable, theoretical entities posited by scientific theories) and that
these facts obtain independently of the beliefs and theories of scientists (and others).
Boyd adds to this characterization the further claim that “scientific theories should be

199

understood as putative descriptions of” these theory-independent facts (1988: 181).
Assuming that our current physical theories are (approximately) true, we should
understand the scientific realist to be committed to the claim that there exist things such
as protons, neutrons, and electrons, and that the existence of these things—and the
properties that they have—depend neither on our believing that they exist, nor on the fact
that we would believe that they exist were we in ideal epistemic conditions.
The standard version of the ultimate argument for scientific realism begins with
the premise that our current scientific theories are instrumentally reliable to a high
degree. As Boyd characterizes it, the instrumental reliability of a theory is a measure of
“its ability to provide…approximately accurate predictions about the behavior of
observable phenomena” (1982: 616). For example, the theory of relativity is
instrumentally reliable to a certain extent in virtue of its ability to predict accurately the
deflection of light passing by the Sun and to predict accurately the perihelion precession
of Mercury (Leplin 1997: 78-80; Will 1986: chh. 3, 4). Several philosophers who
advance the ultimate argument emphasize the importance of “novel” predictions when it
comes to assessing the instrumental reliability of a theory. Following Musgrave, we can
say, roughly, that “a predicted fact is a novel fact for a theory if it was not used to
construct that theory—where a fact is used to construct a theory if it figures in the
premises from which that theory was deduced” (Musgrave 1988: 232; cf. Boyd 1983: 54;
Leplin 1997: 77).31 By this characterization, the theory of relativity’s prediction of the
Sun’s deflection of light and Mercury’s perihelion precession count as novel.32 By

31

I would also include Paul Thagard’s discussion of “conservative dynamic consilience” as an endorsement
of novel prediction as an important element of theory confirmation (Thagard 1978: 83f).
32
As Leplin characterizes novel prediction, the Sun’s deflection counts as novel for the theory of relativity,
but the precession of Mercury’s perihelion does not. He takes the latter prediction to be non-novel because
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contrast, the predictions of the Ptolemaic model of the solar system concerning the
positions of the Sun, Moon, and planets do not count as novel; for the Ptolemaic theory
was constructed precisely in order to fit the known data concerning the recurring
positions of such bodies.33 Consequently, to the extent that these latter sorts of
predictions allow us to say that the Ptolemaic theory is instrumentally reliable at all, we
should say they confer on it only a modest degree of instrumental reliability.
The more controversial premise figuring in the scientific realists’ ultimate
argument is this: the best—indeed, the only credible—explanation for the high degree of
instrumental reliability exhibited by our current scientific theories is that such theories are
approximately (stance-independently) true. More specifically, the claim is that the best
(and perhaps the only plausible) explanation of the instrumental reliability of our
scientific theories is that the central theoretical terms utilized by those theories
successfully refer to stance-independent theoretical entities, and that these entities by and
large have the properties that our theories ascribe to them. In short, in order to best
explain the instrumental reliability of our current scientific theories, we must construe
these theories realistically. Along these lines, scientific realists write:
If the phenomenalist [i.e., anti-realist] about theoretical entities is correct we must
believe in a cosmic coincidence. That is, if this is so, statements about electrons,
etc., are of only instrumental value: they simply enable us to predict phenomena
it fails his “uniqueness condition,” which requires that no existing plausible alternative theory predicts a
qualitatively similar result. Because Newtonian theory also predicted a precession of Mercury’s
perihelion—albeit with less quantitative accuracy than relativity does—the prediction of the precession by
the theory of relativity is not unique, and so not novel according to Leplin’s account. By contrast, although
Newtonian theory could also be used to predict the bending of light, it required discredited auxiliary
hypotheses about the nature of light to do so. For this reason, Leplin claims that relativity’s prediction of
the bending of light passing by the Sun satisfies his uniqueness condition for novelty (Leplin 1997: 77-80).
33
To ward off objections, I recommend that we read Musgrave’s criterion of novelty as concerning facttypes, rather than fact-tokens. Because every prediction is directed towards hitherto unobserved future
token-events, there is a trivial sense in which no interesting fact that we could care to predict figures in the
premises of a putatively empirical theory. (In this vein, a defender of Ptolemy could object that her
successful predictions about an eclipse that is to occur in 2024 ought to count as novel, since Ptolemaic
astronomers could not have appealed to this token-fact in the construction of their theory.)
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on the level of galvanometers and cloud chambers. They do nothing to remove
the surprising character of these phenomena. […] On the other hand, if we
interpret a theory in a realist way, then we have no need for such a cosmic
coincidence: it is not surprising that galvanometers and cloud chambers behave in
the sort of way they do, for if there really are electrons, etc., this is just what we
should expect (Smart 1963: 39).
The positive argument for [scientific] realism is that it is the only philosophy that
doesn’t make the success of science a miracle. That terms in mature scientific
theories typically refer…, that the theories accepted in a mature science are
typically approximately true, that the same term can refer to the same thing even
when it occurs in different theories – these statements are viewed by the scientific
realist not as necessary truths but as part of the only scientific explanation of the
success of science, and hence as part of any adequate scientific description of
science and its relations to its objects (Putnam 1975c: 73).
[The ultimate argument for scientific realism] is, I suggest, an inference to the
best explanation. The fact to be explained is the (novel) predictive success of
science. And the claim is that realism (more precisely the conjecture that the
realist aim for science has actually been achieved) explains this fact, explains it
satisfactorily, and explains it better than any non-realist philosophy of science.
And the conclusion is that it is reasonable to accept scientific realism…as true
(Musgrave 1988: 239, emphasis in the original).
I find the scientific realist’s argument persuasive. But there are at least two
concerns that deserve to be addressed. The first concerns the notion of “approximate”
truth. The second concerns the extent to which the standard version of the ultimate
argument addresses the scientific anti-realist’s objections surrounding the use of nonepistemic considerations when deciding between theories. I will address these concerns
in the next two sections.

6.5.3. Approximate truth.
If the ultimate argument is to be plausible, it must be formulated utilizing the notion of
approximate truth rather than precise truth, or truth simpliciter. Boyd writes that “No
realist conception that does not treat theoretical knowledge and theoretical progress as
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involving approximations to the truth is even prima facie compatible with the actual
history of science” (1990: 216). Perhaps what Boyd has in mind is the sort of worry
described by Thomas Weston:
The history of science provides abundant evidence for what Newton-Smith calls
the “dismal induction”: Theories which have gained and deserved acceptance
have almost always turned out to be false. Past experience would indicate that
even if a theory is sufficiently supported to warrant acceptance, the probability
that it is precisely true is roughly zero (Weston 1992: 54).
In addition, Leplin, who cashes out the notion of approximate truth in terms of “accuracy
of representation,” notes that “there is no reason to suppose that complete or
unimprovable accuracy of representation is required for the explanatory or predictive
adequacy of the mechanism that a theory postulates” (1997: 103). If he is correct, then a
scientific realist could not claim that the only plausible explanation for the instrumental
reliability of our current scientific theories is that these theories are precisely true. Such a
claim would be much stronger than the evidence warrants. Thus, the key premise (and
the conclusion) of the ultimate argument must be formulated in terms of approximate—
rather than precise—truth.
The ultimate argument for scientific realism cannot succeed, then, unless we can
make sense of the notion of approximate truth. Unfortunately, the notion of approximate
truth is both controversial and difficult to formalize. Here are several attempts at a rough
account of approximate truth:
[A sentence] P is approximately true at [world] u if and only if P is true in some
world similar to (or close to) u (Hilpinen 1976: 24)34
…[T]o talk of respects of approximation to the truth is to talk of respects of
similarity and difference between actual causal situations and certain possible
ones (Boyd 1990: 239).
34

In the original, Hilpinen italicizes the entire sentence. I have removed those italics.
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The basic idea of the definition of approximate truth is that a statement will be
approximately true under interpretation I if there is an interpretation J which is
“near” I, and under which it is actually true (Weston 1992: 60f).
A realist interpretation attributes some measure of truth to the theory, where truth
is understood as accuracy of representation. As accuracy comes in degrees, it is
natural to speak of “partial” or “approximate” truth, or of truth in “some measure”
(Leplin 1997: 103)
Roughly, we may say that a theory is approximately true just in case the processes and
mechanisms that it posits and describes are “sufficiently similar” to actual processes and
mechanisms in the world. This is not the place to attempt a defense or formalization of
approximate truth (for the latter, see Hilpinen [1976] and Weston [1987]). Fortunately, in
the context of the current dialectic, a defense is not needed. We have already seen that
Boyd is committed to the legitimacy of approximate truth in his defense of scientific
realism. More importantly, both he and the rest of the principal defenders of synthetic
ethical naturalism make use of the notion of approximate truth in their defenses of moral
realism (Boyd 1988: 201, 207, 209; Brink 1984: 24; 1989: 129, 299; 1999: 207; Sturgeon
1985a: 67f, 72; 1986a: 73f; 1992: 99, 108; 2006a: 254f). In the present context, then, the
legitimacy of approximate truth is not in question. If approximate truth should turn out to
be an unworkable notion, then so much the worse for the naturalist’s case for moral
realism.

6.5.4. Non-epistemic methodological principles and Boyd’s version of the ultimate
argument.
Boyd agrees the standard version of the ultimate argument for scientific realism succeeds
in showing that there is something wrong with the denial of scientific realism. He
observes, however, that the argument does not offer a direct rebuttal to the scientific anti-
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realist’s argument that our reliance on non-epistemic methodological principles in
deciding between empirically equivalent theories implies that we are unwarranted in
supposing our preferred theories are approximately true. A satisfactory version of the
ultimate argument should address this claim (Boyd 1983: 54).
In advancing his own version of the ultimate argument for scientific realism,
Boyd contends that it is not merely the instrumental reliability of scientific theories that
needs explaining, but also the instrumental reliability of scientific methods. For Boyd, a
collection of methodological principles is instrumentally reliable to the degree that the
implementation of these methods tends to lead scientists to accept instrumentally reliable
theories (Boyd 1982: 16; 1983: 76; 1990: 221). As examples of instrumentally reliable
methodological principles, he offers the following:
(1) Conservatism: “…new theories should, prima facie, resemble current theories
with respect to their accounts of causal relations among theoretical entities”
(1973: 7; cf. 1982: 618f).
(2) Principle of experiment design: “…a proposed theory T must be
experimentally tested under situations representative of those in which, in the
light of collateral information, it is most likely that T will fail, if it is going to fail
at all” (1973: 10; cf. 1982: 629f).
(3) Principle of measurement procedures “…one should follow the dictates of the
best confirmed theory in (re)designing measurement procedures” (1983: 79; cf.
1982: 19f).
Boyd notes that all three of these principles are “theory-dependent.” This is obvious in
the case of conservatism: whether or not a new theory is acceptable from the point of
view of conservatism depends upon what theory (or theories) we presently accept. But
even the principle of experiment design is theory dependent: judgments about the sorts of
conditions under which a new theory is likely to fail must be made on the basis of our
current scientific background knowledge, which may include propositions arrived at on
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the basis of the current theory we are looking to replace. Finally, the principle of
measurement procedures explicitly directs us to consider the theories we presently accept
when designing measurement procedures.
According to Boyd, the fact that methodological principles that are so theorydependent are nevertheless instrumentally reliable—the fact that they continually lead us
to accept increasingly instrumentally reliable theories—stands in need of explanation
(1973: 3). He argues that the only scientifically plausible explanations for the
instrumental reliability of methodological principles like those mentioned above require
us to judge that our scientific theories are approximately (stance-independently) true.
According to Boyd, it is because our background scientific theories are approximately
true that the implementation of these theory-dependent methodological principles is able
to guide us towards accepting increasingly instrumentally reliable theories. Boyd
contends that no other hypothesis can make adequate sense of the instrumental reliability
of these methods (Boyd 1973: 11f; 1982: 621f; 1983: 64ff).
If Boyd is correct, then an important consequence follows: because our theorydependent methodological principles are operating on approximately true background
theories, there is reason to expect that the application of these principles will be reliable
in guiding us towards new theories that are themselves approximately true. In short, the
application of these methodological principles is part of a reliable process of true belief
production. As a result, such methodological principles have epistemic import after all,
contrary to what anti-realists like Kuhn and van Fraassen have claimed: that a new theory
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has been arrived at and endorsed through the application of these principles is evidence
that the theory is approximately true (Boyd 1982: 622f; 1983: 67).35
Naturally, Boyd’s argument promises to explain only why aesthetic
considerations or seemingly pragmatic considerations such as parsimony and elegance
are capable of contributing to the epistemic warrant of scientists’ acceptance of certain
theories. Since it is doubtful that ideological considerations for selecting theories are
likely to be truth-conducive, Boyd’s argument may do little to confer epistemic value
upon those kinds of considerations. But this is hardly cause for alarm. To the extent that
our current theories are highly instrumentally reliable, it is doubtful that a credible case
can be made that mere ideological considerations have been the most significant grounds
upon which such theories are accepted by scientists. It is surely too incredible to be
believed that the principle “select the scientific theory that whose acceptance would most
benefit the interests of capitalists over workers” would tend to produce instrumentally
reliable scientific theories in the long run (especially in the natural sciences). More
likely, instrumentally reliable scientific theories are arrived at in spite of—rather than
because of—the influence of political ideology.

6.5.5. What if the ultimate argument is a failure?
As with the standard version of the ultimate argument for scientific realism, I find Boyd’s
argument to be persuasive. If his argument is indeed successful, then there would seem
to be little reason to worry that the kind of reasoning behind the revised explanatory
impotence argument against moral realism could be used to upset our commitment to
35

This inference should be uncontroversial if we follow Boyd in assuming that a reliabilist account of
epistemic warrant is correct. Again, since Boyd and his fellow ethical naturalists do accept epistemological
reliabilism in one form or another, this assumption is safe in the context of the present dialectic.
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scientific realism: the best explanation of our accepting the scientific theories that we
accept is a realist explanation. Consequently, moral anti-realists and ethical nonnaturalists can advance the explanatory impotence argument against naturalistic moral
realism without fear of endangering their commitment to scientific realism, if they have
such a commitment.
As I said, I am inclined to think that the ultimate argument (in at least one of its
forms) is sound. But it must be acknowledged the ultimate argument for scientific
realism has not produced consensus among philosophers of science. Scientific antirealists point to numerous cases in the history of science where a theory proved to be
instrumentally reliable despite the fact that its central terms failed to refer, and thus, the
theory was not even approximately true. In addition, they have raised objections to the
very notion of approximate truth and its use by realists.36
While I continue to find the realist’s case to be persuasive despite these
objections, I must be frank and admit that I do not have the scientific expertise to
evaluate the anti-realist’s replies to either form of the ultimate argument. In place of a
further defense of scientific realism, I want to consider what the fallout would be for the
explanatory impotence argument against moral realism, if it were it to turn out that the
ultimate argument for scientific realism is a failure.
Boyd suggests that the ultimate argument probably “reconstructs the reason why
most scientific realists are realists” (1983: 54). I believe that this is true in my own case:
it strikes me as very unlikely, for instance, that scientists could have developed an atomic
bomb if the physical theory that they were working with was not approximately correct—
at least, correct to the extent that the world really contains entities that have a legitimate
36

Both of these lines of objection to scientific realism are advanced by Laudan (1981).
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claim to being the referents of ‘proton,’ ‘neutron,’ and ‘electron.’ In that respect, I am
convinced that the best explanation of how mid-20th century physicists were able to
produce an atom bomb requires that we posit the existence of protons, neutrons, and
electrons. In short, I believe that we must suppose that the prevailing physics of the time
was at least approximately true in a stance-independent way.
Now, in light of the importance of the ultimate argument (even in unarticulated
and inchoate forms) in persuading philosophers and laypersons of scientific realism, it
seems to me that, if the ultimate argument could be shown to be a failure, then it would
be perfectly reasonable to give up on scientific realism. But in that case, the moral
realist’s deployment of the tu quoque carries no force: if no version of the ultimate
argument for scientific realism succeeds, then those of us who accept EC really ought to
reject scientific realism along with moral realism. If scientific anti-realism is the price
that a metaphysical naturalist must pay for advancing the explanatory impotence
argument against moral realism, then, assuming the failure of the ultimate argument, it is
a price that he would have had to pay anyway. To conclude this section: even if no
version of the ultimate argument for scientific realism succeeds, the moral realist’s tu
quoque reply still fails as a reply to the argument from explanatory impotence.

6.6. Conclusion.
Harman’s original argument from explanatory impotence against moral realism is
vulnerable to a quick tu quoque reply: just as moral facts are not needed to explain our
making this or that moral judgment in response to observing an action, theoretical facts
are not needed to explain a physicist’s theoretical judgments in response to observable
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phenomena. I have suggested that a better argument from explanatory impotence would
focus on the explanations of the origin and content of our collective moral sensibility as a
whole. I have argued that the most promising explanation is a Darwinian account. Since
the Darwinian account makes no essential reference to genuine stance-independent moral
facts, and since moral facts do not seem to potentially explain any other phenomena,
metaphysical naturalists ought to deny the existence of moral facts.
I have argued, in addition, that this revised argument from explanatory impotence
is not vulnerable to the sort of tu quoque reply that undoes Harman’s original version of
the argument. Because of the high degree of instrumental reliability of our best scientific
theories and methods, there is no compelling explanation of the origin and content of our
acceptance of those theories that does not recognize their approximate truth.
In the next chapter, I will consider whether moral realists can mount a
counterattack against the revised argument from explanatory impotence that is modeled
on the defense of scientific realism that I sketched in §6.5. According to this line of
thinking, there may yet be phenomena that moral facts are needed to explain: namely, the
instrumental reliability of moral theories. I will argue that this sort of reply on behalf of
moral realism fails.
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CHAPTER 7
THE PROSPECTS FOR AN ULTIMATE ARGUMENT FOR MORAL REALISM
7. Chapter.
7.1. Introduction.
Although the failure of the ultimate argument for scientific realism would do no favors
for naturalist moral realists, my own view, again, is that the ultimate argument (in at least
some of its versions) is sound. Thus, I believe that a debunking argument of the kind of
advanced against moral realism in §6.3 fails when it is directed against scientific realism.
But even if we grant the success of the argument for scientific realism, the moral realist
has one more hand to play. As we saw, the central argument in favor of scientific realism
rests on two claims: (i) our best present-day scientific theories (and methods) exhibit a
high degree of instrumental reliability, and (ii) the best explanation of this instrumental
reliability requires that we construe those theories realistically. Perhaps the moral realist
could utilize a similar argument in order to respond to the argument from explanatory
impotence. An argument of this sort would begin with the premise that our best current
moral theories are instrumentally reliable to a high degree. To this the realist would add
the claim that the best available explanation for the instrumental reliability of such
theories requires that we construe them realistically.1 Let us call this the ultimate moral
argument. In this chapter, I aim to refute the ultimate moral argument—or, to state my
goals more modestly, I aim to raise a good amount of doubt about the prospects for the
success of such an argument.
1

To keep things simple, I am going to set aside discussions of claims to the effect that the methodological
principles underwriting moral inquiry (as opposed to particular moral theories) are themselves
instrumentally reliable. From my discussion of the putative instrumental reliability of moral theories
below, my hope is that it will be evident than such methodological principles—at least in their application
to moral matters—do not exhibit an impressive degree of instrumental reliability.
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7.2. Moral Theories and Empirical Predictions.
7.2.1. On the instrumental reliability of moral theories.
Recall from §6.5.2 that a theory is instrumentally reliable to the extent that it yields
“approximately accurate predictions about the behavior of observable phenomena.”
Recall also that a theory’s ability to yield accurate novel predictions carries an especially
heavy weight in determining the degree of instrumental reliability that it enjoys. Our
present task is to examine whether moral theories exhibit a significant degree of
instrumental reliability. We must search, then, for observable phenomena that moral
theories might help us to predict. On the face of it, this might seem like a fool’s errand:
moral theories do not aim to tell us what is the case or what will be the case; rather, they
aim to tell us what ought to be the case. This sort of consideration might lead
philosophers, including moral realists, to doubt the propriety of asking of a moral theory
that it be instrumentally reliable (cf. Nagel 1986: 144; Quinn 1986; Shafer-Landau 2006).
Be that as it may, at this point in the dialectic, moral realists who accept naturalism, and
thus, accept EC, do not have the luxury of dismissing the demand that moral theories
yield predictions about observable phenomena; they desperately need to find explanatory
work for moral facts to do. As it happens, SEN proponents have offered several examples
of predictions derived from moral theories. After dealing with a preliminary concern, I
will discuss three of these examples below.
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7.2.2. A bad argument against the instrumental reliability of moral theories.
Here is an argument against the instrumental reliability of moral theories that moves too
quickly. Let us suppose that our best moral theory is hedonistic act-utilitarianism (AUh).
Consider a case in which an agent, Ann, has several alternative actions open to her.
Suppose, further, that only one of Ann’s alternatives maximizes hedonic utility. Given
our assumptions so far, this alternative is morally obligatory according to our best moral
theory. Let us now ask what sort of event AUh predicts will occur in this case: will Ann
choose to perform the morally right action or not?
It should be obvious that, in the absence of further premises, AUh yields no
predictions about which action Ann will perform. In the face of this fact, one might be
tempted to conclude that AUh is not at all instrumentally reliable. It may be, of course,
that this failure indicates only that AUh is itself a flawed theory. However, it is easy to
see that matters are no different for any rival theory of morally right action: no such
theory by itself yields empirical predictions about how any agent will behave. Since it is
hard to see what other kinds of facts such a theory might predict besides the actions of
agents, it would seem that no theory of morally right action is instrumentally reliable. If
this is really the case, then the ultimate moral argument is unsound. (At least, this is so
insofar as the argument attempts to establish realism about deontic moral properties such
as rightness and obligation. Further argument would be needed to show that evaluative
properties such as goodness and badness share the same fate.)
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7.2.3. Three examples of prediction by moral theory.
I said that the argument sketched in the previous section moves too quickly. Here is why:
As Brink and Sturgeon observe, theories in general (be they moral theories or non-moral
theories) do not yield empirical predictions in isolation. In order to derive a prediction, a
theory must be conjoined with “auxiliary premises.”2 Putnam, for example, notes that
Newton’s theory of universal gravitation issues no empirical predictions without auxiliary
premises that give an inventory of what objects there are in space and what additional
forces besides gravity are present (Putnam 1974: 255). Both Brink and Sturgeon contend
that, if we allow ourselves to utilize auxiliary premises, we can in fact derive empirical
predictions from moral theories and principles:
Candidate moral principles—for example, that an action is wrong just in case
there is something else the agent could have done that would have produced a
greater net balance of pleasure over pain—lack empirical implications when
considered in isolation. But it is easy to derive empirical consequences from
them, and thus to test them against experience, if we allow ourselves, as we do in
the scientific case, to rely on a background of other assumptions of comparable
status. Thus, if we conjoin the act-utilitarian principle just cited with the further
view, also untestable in isolation, that it is always wrong deliberately to kill a
human being, we can deduce from these two premises together the consequence
that deliberately killing a human being always produces a lesser balance of
pleasure over pain than some available alternative act; and this claim is one any
positivist would have conceded we know, in principle at least, how to test”
(Sturgeon 1985a: 51; cf. Brink 1989: 137; Sayre-McCord 1988: 436f).3
Presented more formally, Sturgeon’s example is this:
Example A:
A1. For any act, x, x is morally right iff x maximizes hedonic utility (moral
theory).

2

This is insight is commonly credited to Pierre Duhem (1906/1914: 183-188) and Quine (1951: 38f).
Brink appears to hold that the auxiliary premises that conjoin with moral principles to yield empirical
predictions must themselves be moral propositions (Brink 1989: 137, 183). I am not so sure that he is right
about this. His own example (represented by B below), contains at least one non-moral auxiliary premise.
Furthermore, example C below appears to contain only auxiliary premises that are non-moral.
3
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A2. For any act, x, if x is the deliberate killing of a human being, then x is not
morally right (auxiliary moral proposition).
A3. For any act, x, if x is the deliberate killing of a human being, then x does not
maximize hedonic utility (empirical prediction).
The prediction A3 is entailed by A1 and A2. Now, it may not be quite right to say that
A3 is an empirical prediction, since it can’t be confirmed by direct observation. Its
confirmation would have to proceed, instead, by way of enumerative induction from
direct observations of act-tokens of deliberate killings. I propose that we ignore this
complication. In any case, it would do just as well for the purposes of the naturalistic
moral realist to substitute A3 with the claim that all observed acts of deliberately killing a
human being fail to maximize hedonic utility.4
Another type of example offered by SEN proponents derives predictions from
claims about the moral character of agents. This kind of prediction is illustrated most
clearly by Brink:
My moral belief that good people keep their promises when doing so involves
great personal sacrifice has no observational consequences when taken in
isolation. But when I conjoin it with my independently supported moral belief
that Zenobia is a good person (i.e., my evidence not including Zenobia’s promisekeeping behavior), I can obtain the observational consequence that Zenobia will
keep her promise to Zelda, even though doing so will involve great personal
sacrifice on Zenobia’s part (Brink 1989: 137).
From this passage, let us construct a second example of a moral prediction:
Example B:
B1. For any person, x, if x is morally good and x has made a promise that
requires great personal sacrifice, then x will keep x’s promise (moral
theory).
4

A further complication is this: in order to know that a given act-token maximizes hedonic utility, it is not
sufficient that we know the hedonic utility of the observed act; we must also know the hedonic utility of all
of its alternatives that go unperformed; but this information certainly cannot be acquired by direct
observation. I think this fact may well be a serious problem for those who would use example A as
evidence in support of an ultimate moral argument. Nevertheless, as with the previous difficulty, I am
prepared to set it aside.
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B2. Zenobia has made a promise that requires great personal sacrifice (nonmoral auxiliary proposition).
B3. Zenobia is morally good (auxiliary moral proposition).
B4. Zenobia will keep her promise (empirical prediction).
In other passages, Brink and Sturgeon suggest that the property justice plays a
causal role in the world. Sturgeon writes: “A widespread and longstanding assumption
about social justice is that it is a stabilizing condition and injustice a destabilizing one, at
least under circumstances common enough to be interesting” (1991: 29). Similarly,
Brink writes: “We think that political vices (e.g., social injustice) sometimes cause, and
so help explain, instability, protest movements, and revolutions; and we think that the
political virtues of a society’s laws and institutions (e.g., its social justice) can help
explain its stability” (1989: 187; cf. Railton 1986: 191f). If they are correct, then our best
theory of social justice—assuming it is stance-independently true—ought to facilitate
reliable predictions concerning the stability of a given society, at least when that theory is
conjoined with this and other auxiliary propositions.
In order to produce an example of a prediction of this sort, we need a sample
theory of justice. Because of its familiarity and its plausibility, I will use John Rawls’s
two principles of justice for my illustration. According to Rawls, the basic structure of
society is just if and only if it satisfies the following two principles (with the first given
priority over the second):
[1] Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. […]
[2] Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a)
to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings
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principle,5 and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of
fair equality of opportunity (Rawls 1971/1999: 266).
I will refer to the conjunction of these principles as ‘RPJ’ (for ‘Rawls’s Principles of
Justice’).
With this theory of justice in hand, I can sketch the third and final example of an
empirical prediction generated by a moral theory:
Example C:
C1. For any society, x, x is just if and only if the basic structure of x satisfies
RPJ (moral theory).
C2. For any society, x, if x is just, then x is stable (non-moral auxiliary
proposition).
C3. The basic structure of society S satisfies RPJ (non-moral auxiliary
proposition).
C4. Society S is stable (empirical prediction).
Examples A, B, and C represent the most significant examples of empirical
predictions derived from moral theories that are found in the writings of the principal
defenders of synthetic ethical naturalism. I believe that, as Brink and Sturgeon contend,
these examples succeed in showing that moral theories really do have empirical
consequences, at least when conjoined with certain auxiliary assumptions. Thus, there is
nothing in principle that prevents a moral theory from being instrumentally reliable to
some degree. Unfortunately for ethical naturalists, this finding is not enough to ground a
successful ultimate moral argument. In the first place, it is not enough that some moral
theories have empirical consequences. What the ultimate argument requires is that our
best current theories have such consequences, and, moreover, that these consequences are
in fact born out by our observations. In other words, our best theory must not only

5

A just savings principle specifies the kinds and amounts of things that any given generation must save for
future generations (Rawls 1971/1999: 252ff). The matter of which savings principle really is just is not
important for my purposes here.
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predict; it must predict successfully. But even this does not go far enough. For it must
also be the case that a realist construal of our best theories offers the best explanation of
this predictive success. To some extent, whether or not a realist explanation is best will
depend upon the character of the predictions and their relationships with the relevant
theories. Scientific realists and scientific anti-realists alike acknowledge that some false
theories are able to generate reliable predictions. For instance, after it was discovered
that metals weigh more after combustion, the phlogiston theory of combustion was
amended so as to include the proposition that phlogiston—which was supposed to be
released from an object during combustion—had “negative weight” (Thagard 1978: 78;
Kuhn 1962/1996: 71). With this amendment, the phlogiston theory would now correctly
“predict” of any piece of metal that it would weigh more after it was burned (with the
explanation being that, during combustion, the metal releases its phlogiston and hence,
loses some of its negative weight). It should be obvious, however, that the best
explanation of the amended phlogiston theory’s predictive “success” here does not
require us to read that theory realistically. (This should be obvious, at the very least,
because we now know that phlogiston does not exist.) Indeed, this sort of phenomenon
illustrates one reason why scientific realists have held novel predictions to be of special
importance in confirming a theory. In the phlogiston example, the prediction that metals
lose weight upon combustion is clearly not novel to the mature phlogiston theory; the
amendment that makes these successful predictions possible would have been completely
unmotivated if the relevant data concerning the weight of combusted metals had not
already been known.
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In the remainder of this chapter, I will examine examples A, B, and C. I will
argue that none of these provide a compelling example of a (i) currently best moral
theory that (ii) yields successful empirical predictions, where (iii) the best explanation for
this success requires a realistic reading of that theory.

7.3. Example A: Predictions Grounded in Two Deontic Moral Principles.
7.3.1. The implausibility of premise A2.
An initial difficulty with example A concerns the auxiliary premise A2. If A is to be a
compelling example of a successful moral prediction that supports a realistic construal of
a moral theory, then the relevant auxiliary premises used to generate the predictions
ought to be plausible. Unfortunately, A2 is not all that plausible. It is surely only the
rare pacifist (or perhaps someone who is already in the grip of an explicit moral theory)
who thinks that it is in all cases morally wrong to kill another human being. I believe that
a more plausible auxiliary proposition would allow that killing is permitted in cases of
self-defense. Moreover, those of us who think that not all human beings are persons will
not find A2 plausible, even when it is amended to permit self-defense. Perhaps then, the
auxiliary hypothesis we are looking for is this:
A2': For any act, x, if x is the deliberate killing of a person in a non-self defense
scenario, then x is not morally right.
While some philosophers might find A2' plausible, others might contend that it is false
insofar as it fails to accommodate certain “doomsday” scenarios. For instance, one might
think that it is morally permissible to deliberately kill a non-threatening person if that
person’s sacrifice by us is required in order to avert a catastrophic disaster (e.g., the
destruction of 90% of the Earth’s human population). One way to deal with this sort of
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case is to reformulate A2 as a ceteris paribus principle. Another solution, which I will
utilize below, is simply to amend it with a “non-doomsday” clause.
In addition to the non-doomsday clause, I would recommend another amendment.
As it stands, A2' implies that many—if not most—cases of voluntary active euthanasia
are morally wrong. For my own part, I have a firm intuition that many such cases are not
morally wrong. In light of these considerations, I recommend the following auxiliary
proposition to replace A2:
A2'': For any act, x, if x is the deliberate killing of a person against her will in a
non-self defense and non-doomsday scenario, then x is not morally right.
A2'' is close enough to a plausible moral principle for our purposes. When conjoined
with A1, it entails the following empirical prediction:
A3': For any act, x, if x is the deliberate killing of a person against her will in a
non-self defense and non-doomsday scenario, then x does not maximize
hedonic utility.

7.3.2. AUh predicts unsuccessfully.
With the trouble over the auxiliary premise of example A settled, we can now turn to a
more serious problem: AUh is more likely to be disconfirmed by the prediction A3' than
to be supported by it. It is a longstanding objection to AUh that it is too indiscriminate in
countenancing as morally right the deliberate killing of persons when such killing would
maximize hedonic utility. Typically, this objection simply points to possible worlds in
which the killing of a person against her will (even in a non-doomsday, non-self defense
situation) would maximize the balance of pleasure over pain. However, if it should
happen that no such possible world is near to our own, then the naturalistic realist who
defends AUh might be able to escape the present worry. After all, it is observations of
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the actual world that confirm or disconfirm empirical predictions. Unfortunately, there
isn’t very good reason to think that it never happens in the actual world that killing a
person against her will maximizes hedonic utility in non-doomsday scenarios. In fact, an
anti-utilitarian who is hell-bent on giving the theory an empirical refutation could arrange
to make the prediction come true herself! She could arrange for someone who gets
intense joy from killing to kill an isolated and very depressed hermit.6
The trouble with example A, then, is that it is a case in which a representative
moral theory is likely to be refuted by its empirical prediction, rather than supported by it.
Thus, it is not an example that could be used to support the ultimate moral argument.7

7.3.3. Example A restated using a different moral theory.
Those who are inclined to retain the auxiliary hypothesis A2'' will perhaps doubt that
AUh really is our best current moral theory. As it so happens, neither Sturgeon, nor
Brink, nor Boyd is a proponent of AUh. As we saw in Chapter 5, Boyd and Sturgeon
endorse a view called ‘homeostatic consequentialism.’ Brink endorses a view that he
calls ‘objective utilitarianism.’ Let us consider, then, how one of these more
sophisticated theories of morally right action fares when it is conjoined with A2'' to

6

Or perhaps it would not be so easy for the malevolent anti-utilitarian: some have argued (usually as an
objection to AUh) that it is nearly impossible to make reliable utility calculations about actual act-tokens
and their alternatives with any kind of accuracy (see, for example, Lenman 2000). If so, the anti-utilitarian
would have a very hard time ensuring that the killing she is planning really will be an act that maximizes
hedonic utility. Fair enough. But this only raises a further problem for example A: if it really is that
difficult to assess the hedonic utility of an act and its alternatives, then we will find ourselves unable to
know whether AUh is vindicated by prediction A3'; we would never know whether or not the act of killing
that we observe really maximizes hedonic utility In that case, example A cannot be used to show that AUh
is a highly instrumentally reliable theory; we would never know whether its predictions are successful or
not.
7
In fairness to Sturgeon, example A works well enough for his immediate purposes in his (1985a). He
presents the example merely to show that moral theories have empirical consequences when conjoined with
auxiliary hypotheses. His goal in that paper is not to show that our best moral theories are, in fact,
instrumentally reliable.
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produce an empirical prediction. Because Brink’s objective utilitarianism is better
developed and less unwieldy than homeostatic consequentialism, I propose to use it as the
sample moral theory for my discussion. Unfortunately, since the value component of
objective utilitarianism eludes a concise formulation, and since Brink’s own formulation
of the view is sketchy and incomplete, my formulation of the theory will be very rough.
Here it is:8
OU: (1) For any act-token, x, x is morally right if and only if x maximizes
objective utility.
(2) The objective utility of thing (e.g. an action, a motive, a state of affairs,
etc.), x, is a quantity that increases with the degree to which x
“expresses” at least one of the following:
(a) the pursuit of an admissible project by an agent; or
(b) the realization of an admissible project by an agent; or
(c) personal and social relationships that exhibit respect for persons.
(3) For any project, x, and moral agent, S, x is admissible if and only if:
(a) the formation and pursuit of x by S is reflective; i.e., S attempts to
integrate x into a “coherent life plan” that realizes S’s human
essence
(b) x shows respect for other persons; i.e., S’s pursuit of x does not
cause other persons “significant and avoidable harm” and involves
the recognition that other person’s well-being matters.

8

Objective Utilitarianism is introduced in Brink (1989: ch. 8, especially pp. 231-237, although refinements
are made throughout the chapter). My formulation of OU centers around the following passage in which
Brink lays out what I take to be the core of his axiology: “As components of human welfare, pursuit and
realization of admissible projects and personal and social relationships exhibiting respect for persons are
intrinsically valuable. Actions, motives, and other things that express these values are themselves
intrinsically valuable, while actions, motives, and other things that causally contribute to the realization of
these values are extrinsically valuable” (ibid. 234). He conjoins this theory of value with an act-utilitarian
theory of right-action: “an action is right just in case it contributes to human welfare at least as much as any
alternative action available to the agent” (ibid. 237); “…rightness is identical with the maximization of
welfare…” (ibid. 238). The specification of admissible projects can be found in (ibid. 232f). Clause 3b is
also fleshed out in two additional passages: “But there are moral constraints on valuable projects; in order
for the pursuit or realization of a project to be of value, that project must, among other things, respect other
people at least in the minimal sense of not causing significant and avoidable harm” (ibid. 264); “…[A]n
agent’s projects cannot be valuable if they fail to show respect for others. Respect for others requires
recognition that others matter, and this requires that we recognize their claims to basic well-being and
overall welfare in certain ways” (ibid. 289).
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There is no doubt that much needs to be said in order to elucidate OU. However, I will
confine myself to only three comments. First, my formulation of OU takes at least one
liberty with Brink’s own presentation of the theory: in order to cast OU as a full criterion
of morally right action, I have presented conditions 3a and 3b as jointly sufficient for a
project to count as admissible. In Brink’s presentation, he explicitly allows that there
might be additional constraints on projects; but he declines to outline what they might be
(1989: 232). Nothing that I say below turns on whether or not there are additional
conditions that a project must meet in order to be admissible. Second, it should be
noticed that while clauses 2 and 3 of OU spell out what sorts of considerations give
positive intrinsic value to a state of affairs, Brink offers no account of what sorts of
considerations, if any, confer negative intrinsic value upon a state of affairs. Finally, the
axiological component of OU (constituted by clauses 2 and 3) is to some degree circular.
This is because the notion of well-being appears in the specification of the conditions of
admissibility for projects. Unfortunately, this last feature of OU complicates things with
respect to the claim that it is empirically observable (or at any rate, empirically
confirmable) whether an act maximizes objective utility. I propose that we simply
overlook this complication and give Brink and the ethical naturalists the benefit of the
doubt by assuming that whether an act maximizes objective utility is something that, at
least in principle, can be empirically confirmed.
I am not interested in criticizing OU as a theory of morally right action. For the
purposes of this discussion, I am ready to grant that it is the best available theory of its
kind. Instead, my present concern is with the question of whether OU, when conjoined
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with auxiliary premises such as A2'', yields enough interesting successful predictions to
render a realistic reading of the theory superior to any anti-realist readings.
Now, the conjunction of OU and A2'' yields the following (putatively) empirical
prediction:
A3'': For any act, x, if x is the deliberate killing of a person against her will in a
non-self defense and non-doomsday scenario, then x does not maximize
objective utility.
Let us use ‘example A-II’ to refer to the set of propositions whose members are OU, A2'',
and A3''. In assessing the prospects of using A-II as the foundation of an ultimate moral
argument, we must begin with the question of whether the prediction captured in A3'' is
true. Again, because A3'' is a universally quantified proposition, no single observation
can confirm it. What we are interested in is, rather, whether it is the case that all
observed acts of killing a person (against their will and in a non-doomsday scenario)9
have been acts that fail to maximize objective utility.
I suspect that few people have ever, upon witnessing a killing, stopped and tried
to discern with any accuracy whether or not no alternative action expressed to a greater
degree the pursuit or realization of projects or relationships that exhibit respect for
persons. Thus, I doubt that the kinds of predictions yielded by A3'' have been directly
confirmed by empirical observation. Nevertheless, I am ready to concede that a plausible
case can be made that such predictions are likely to be vindicated. Here is how such a
case might go: Any act that involves the deliberate killing of a person against their will
can plausibly be argued to be an instance of pursuing a project that fails to “show respect
for other persons.” In particular, it can plausibly be maintained that all such acts cause

9

From here on, let it be understood that by ‘acts of killing a person,’ I mean ‘acts of killing a person
against their will in a non-doomsday scenario.’
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“significant and avoidable harm” of the kind that Brink takes to be constitutive of failing
to respect other persons (Brink 1989: 264). If so, then all actions that involve killing
persons fail to express the pursuit or realization of an admissible project or a relationship
that exhibits respect for others. From these considerations, it follows that the objective
utility of any such action is, at best, 0. A defender of OU might be able to argue
successfully that, in all actual world cases, there will always be some other alternative
open to an agent that has greater objective utility. Because of this, we have good reason
to think that the prediction that all acts of killing a person fail to maximize objective
utility will ultimately be born out.

7.3.4. The approximate truth of OU is not needed to explain its predictive success.
Let us grant, then, that A-II is example of a successful empirical prediction by what is our
best theory of morally right action. This is a start towards constructing a viable ultimate
moral argument; but it is not enough. If A-II is to ground such an argument, then it must
also be the case that the best explanation of our ability to predict A3'' using OU requires
us to hold that OU is (approximately) true. I think there is reason to doubt that the best
explanation really requires this. Let me explain.
Unlike cases of scientific prediction, the relevant moral theory (OU conjoined
with A2'') offers no explanation of why A3'' obtains. Those of us who think A3'' is true
certainly do not think it is true because all acts that maximize objective utility are morally
right and no act of killing a person is morally right. Instead, we expect that the
explanation for why A3'' obtains will be of a psychological or sociological sort: e.g.,
people desire not to be killed; being killed usually conflicts with a person’s projects and
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values; etc. (The exact form of the psychological explanation will depend upon how we
cash out the notion of harm and well-being in clause 3b of OU). Most importantly, we
have every reason to expect that, if there is a fully satisfying explanation of why A3''
obtains, it will be one that makes no ineliminable use of moral vocabulary. The upshot
here is that we should have a very high degree of confidence that we will be able to
satisfactorily explain why A3'' is true without having to assume that OU (or the
conjunction of OU and A2'') is approximately true.

7.4. Example B: Predictions Based on Moral Character.
7.4.1. The independence of the prediction.
The first difficulty with example B concerns the independence of the prediction B4 from
the moral theory or principle captured by B1. This worry arises primarily with respect to
the role that B1 (or a more general moral theory that implies B1) plays in our arriving at
B3, the judgment that Zenobia is morally good. Here is the problem: suppose that our
evidence for Zenobia’s being morally good is our past observation that she always keeps
her promises, even at great personal cost. Notice now that the very same evidence is
sufficient to justify the conclusion, simply by way of enumerative induction, that B4 is
likely to be true: Zenobia will keep her promise.10 Given the evidence already in our
possession, the knowledge that B1 is true adds nothing to our ability to predict Zenobia’s

10

Below, we will see that there is reason to doubt that such an inductive inference is cogent, at least if we
are trying to predict whether Zenobia will keep her promise in a novel situation—i.e., a situation that is
importantly different from the past situations in which she was observed to keep her promises. But, as I
argue below, these doubts only make things worse for those who would use B1 to make predictions. My
present claim, then, proceeds from assumptions about personality and behavior that the ethical naturalist
already needs to accept if example B is to be successful in grounding the ultimate moral argument.
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behavior.11 Obviously, then, the approximate truth of B1 is not needed in our best
explanation of our ability to successfully predict B4.
Although Brink’s own reasons for producing his version of example B do not
directly concern the role it might play in a constructing an ultimate moral argument, he
does notice the threat of dependence between B3 and B1. To address it, he suggests that
our evidence for B3 ought to be independent of Zenobia’s promise-keeping behavior
(1989: 137). This requirement can be satisfied, perhaps, if the judgment that Zenobia is a
morally good person is arrived on the basis of observations that reveal her to have
virtuous character traits that are suitably distinct from promise-keeping. For example, we
might have judged Zenobia to be good in response to our observation that she is (or that
she generally behaves in ways that are) kind, courageous, and/or temperate. For this
maneuver to be plausible, it must be the case that we are warranted in inferring that a
person is morally good merely from the observation that she is kind, courageous, and
temperate, etc. Thus, for the purposes of building an ultimate moral argument, we must
see B1 as part of a broader theory of moral character according to which characteristics
besides promise-keeping or fidelity (e.g., characteristics such as courage, temperance,
kindness, etc.) are constitutive of a person’s being morally good. But more than this, it
also requires such a theory to incorporate a kind of “unity of the virtues thesis.” This
unity thesis need not be as strong as some traditional versions whereby a person counts as
morally good only if she has all of the good-making character traits (i.e., virtues). But it
11

It is true that, since the observation of Zenobia’s past promise-keepings have led us to judge her to be
morally good, we must already be committed to accepting a moral theory that incorporates something like
B1. But this fact does not show that the approximate truth of B1 is needed in the best explanation of our
success in predicting Zenobia’s behavior. If, instead of accepting B1, we thought that keeping promises
was a bad character trait to have, we would still have been able to successfully predict Zenobia’s behavior
by enumerative induction on the basis of our observation of her past promise keepings. The only difference
in this case is that is that, instead of accepting B3, we would have judged Zenobia to be morally bad.
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does require, at the very least, that there is a strong nomological connection between the
having of some of the virtues and the having of the rest. (In other words, the virtues must
be homeostatically clustered). This connection must be strong enough so that the
observation that a person is kind, temperate, courageous, etc., warrants an inductive
inference to the proposition that that person is also disposed to keep promises, even at
great personal cost.

7.4.2. Trouble from social psychology.
On the face of it, it seems plausible enough that a person who is kind, courageous, and
temperate is also the sort of person who honors her promises even at great cost to herself,
and that this latter disposition will be reflected in her behavior on the occasion that we are
trying to predict. Unfortunately, there exists a body of psychological research that casts
doubt on the cogency of such an inference. This research suggests that stable character
traits are much less predictive of agent’s behavior than are the features of the particular
situation that the agent finds herself in. Among the classic studies that support this
conclusion is one by Alice Isen and Paula Levin (1972). In one experiment they found
that subjects were significantly more likely to offer help to a person who had dropped
papers on the floor of a shopping mall if, moments before, the subject had found a dime
in the coin return of the public phone from which she had just made a call. Of the
subjects who did not find a dime after checking the coin slot, only 4% stopped to offer
help. By contrast, 87% of those who found a dime in the coin slot offered help. This
data supports the conclusion that, in this sort of case at least, facts about the agent’s
situation (such as whether she found a dime) are a greater predictor of her behavior than
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are facts about the agent’s moral character. Other classic studies that have been invoked
to support this “situationist” view of behavior are Stanley Milgram’s (1963) famous
obedience study and the Stanford prison simulation (Haney, et al. [1973]). In his attack
on virtue ethics, the philosopher John Doris argues that these and other studies establish,
among other things, that
Personality is not often evaluatively integrated. For a given person, the
dispositions operative in one situation may have an evaluative status very
different from those manifested in another situation; evaluatively inconsistent
dispositions may “cohabitate” in a single personality” (Doris 2002: 25).
In other words, virtuous character traits such as kindness, courage, and temperance are
not strongly connected to other virtuous character traits such as, e.g., honesty or fidelity.
If this is correct, then we should not expect that the judgment that Zenobia is good—
when made on grounds other than her honesty or promise-keeping tendencies—will be of
help in predicting how she will behave when her fidelity to her promises is tested. But in
that case, it is hard to see how those who want to make use of example B can maintain
the requisite independence between theory and auxiliary hypotheses without undermining
their ability to make a successful prediction about how Zenobia will act.
But things may be even worse for example B. Doris argues that these studies
show more than just that that we cannot accurately predict a person’s behaving in
accordance with one kind of virtue (e.g. honesty) in a particular situation on the basis of
evidence that they possess virtues of a different kind (e.g., courage, charitableness). The
studies also show that, in general, we cannot predict how an agent will behave in a novel
situation in which a virtue is tested, even if that agent has always acted in accordance
with that virtue in more familiar situations (Doris ibid.; Nisbett and Ross 1991). In other
words, upon observing that an agent has always behaved honestly in her personal
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dealings (even when there has been temptation to lie), we cannot reliably predict that she
will also behave honestly in, say, a business setting. Suppose, then, that we have judged
Zenobia to be good precisely because we have observed her always to keep her promises.
If the situationist account of behavior is correct, then we will not be able to predict that
she will keep her promise the present situation unless this situation is relevantly similar
to others in which we have observed her to keep her promise. If the situation with respect
to which we are trying to predict Zenobia’s behavior is one in which she has made a
promise to keep a secret—and not one in which she has promised to look after a friend’s
child, to repay a debt, to be faithful to her spouse, to donate her kidney, etc.—then we
should expect our prediction to be reliable only if we have previously observed Zenobia
to keep her promises not to tell secrets. However, we cannot reliably predict she will
keep this promise if our basis for this prediction is merely our past observations of her
having always kept her promises to care for her friend’s children.
Although I cannot here defend the situationist account of human behavior from its
critics (for example, Epstein and O’Brien 1985), the very presence of a vibrant
situationist research program in social psychology should be sufficient at least to raise
significant doubts about how useful example B is as a foundation for the ultimate moral
argument. If situationism is correct, then example B-type predictions—predictions about
how a person will behave based on observations about their moral character—are not
likely to prove reliable and accurate. Consequently, example B is not likely to be an
example of a successful empirical prediction. Thus, it does not offer promising evidence
that our best current moral theories are instrumentally reliable to such a high degree that
their reliability is best explained only by supposing them to be approximately true.
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7.4.3. A competing non-moral explanation of the predictive success of B1.
For a defense of the situationist theory in social psychology, the best I can do is to refer
readers to Ross and Nisbett (1991). Since I have neither the space nor the expertise to
mount such a defense myself, it might best that I do not rest the entirety of my case
against example B on the success of situationism. Fortunately, example B fails as a
foundation for an ultimate moral argument for additional reasons that are independent of
situationist considerations.
To see why example B fails, we will need to make several assumptions, all of
which are concessions that favor the ethical naturalist in this context. To begin, let us
assume that there are character traits such as fidelity, and that persons who have these
traits really do exhibit an unwavering tendency to behave in accordance with them across
all the kinds of situations that human being normally encounter. Let us grant, further,
that several of these character traits are homeostatically clustered. And let us suppose
that there is at least one clustering of such traits such that all of the traits in that cluster
are ones that we commonly think of as virtues. To fill out this assumption with some
detail, let us suppose that the properties or character traits fidelity, courage, temperance,
humility, and kindness are homeostatically clustered for human beings: if a person has
four of these traits to a high degree, then there is a much greater than average likelihood
that they will have the fifth trait to at least a significant degree. Finally, granting that
these five properties are natural properties, I will use the non-moral term ‘N1’ to denote
this natural property cluster.
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Above, I suggested that B1 should be viewed as a part of—or else as an
implication of—a more general theory of morally good personhood. We can now see
what such a theory would look like. If the above assumptions are granted, then the
following moral theory could be used to underwrite B1:
GP: a person, S, is morally good if and only if S instantiates N1.
The question before us, as I see it, is whether the best explanation for our ability to
successfully predict B4 on the basis of GP and the auxiliary premises B2 and B3 requires
us to view GP as approximately true. Can we explain the predictive success of GP just as
well if we suppose that GP is false, and not even approximately true? I think we can.
In order to explain how it is that proponents of GP are able to successfully predict
B4, we need only to take on a commitment to the existence of the property cluster N1 and
a commitment to the proposition that proponents of GP identify morally good
personhood with N1. These commitments do not require us to suppose that this identity
claim is true. What explains the ability of GP proponents to predict B4 is simply (i) the
fact that they ascribe morally good personhood to all and only persons who instantiate N1
and (ii) the fact that all persons who instantiate N1 always keep their promises, even at
great cost to themselves. I see no reason to think that this explanation is any worse than
an explanation that takes GP to be approximately true. Thus, the predictive success of
GP does not commit us to realism about morally good personhood.
There is a potential objection to this line of argument that I need to address. The
objection is that my supposed explanation of GP’s success is not really a non-moral
explanation, as I claim. The trouble is that, in describing N1, I made use of the terms
‘fidelity,’ ‘courage,’ ‘temperance,’ ‘humility,’ and ‘kindness.’ These terms are often
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thought of as part of our moral vocabulary. Perhaps one reason for this thought is that at
least part of the linguistic function of these terms is evaluative: under normal
circumstances, to call someone courageous is to praise her. Unless there is a satisfying
explanation of GP’s predictive success that can be stated entirely without recourse to
moral vocabulary, it looks like we will find ourselves committed to moral realism after
all.12
My own view is that, in their typical uses, terms like terms like ‘fidelity’ and
‘courage’—the so-called “thick” moral terms—perform a dual function: first, they pick
out a syndrome of behavioral or psychological dispositions; and second, they function
either to praise the having of these dispositions, or else, to represent the possession of
them as praiseworthy. I believe that in certain contexts, these terms can be used in such a
way that their second, evaluative function is suppressed or canceled. When one of these
terms is used in such a way, I contend, it no longer functions as part of moral vocabulary,
but rather, as part of the vocabulary of psychology or some other social science (cf.
Blackburn 1998: 101-104; Gibbard 1990: 112-115; Hare 1963: 24f). As evidence that
thick moral terms can be used in non-evaluative ways, consider the fact that we
sometimes debate whether the character traits they denote really are virtues, i.e., whether
or not they really are praiseworthy. Now, in order to render GP plausible, I chose
character traits whose status as virtues are unlikely to be disputed by contemporary
secular ethicists (although I would not be surprised if some doubt whether humility is a
virtue). Consider, however, the following character traits, all of which have at one time
or another been suggested to be virtues by speakers in our intellectual tradition:

12

Sturgeon raises a similar objection against Harman’s supposed non-moral explanation of the judgment
that setting the cat on fire is wrong (Sturgeon 2006a: 251).
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cleanliness, chastity, frugality, humor, industriousness, loyalty, manliness, modesty,
patience, patriotism, pride, religious faithfulness, selfishness, and tolerance. It seems to
me that there is nothing at all odd about asking of any item on this list whether it is a
virtue. If I am right, then there is no reason why the terms used to refer to these character
traits cannot be construed as part of non-moral vocabulary, at least if we decide that the
trait it picks out is not, upon reflection, a virtue.13 And if we allow this, then there seems
to be no reason why an ethical nihilist (who holds that no character trait has the property
of being a virtue) cannot utilize these terms as part of a lay psychological vocabulary that
functions to pick out interesting behavioral and psychological dispositions. It seems to
me, then, that there should be no trouble with construing the five terms used to describe
N1 as non-moral or non-evaluative, as I intended them.
For those who remain unconvinced, however, I recommend a different strategy:
when describing N1, we should simply replace the thick moral terms with
uncontroversially non-moral descriptions that pick out the very same character traits. For
instance, in place of the suggestion that one component of N1 is the property courage, we
may instead pick out the relevant component property using the term ‘being disposed to
remain calm and be steadfast in the face of great danger.’ This latter term, I take it, is
uncontroversially non-moral. In addition, it picks out the same character trait that most

13

Note that I am not claiming—nor do I need to claim—that all putatively thick terms can be purged of
their evaluative import. I have doubts about whether one can use a racial epithet or ethnic slur nonironically without being understood by others to be denigrating people of the relevant race or ethnicity.
The evaluative function of such terms is not cancelable in our language, as our language currently is. But
even if this is true for epithets and slurs, I do not think the same must be true for terms denoting character
traits. (On the other hand, it is worth observing that epithets sometimes evolve so as to lose their negative
connotations. This is arguably the case with the term ‘queer,’ which, despite seeing no significant change
in the extension that it picks out, no longer implies a negative evaluation of those to whom it is applied, at
least in many common contexts. I hesitate to push this point too far, since it might be argued that these
uses of ‘queer’ are merely ironic. Still, it does seem to me that the term certainly is on a trajectory where it
may eventually have an evaluatively neutral use that is perfectly earnest.)
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uses of ‘courageous’ pick out.14 At any rate, I believe it comes close enough to give us
confidence that some nearby non-moral property term will do the job.15 Utilizing this
strategy, I believe it is possible to offer an explanation of the predictive success of GP
using purely non-moral vocabulary.

14

It might be objected that thick moral terms denote more than just a syndrome of behaviors. What makes
the term apply to those behaviors is that those behaviors are either appropriate or inappropriate, where
‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ are moral terms, each denoting an irreducible moral property. For
example it might be said that ‘cowardice’ does not denote (something like) the property of feeling fear in
situations that do not cause the average person to feel fear; instead, it denotes something like the property
of taking fear in things that are inappropriate objects of fear. If this is so, then we cannot replace
‘cowardice’ with a thoroughly non-moral, non-normative term. (And the problem, of course, is that it
would be difficult to resist the conclusion that something similar holds for virtue terms, like ‘courage’ and
‘fidelity’.) Whatever the merits of this kind of argument, it does little good for the naturalist’s cause. The
problem is that what explains and predicts the coward’s behavior (e.g., her fleeing from the sight of a
spider) is the fact that she is disposed to take fear in objects of a certain sort (e.g., spiders, or animals, or
things that bite, etc.) and not the fact that these objects are inappropriate objects of fear. That is to say, if
cowardice is an irreducibly normative or evaluative property, then cowardice is never what explains or
predicts a person’s behavior. Similarly for other thick moral terms that are given this sort of analysis.
15
I should acknowledge that some philosophers have expressed doubts about the prospects for such a
maneuver to succeed. For example, John McDowell writes, “It does not follow from the satisfaction of [the
requirement that evaluative classifications are supervenient on non-evaluative classifications] that the set of
items to which a supervening term is correctly applied need constitute a kind recognizable as such at the
level supervened upon. In fact supervenience leaves open this possibility…: however long a list we give of
items to which a supervening term applies, described in terms of the level supervened upon, there may be
no way, expressible at the level supervened upon, of grouping just such items together” (McDowell
(1981/1998: 202). To avoid confusion, I should make it clear that my proposal does not require that the
extension (or, perhaps better: intension) picked out by the relevant non-moral term forms a natural kind
from a non-moral point of view. All it requires is that we can pick out that intension using non-moral
vocabulary. To do this, it is not required that the relevant intension corresponds to a natural kind from the
non-moral point of view. After all, most agree that there is no natural kind corresponding to ‘grue’; but for
all that, it is not controversial that there is an intension that ‘grue’ picks out.
The more serious charge against my proposal, then, is that the natural property that ‘courage’
picks out has such a wildly heterogenous extension that it is simply beyond human capacity to describe this
extension from anything other than a moral perspective. I think it is plausible that this kind of situation
arises with respect to the vocabularies of some sciences or disciplines that describe a certain class of facts
and the vocabularies of those disciplines that describe the facts upon which the former facts supervene. I
would not be surprised, for instance, if there is no humanly possible way to pick out the intension the
psychological predicate ‘pain’ using only the vocabulary of fundamental physics. But that is not the
situation that we are in with respect to moral vocabulary. I am not suggesting that we pick out the natural
property denoted by ‘courage’ by limiting ourselves to the vocabulary of fundamental physics; I am
suggesting that we do so using (primarily, but not exclusively) the resources of personality psychology. Of
course, it could turn out that when we attempt a fully adequate non-moral description of the kind of person
to whom ‘courageous’ is applied, we will find that the vocabulary of psychology and the rest of the
sciences simply aren’t up to the task. It seems to me, however, that the more natural position here is the
optimistic one.
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7.5. Example C: Predictions Grounded in a Causal-Moral Generalization.
7.5.1. Does justice really cause social stability?
Sturgeon himself locates the major weakness of example C. The plausibility of C rests
on its auxiliary premise, C2. According to C2, the justice of a society implies (because it
causes) social stability. Sturgeon acknowledges, however, that “there is…a tradition that
attacks this latter claim as a pious fiction” (1992: 106). While I would not quite call C2 a
pious fiction, I do think there is reason to doubt it. As Brian Leiter writes, “it seems that
justice provokes opposition as often as it produces allegiance: many people have little
interest in just arrangements, and so resist them at every step” (Leiter 2001: 95). Indeed,
if, as I believe, a just society in the United States would more closely conform to RPJ
than it does to its present socio-political arrangement, then it would be nothing short of
naïve to suppose that movements towards justice would strengthen—rather than
weaken—social stability, at least in the short term. In order to satisfy Rawls’s principle
2a (the so-called “difference principle”), there would surely need to be far greater
taxation on the wealthiest individuals for the purposes of redistribution. Unfortunately,
there is a sizable constituency in the United States (which includes, not surprisingly,
many of its wealthiest citizens) who view heavy taxation for such purposes as an affront
to liberty and as deeply unjust. These citizens would surely offer vocal—and very
possibly destabilizing—resistance to any proposal to enact policies that would push the
U. S. towards greater conformity with RPJ. If this is correct, and if Rawls’s theory is our
best theory of justice, then we cannot accurately predict that a society will be stable upon
our observing that it satisfies RPJ.
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7.5.2. Is C2 a non-negotiable condition of adequacy for theories of justice?
Of course, if a society that is observed to satisfy RPJ is found to be unstable, then, rather
than reject C2, we might reject Rawls’s theory of justice instead. Indeed, Sturgeon
suggests that we could use C2 as a means for selecting between alternative theories of
justice. By this methodology, if there is some plausible rival theory of justice, T, and if
societies conforming to T exhibit stability (whereas societies conforming to RPJ do not),
then we have reason to think that T, rather than Rawls’s theory, is true (cf. Sturgeon
1991: 29). Rawls himself appears to accept something like this as part of his own
methodology:
“It is…a consideration against a conception of justice that, in view of the laws of
moral psychology, men would not acquire a desire to act upon it even when the
institutions of their society satisfied it. For in this case there would be difficulty
in securing the stability of social cooperation” (Rawls 1971/1999: 119).
It needs to be recognized, however, that both Rawls and Sturgeon suggest only that the
tendency to stabilize is just one consideration among others for selecting a theory of
justice. Neither philosopher denies that there might be competing reasons with enough
strength to justify our acceptance of a theory of justice that would not have a stabilizing
effect when it is satisfied. In other words, under certain circumstances, social instability
is an acceptable theoretical (and practical) cost of a theory of justice. But if we accept
this possibility, then we have rejected C2. Consequently, it is not clear, after all, that
Rawls (and, for that matter, Sturgeon) really accept C2; both philosophers allow the
possibility that our best theory of justice fails to exert a stabilizing influence on society.
But suppose it is argued that C2 is a non-negotiable part of our criterion of theory
selection when it comes to theories of justice. By this way of thinking, we must reject
any principles of justice that fail to make (or keep) a society stable when that society
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satisfies them. If we take this stance, then it all but guaranteed that our best theory of
justice will make it possible to predict that certain societies are stable.16 But again, this
approach compromises the independence of the moral theory from the relevant auxiliary
hypotheses: C2 would become an important premise in the argument that leads to the
construction and acceptance of our best theory of justice, whatever that turns out to be.
Consequently, any prediction concerning the stability of a society on the grounds that it is
(un)just would not be a novel prediction. Because of this, we can again expect to have
serious doubts about whether a realistic construal of the best theory of justice is really
needed to explain its success in “predicting” the stability of societies that satisfy its
conditions.
More importantly however, I think there is no good reason to hold C2 to be a nonnegotiable condition of theory selection. I certainly agree, of course, that we should hope
that the best theory of justice is such that the satisfaction of its principles has a stabilizing
effect on societies. At any rate, we should hope that our best principles of justice do not
have a destabilizing effect on societies. Since most of us very strongly want societies to
be both stable and just, it would be a shame if we had to choose between these desiderata.
Be that as it may, I see no reason why we should think that justice-making properties
must be stabilizing. Consider, first, a libertarian capitalist theory of justice of the sort
advanced by Robert Nozick in his Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974). The human
tendency to experience envy being what it is, it may be that libertarian capitalist
principles of justice, which permit radical economic inequality, simply cannot be satisfied
by a society without resulting in significant social instability. I suspect that this could be

16

Or, at any rate, it is all but guaranteed that those societies will exhibit more stability than societies
satisfying competing principles of justice.
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true even if the economy of such a society succeeded in meeting the basic needs of the
worst off. If this is so, then this strikes me as a reason not to want to see such principles
of justice realized. But this does not strike me as a reason to think that those principles
must be false. I think something similar holds for the sorts of egalitarian principles of
justice that I favor. Human nature being what it is, it could turn out that egalitarian
principles of justice would never be accepted by large segments of the most powerful
groups in any given society. If this were true, then such principles would make for a less
stable arrangement than some other, less egalitarian principles of justice. While such a
fact might lead me to hesitate as to the matter of whether, all things considered, I would
like to see egalitarian principles of justice realized, I am less inclined to worry that the
instability would indicate the incorrectness of those principles. It may simply be an
unfortunate fact about human nature that the most just arrangement can never garner as
wide an allegiance as some less just arrangement. For this reason, it seems to me that C2
should not be held as a non-negotiable condition of adequacy for theories of justice.

7.5.3. Justice is not what explains stability.
Finally, it seems to me that, to the extent that there is a causal or explanatory relationship
between justice and stability, what explains the stability of a society is not the fact that
the society satisfies principles of justice that are stance-independently true; rather, what
explains the stability is the fact that the society satisfies principles of justice that are
widely accepted by its members. As long as a large enough segment of society can and
does internalize and subscribe to its principles of justice—whatever they happen to be—it
seems plausible to suppose that the society will be to that extent stable. If this is correct,
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then, unless a plausible case can be made for the claim that only the true principles of
justice can be internalized by a vast supermajority of denizens living within the
boundaries of a state—and I see no reason to think such a case will succeed—we should
expect that even unjust states can exhibit a good deal of stability.17 But in that case,
when a theory of justice, conjoined with C2, successfully predicts that a society is stable,
this success can be satisfactorily explained without supposing that the theory is
approximately true. Thus, example C fails to show that the approximate truth of our best
theory of justice is needed in order to explain the instrumental reliability of that theory.

7.6. Moral Explanations and Interesting Generalizations.
There is a final point that I need to address, although it is not entirely obvious to me
where it fits in the current dialectic. Brink and Sturgeon suggest that there are some
moral explanations of non-moral facts that cannot be replaced by wholly non-moral
explanations that cite instead only the non-moral supervenience base facts that realize
those putative moral facts. This sort of situation might occur when there are a number of
distinct non-moral properties that can realize the same relevant moral property in
different circumstances. It may be that the instantiation of the moral property would have

17

Against this, Brink suggests that sometimes “there will be cases where the causal efficacy and
explanatory power of moral facts precede their recognition” (1989: 189; cf. Railton 1986: 192).
Unfortunately, although Brink offers an illustration showing how this might happen, he offers nothing in
the way of evidence to suggest that it ever actually does happen. Moreover, the illustration that he offers
(which involves a person who comes to unreflectively resent his social position despite his accepting an
inegalitarian ideology according to which his own inegalitarian society counts as just) does not obviously
preclude a satisfactory non-moral explanation. Again, for example, it may simply be a fact about human
nature that we resent it when some have more power and goods than we have. (And this feature of human
nature may be so recalcitrant that it operates even when we consciously accept inegalitarian principles of
justice.) If this was a fact of human nature, then it may well be true that the inequality of social
arrangements causally contributes to resentment among those of a lower socio-economic status. But we
should expect this resentment to occur regardless of whether the true principles of justice are, in fact,
egalitarian ones. In fact, we should expect this resentment regardless of whether any principles of justice
are true at all.
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the same causal consequence no matter which of its potential non-moral realizer
properties has realized it. In that case, it could be argued that a better explanation of the
effect in question would cite the higher-level, moral property (or the fact of its
instantiation), rather than the lower-level, non-moral realizer property (Brink 1989: 193197; Sturgeon 1998: 201; 2006: 251f).
One reason that I am unsure how this fits into the present dialectic is that it is not
clear how this consideration, if true, could be used to support an ultimate moral
argument. I suspect that it could support such an argument if it should turn out that
theories that recognize the higher-level moral property make better, more accurate
predictions than any theory that does not recognize it. If so, then perhaps we will need to
cite the approximate truth of those theories in order to explain their predictive success.
However Brink and Sturgeon’s claim relates to the prospects for building an ultimate
argument, I want to address their suggestion that, because explanations citing only nonmoral realizer properties might fail to capture “interesting generalizations”—
generalizations that a better explanation would illuminate—our best explanations of nonmoral facts might require us to make reference to moral properties.
I do not deny that Brink and Sturgeon are right when they suggest that if no nonmoral explanation can capture the right generalizations or support the right
counterfactuals, then moral facts would be needed in our best explanation of some state
of affairs or event. I do not believe, however, that they have shown that it is likely that
there really are regularities or generalizations or other phenomena for which a moral
explanation is better than all competing non-moral explanations. To begin with, consider
explanations couched in terms of an agent’s moral character. In §6.2.2 I noted that that
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Sturgeon maintains that Hitler’s genocidal actions are explained by the fact that he was
morally depraved. In that same section, however, I pointed out that any explanation that
did not go on to cite Hitler’s non-moral, depravity-making properties would be a poor
explanation. This is so because it isn’t true that Hitler would have ordered genocide if his
depravity had been constituted by the non-moral properties of being dishonest or of being
a pedophile rather than the non-moral properties of being homicidal or being sadistic.
But once we have an explanation couched in terms of one (or both) of these latter
properties, that explanation is not improved by adding the further claim that Hitler was
morally depraved. And indeed, such an addition would make for an inferior explanation
insofar as it renders the explanation less parsimonious than it would otherwise be.
Consequently, it seems that our best explanation of Hitler’s actions does not require that
we cite his depravity.
Now the Hitler example is just one putative moral explanation. So perhaps some
better example can be found. I contend, however, that the failure of the Hitler example
places the burden of evidence on those who would claim that some moral explanations
capture interesting generalizations that cannot be captured by wholly non-moral
explanations. Let us examine, then, the sorts of examples that the synthetic ethical
naturalists offer to support the claim that some moral explanations cannot be replaced
without explanatory loss.
Between the writings of Brink, Boyd, and Sturgeon, I am aware of only one
example offered to illustrate a case in which an explanation of a non-moral fact that cites
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only non-moral realizer properties is explanatorily inferior to a moral explanation.18 The
example is Brink’s:
…[R]acial oppression in South Africa consists in various particular social,
economic, and legal restrictions present in South African society. Now, it seems
better to cite racial oppression as a cause of political instability and social protest
in South Africa than the particular social, economic, and political restrictions,
precisely because there would still have been racial oppression and instability and
protest under somewhat different social, economic, and legal restrictions, and the
only thing this large set of alternate possible social, economic, and legal bases of
oppression have in common is that they realize racial oppression (it is very
unlikely that there is a natural – nonmoral – social category that corresponds to
this set) (1989: 195).
This example is unpersuasive. In the first place, it is, again, doubtful whether the
oppressiveness or the injustice of South Africa’s policies during the relevant period of
time can explain the protest and instability independently of facts about what South
African blacks (and sympathetic whites) thought about the system. In other words, what
explains the protest and instability is the fact that the socio-political arrangements
violated principles of justice that blacks and sympathetic whites accepted or believed. If
so, then the protest and instability is to be expected regardless of whether those beliefs
were true. But then, the actual oppression or injustice is not what does the explaining.
As support for the claim that what explains the instability are beliefs about what is unjust,
rather than injustice itself, notice that most of the world’s population throughout human
history has lived under political arrangements that are, by our own lights, seriously unjust
or oppressive. Liberal democracy, after all, is a fairly recent invention. Most humans
living under the jurisdiction of a state have lived under some form of aristocracy,
monarchy, or oligarchy. I take it that according to our own best theories of justice, all of
18

To avoid misunderstanding: when I say that the relevant explanation cites only non-moral realizer
properties, I do not mean that it cites no other non-moral properties (e.g., non-moral properties that no one
thinks realizes any moral property). I mean only that the explanation cites no moral properties in addition
to the non-moral realizer properties.
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these forms of government are unjust. Moreover, most states that have existed
throughout human history have been deeply sexist. The oppression of women was often
explicitly written into law, and when it wasn’t, it was condoned anyway. Despite the
injustice of these arrangements, many of these states managed long eras of internal
stability. It seems to me that if injustice or oppression—rather than merely the belief that
one’s society is unjust or oppressive—is what explains political instability, this historical
fact would be more surprising than it is.
Secondly, I do not concede Brink’s claim that there is no non-moral property
realized by the various possible social, economic, and legal arrangements that are said to
be potential realizers of racial oppression. It is true that at present we may not have a
convenient non-moral term for such a property; but I see no reason to think that such a
term cannot be concocted. As a first approximation, consider the following non-moral
term: ‘being a socio-political system that allocates basic rights and privileges
differentially on the basis of race.’ For convenience, let’s abbreviate this term with ‘N2.’
Like racial oppression, the property picked out by ‘N2’ (viz., N2) can be realized by a
multitude of different social, economic, and legal arrangements. Indeed, it seems to me
that any particular socio-political arrangement that realizes racial oppression also realizes
N2. A more difficult question, however, is whether every socio-political arrangement that
realizes N2 also realizes racial oppression. I think there is reason to doubt that they do.
The trouble is that political systems that employ affirmative action programs to redress
past racial injustices can arguably be said to allocate rights and privileges differentially
on the basis of race. If this is right, then those political systems will realize N2.
Nevertheless, many of us do not view affirmative action programs to be unjust. Thus, N2

244

will not be perfectly coextensive with racial injustice as this latter property is
characterized by our best current moral theories.
I do not think this feature of N2 constitutes a serious problem with my objection to
Brink’s argument. In the first place, if we were really convinced that only a natural
property that was perfectly coextensive (or co-intensive) with racial injustice can capture
the right causal generalizations, then we could simply find a more complex non-moral
term to replace ‘N2’, one that picks out a natural property that better mirrors the extension
(or intension) of ‘racial injustice’ than N2 does. I see no reason to be pessimistic that a
term of this sort can be found. But secondly, I am not convinced that only a natural
property that is perfectly coextensive with racial oppression can do the explanatory work
that we need of it. In fact, a case can be made that reference to N2 makes for a superior
explanation of the instability of certain societies. There is anecdotal evidence that
suggests that government programs allowing for the differential allocation of rights and
privileges on the basis of race may cause instability even when they are employed with
the goal of redressing past racial injustices. The anecdotal evidence of which I speak is
the resentment expressed by whites in the United States who complain of “reverse
racism” in response to affirmative action programs that favor non-white minorities.
Granted, these resentments are not expressed so loudly or intensely that we should say
that they constitute or herald full-blown social instability or social protest. But it seems
to me that these resentments are no different in kind from the sort of resentments that
ultimately lead to mass protest movements. If I am right, then it may well be that
reference to N2 makes for an even better explanation of social instability and social
protest than does reference to racial oppression.
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I conclude, then, that naturalist moral realists have yet to provide a compelling
example of a moral explanation of a non-moral fact that cannot be replaced without
explanatory loss by a non-moral explanation. We may conclude, further, that to the
extent that our best theory of justice successfully predicts which societies will be
unstable, we can satisfactorily explain this predictive success without supposing that that
theory is true. Nor is there any reason to think that a realist explanation would be better.

7.7. Conclusion.
The prospects for constructing a compelling ultimate moral argument in defense of moral
realism are dim. An argument of this sort consists of two premises. First, it is claimed
that our best current moral theories are highly instrumentally reliable—where this
reliability is a measure of their success at making accurate empirical predictions (with
special weight given to those predictions that are novel). Second, it is claimed that the
best explanation of this success requires that we suppose those moral theories to be
approximately stance-independently true.
We have considered three examples of predictions derived from moral theories.
None of these have furnished us with a compelling example of a (i) currently best moral
theory that (ii) yields successful empirical predictions, where (iii) the best explanation of
this success requires a realistic interpretation of that moral theory. In the absence of
convincing examples of predictions that have these characteristics, there can be no
compelling ultimate moral argument. While my discussion has obviously not considered
all of the possible examples of moral prediction that might be offered, I believe that the
(mis)fortunes of A, B, and C give us reason to be pessimistic that any others will do
significantly better.
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Let me conclude by tying Chapters 6 and 7 together. In Chapter 6, I argued that
the most plausible a posteriori explanations of our accepting the moral theories that we
accept (e.g., the evolutionary story) do not require us to suppose that those moral theories
are approximately true, and thus, they do not require us to suppose that there are any
stance-independent moral facts. In addition, in the present chapter I have argued that
moral facts are not needed in order to explain anything else, such as the apparent
predictive successes of our best moral theories or the occurrence of historical events, such
protests and revolts. Because metaphysical naturalists are committed to a methodological
principle that directs us to accept an ontological commitment only to those entities and
kinds that are needed in our best a posteriori explanations of observable phenomena,
metaphysical naturalists must reject moral realism; and because moral realism is a
commitment of SEN, SEN must be rejected as well.
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APPENDIX
A DEFENSE OF MORAL TWIN EARTH FROM MISCELLANEOUS
OBJECTIONS

A. Appendix.
In Chapters 2, 3, and 4, I defended the Moral Twin Earth argument against SEN from
several objections. In this appendix, I take up several additional responses to the MTE
argument that have been made (or that might be made) on behalf of SEN.

A.1. Adopting Partial Non-Cognitivism.
Some have suggested that the appearance of moral disagreement between Earthlings and
Twin Earthlings can be satisfactorily accounted for if, allowing that CSN or some other
cognitivist semantics accounts for the content of ‘morally right’ is correct, we adopt a
non-cognitivist semantics for the non-moral, “all things considered” ‘ought.’ Something
like this strategy is hinted at by David Copp (2000: 120-124); but it been expressed more
explicitly, and developed in greater depth, by David Merli (2002).
Merli distinguishes an “all-in” use of ‘ought’ from the term’s moral, prudential,
and aesthetic uses. He sometimes refers to this kind of ought as “the last ought before
action.” His idea is that, even when it is settled by our moral theory that φ is morally
obligatory (and thus, that we morally ought to φ), there remains a further question about
whether one ought to φ. For instance, there may be cases in which φ-ing exacts such a
large a cost on an agent that it simply “makes more sense” for the agent to abide by what
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he prudentially ought to do, rather than by what he morally ought to do. With this
distinction in hand, Merli writes,
There is, I think, another way of thinking about the last ought before action. This
combines realism about moral discourse with expressivism about all-in
endorsement. According to this view, moral rightness is a matter of natural fact,
but an answer to the question of what to do...is not a factual judgment but an
endorsement of one course of action or one set of reasons for action. When I get
behind doing the [morally] right thing, I’m expressing my acceptance of certain
norms, or urging others to act accordingly, or something along these lines (2002:
236).
This combination of views allows the defender of SEN to make sense of the disagreement
between Earthlings and Twin Earthlings without having to deny that ‘right’ and t-‘right’
express different natural properties. When an Earthling and a Twin Earthling are
debating whether or not to perform an organ harvest, the locus of their disagreement is
not about whether the act is morally right; instead, their disagreement is a non-moral
disagreement about whether to perform it. Each party is prescribing (or expressing their
endorsement of) the action or its omission. Since their disagreement takes place with
respect to all-in ought judgments, rather than moral ought judgments, we may still
maintain that ‘morally right’ and t-‘morally right’ express different natural properties, as
is entailed by CSN. Importantly, however, because they have a disagreement in attitude
(at the level of all-in ought judgments), we do not need to view the parties as having a
merely verbal disagreement. In this manner, it might be argued that the problem of
chauvinistic conceptual relativism is avoided. Because of this, the pressure to view
Earthlings and Twin Earthlings as expressing the same content with their respective uses
of ‘morally right’ is greatly diminished.
There are two problems with the “partial non-cognitivist” strategy. First, Merli’s
proposal seems to require that the disagreement between Earthlings and Twin Earthlings,
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though substantive, isn’t really a moral disagreement. However, it is easy enough to
imagine a case of disagreement where this result is incorrect. We may easily suppose
that the Earthlings and Twin Earthlings find themselves in a situation in which they agree
that prudential, aesthetic, legal, and etiquettical considerations are all of negligible
relevance to the decision of whether or not to perform, say, an organ harvest; in such a
situation, the question of whether to perform the act will hinge entirely on the question
what there is most moral reason to do. Unfortunately, as before, it is hard to make sense
of the Earthlings’ and Twin Earthlings’ disagreement about what there is most moral
reason to do if we accept CSN; for, if CSN were true, each party’s judgment about what
there is most moral reason to do will be incommensurable with the judgments of the other
party.1
The second problem with Merli’s proposal is that concedes too much to the moral
non-cognitivist opponents of moral realism.2 Moral realists have long argued against
moral non-cognitivism on the grounds that the latter view: (a) requires us to view the
declarative surface grammar of moral utterances as misleading, (b) cannot make good
sense of moral sentences embedded in conditional statements, (c) cannot make good
sense of the apparent logical validity of arguments involving moral predicates, and (d)
cannot make good sense of our practice of predicating truth of some moral sentences
(Brink 1989: 25; 87; 1999: 197ff; Shafer-Landau 2003: 23f). Unfortunately, if
naturalistic moral realists adopt non-cognitivism about the all-in ought, they would find
1

One might be tempted to respond to this objection by proposing that, in this circumstance, their
disagreement is over which party’s moral norms to all-in accept. Whatever the merits of this kind of
maneuver, it seems to me to concede a too much to certain non-cognitivist treatments of moral judgments.
In particular, the view that emerges from this way of viewing the parties’ disagreement is strikingly similar
to the norm-expressivist account of moral judgment advanced by Alan Gibbard (1990).
2
By ‘moral non-cognitivist’ I mean someone who advances a non-cognitivist account to moral judgments,
as opposed merely to some other sort of practical judgment (such as all-in ought judgments, or prudential
ought judgments, etc.).

250

themselves obliged to answer these very same objections—only now with respect to allin ought judgments, rather than moral judgments. To see that this is so, consider the
following argument:
1. We (all-in) ought to perform the organ harvest only if we have sterile
instruments.
2. It is not the case that we have sterile instruments.
3. Therefore, it is not the case that we (all-in) ought to perform the organ harvest.
This argument is perfectly intelligible. The premises and the conclusion each have a
declarative form. In the first premise, an all-in ‘ought’ appears embedded in the
antecedent of a conditional statement. Moreover, the argument appears to be logically
valid in the form of modus tollens. And finally, it is easy enough to imagine situations in
which we will want to say that all of the premises and the conclusion are true. Thus, it
should be clear that all of the same phenomena that are thought to raise trouble for noncognitivism about moral judgments arise with respect to all-in ought judgments as well.
This fact poses a dilemma for the proponent of SEN who would avail himself of the
partial non-cognitivist solution to Moral Twin Earth: On the one hand, if he cannot
answer the standard objections to non-cognitivism, then his solution fails for all the same
reasons that moral non-cognitivism fails. On the other hand, if he succeeds in answering
the standard objections to non-cognitivism, then he has vastly improved the fortunes of
his metaethical rivals, the moral non-cognitivists. Indeed, once it is shown that noncognitivism about all-in ought judgments is a viable position, it is hard to see why we
shouldn’t adopt non-cognitivism about moral judgments as well. Given the advantages
that moral non-cognitivism has over moral realism with respect to ontological parsimony
and an explanation of the intimate (even if contingent) connection between moral
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judgment and motivation,3 the concessions that Merli’s proposal requires may well prove
fatal for moral realism. At a minimum, however, these concessions deprive moral
realism of a great many advantages over moral non-cognitivism that are often claimed on
its behalf.

A.2. Brink’s Counterfactual Causal Regulation Account of Reference
Before offering his own preferred moral semantics (BMS, discussed in Chapter 4), Brink
proposes a revision to Boyd’s causal regulation theory of reference. This revision
promises to render the application of Boyd’s theory of reference to moral vocabulary less
vulnerable to MTE-type counterexamples. He suggests that Boyd’s account be revised so
that we understand causal regulation in the following way: “[A] natural property N
causally regulates a speaker’s use of moral term ‘M’ just in case his use of ‘M’ would be
dependent on his belief that something is N, were his beliefs in dialectical equilibrium”
(2001: 169).
Because Brink does not ultimately endorse the resulting semantics as answer to
MTE, I will not discuss it in depth. I do, however, want to make brief note of two
objections to it. First, it can easily be shown that a moral semantics that incorporates this
3

Naturally, those who accept a strong link between moral judgment and motivation—such as the link
expressed by MJI (see §1.5.5)—will find a non-cognitivist treatment of moral judgments more congenial
that cognitivist-realist treatment. However, realists such as Brink and Sturgeon deny MJI. Still, there is a
weaker kind of internalism that is to my mind less vulnerable, less easy to reject than MJI is. I have in
mind a form of internalism that asserts not a necessary link between an individual’s moral judgments and
her motivation, but rather a necessary link between the having of a moral vocabulary by a community, and
the motivational tendencies of its members. Roughly, this form of internalism holds that it is not possible
that there be a community of speakers that have a moral vocabulary (and who make moral judgments)
where the large majority of these speakers are not regularly motivated to act in accordance with those
judgments. We may call this claim global internalism. (Something like this form of internalism is
suggested by James Lenman [1999: 445f]. He denies the possibility of a form of “global” amoralism,
where global amoralism is essentially the contradictory of my global internalism.) The truth of even this
weaker form of internalism seems hard to explain given the naturalist moral realist’s understanding of
moral judgment. Thus, if true, global internalism arguably favors a non-cognitivist construal of moral
discourse.
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understanding of causal regulation leads to a view of moral facts that is incompatible with
moral realism. In particular, it leaves no room for the possibility that our ideal moral
theory is false. Here is why: when Brink’s counterfactual account of causal regulation is
conjoined with CSN, facts about what moral theory we would accept under ideal
epistemic conditions themselves fix the referents of our moral terms. This feature of the
present proposal violates realism’s stance-independence requirement.4
A second problem for Brink’s proposal is that it is hard to see how the revised
understanding of causal regulation is supposed to shield CSN from MTE-type
counterexamples. H&T’s stipulations are consistent with the assumption that both
Earthlings and Twin Earthlings would accept different moral theories even when their
respective beliefs are in dialectical equilibrium.5 Unless this stipulation renders the MTE
example incoherent, and I see no reason to think that it does, then even the revised
version of CSN wrongly entails that ‘right’ and t-‘right’ express different content.

4

Brink appears to acknowledge this in (2001: 175f, especially note 34). In fact, he seems to suggest that
genuine moral realism is incompatible with—or at any rate, fits uncomfortably with—Boyd’s causal theory
of reference as Boyd himself formulates it. (I think this is incorrect; but if I am wrong, then so much the
worse for moral realists who would avail themselves of Boyd’s semantics.)
5
While Brink contends that there is no a priori reason to think that a common moral theory would not
emerge for all rational creatures whose beliefs are in dialectical equilibrium (2001: 170), the proposed
response to MTE that we are presently examining requires more than just the possibility that there would be
convergence in moral belief; it requires that such convergence is necessary. The reason why is that, if it is
so much as possible that Earthlings and Twin Earthlings fail to converge in the moral theories they accept
in dialectical equilibrium, then an MTE-type counterexample can be concocted to refute the revised
Boydian semantics. Thus, to sustain the case that the revision of Boyd’s semantics avoids MTE, Brink
needs to make the much stronger claim that we have good reason to believe that there could not be a
divergence in moral theory under conditions of dialectical equilibrium. With respect to this strong claim, it
seems to me that skepticism is perfectly warranted as a default position.
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A.3. Boyd’s Achievement Explanation Condition.
A.3.1. The achievement explanation condition and practical success.
On Boyd’s most recent formulation of his theory of reference, the mere fact that a term, t,
is causally regulated by the properties of a given phenomenon, p, is not sufficient to
establish that that t refers to p. What is required, in addition, is that “the epistemic access
which uses of t affords [sic] speakers to the real properties of p must (help to) explain the
theoretical and/or practical successes achieved in the domains of inquiry or of practice to
which t-talk is central” (Boyd 2003a: 515; cf. 538). Boyd calls this the achievement
explanation condition for reference.6 Given the addition of this condition to his
semantics, it follows that Moral Twin Earth is a problem for SEN only if we can
coherently add a further stipulation to the Twin Earth story: where it is stipulated that
Twin Earthling uses of t-‘right’ are causally regulated by Td properties, we must be able
to add the further stipulation that the fact of this causal regulation helps to explain the
successes Twin Earthlings achieve in employing moral terms like ‘right.’7 (Similarly, we
must be able to stipulate coherently that the causal regulation of ‘right’ by Tc properties
on Earth helps to explain Earthling successes achieved through the use of moral
discourse.)8
To evaluate whether Boyd’s achievement explanation condition poses a threat to
Moral Twin Earth, we would need to know what would count as a theoretical or practical

6

In other contexts, Boyd calls it the accommodation condition.
For Boyd, a term’s affording us epistemic access to a phenomenon, p, consists in the fact that p causally
regulates the use of t. (In the later formulation of his theory of reference, the causal regulation condition is
dubbed the epistemic access condition, see Boyd 2003a: 538.)
8
In adding the achievement explanation condition to his semantics, Boyd cannot be accused of making an
ad hoc modification for dealing with Moral Twin Earth. He adds the achievement explanation condition
with the goal of addressing problems of referential indeterminacy that have long posed a challenge to
causal theories of reference. His actual motivation for this modification, as far as I am aware, has nothing
to do with worries about MTE-type cases.
7

254

success of moral discourse. In the natural sciences, it does not seem all that difficult to
identify such success. Using scientific theories, we are able to make impressive
predictions about observable phenomena. Especially important for the successfulness of
a theory are those predictions that are “novel,” i.e., those predictions that were not
utilized in the construction of that theory.9 To give an example relevant to the concern at
hand, we may plausibly suppose that our scientists’ practical achievement of detonating a
nuclear bomb (and their ability to predict the conditions under which this achievement is
possible) is to be at least partially explained by the fact that the discourse of our best
physical theories, which include terms like ‘proton,’ ‘neutron,’ and ‘electron,’ is causally
regulated by protons, neutrons, electrons, and their properties. When we turn our
attention to the supposed theoretical and practical achievements of moral discourse,
however, it is not obvious what those achievements might be. I have already argued in
Chapter 7 that moral properties and facts do not seem to play any ineliminable role in the
best explanations of whatever practical successes we have achieved utilizing that
discourse. On the face of it, this finding would seem to imply that, to the extent that our
moral terms are causally regulated by certain natural properties, the fact that these terms
are causally regulated in this way does not help to explain any theoretical or practical
successes achieved using them. If so, then it follows from Boyd’s updated semantics that
the central terms of our moral discourse fail to refer. In that case, moral nihilism is true
and moral realism is false.

9

Several examples of this kind of predictive success were discussed in §6.5.2.
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A.3.2. Practical success as facilitating well-being.
Perhaps the argument of the previous section is too hasty. Although Boyd acknowledges
that “it is a controversial issue just what sorts of successes would count as moral
successes,” he suggests, nevertheless that what we achieve (or what we can achieve)
through our use of moral discourse is “the well-being of people generally” (Boyd 2003a:
516f, 2003b: 36, emphasis in the original). Now, I count myself among those who are
skeptical that such an achievement, if it is real, is best viewed as a success of moral
theory, rather than, say, psychological theory.10 But let us waive this skepticism and
suppose that moral discourse really does play an indispensable role in our achieving the
well-being of people. With this supposition granted, those who would press the MTE
argument against Boyd’s semantics must make plausible the further stipulations that (a)
Twin Earthlings are able to successfully achieve some measure of well-being through
employing terms like t-‘right’ etc., and (b) this success is partly explained by the fact that
Td properties causally regulate the use of their terms like t-‘right’ etc.
What are the prospects for the anti-naturalist defender of MTE with respect to
meeting this challenge? Can an MTE scenario be described that coherently incorporates
these two additional stipulations?
One thing that makes answering these questions difficult is that the question of
what constitutes well-being itself depends upon the results of first-order theories in
axiology. Presumably, then, the term ‘well-being’ as used on Twin Earth is causally
regulated by a different natural property than the natural property that regulates its use on
10

Provided that I have a fairly clear idea of the sort of mental or physical condition that I want to be in (i.e.,
of what sort of property I view as flourishing-making), I do not seek out the writings of philosophers for
advice on how to achieve this condition; for that, I address my inquiries to psychologists, nutritionists, and
physical trainers. I expect things would be no different if I were concerned to discover how best to bring
about this condition for a multitude of people in my community, rather than just myself.
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Earth. This raises the question of whose standard of well-being we should use to
determine whether Twin Earthlings have succeeded in achieving some level of
flourishing. There appears to be three options: First, Twin Earthlings’ success in
achieving well-being should be judged by their own Twin Earthling standards (i.e., by the
standards prescribed by the theory Td, which specifies the essences of the properties to
which Twin moral terms putatively refer). Second, we should judge Twin Earthlings’
successes using our own Earthling axiological standards; that is, we credit Twin Earthling
individuals with achieving a measure of flourishing when they exemplify the natural
property that causally regulates our own Earthling uses of ‘well-being’ and ‘flourishing,’
i.e., a property specified by Tc. And the final option is that we should judge their and our
own successes by some very broad axiological theory that is somehow compatible with
both Td and Tc.
Now, it is not entirely clear to me how the third option can be worked out.
Presumably, the axiologies associated with Td and Tc respectively will give divergent
verdicts about the welfare-value of at least some lives. If they do, it is hard to see how to
formulate a broad, substantive axiology that is compatible with both evaluative theories.
For this reason, I recommend that we set option three aside. Let’s consider, instead, the
first option. According to this, we are to judge Twin Earthlings’ practical successes using
the axiological standards enshrined in their own moral theory, Td. Under this constraint, I
see no reason why it is impossible that there be a scenario where Twin Earthling
discourse satisfies Boyd’s achievement explanation condition. Presumably, well-being
for a Twin Earthling consists in living a life in accordance with some standard prescribed
by Td. This standard specifies what natural properties must be instantiated by a life in
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order for it to count as flourishing for Twin Earthlings. If, in fact, these natural properties
are what causally regulate Twin uses of t-‘good,’ then it would seem that Twin Earthlings
can come to better know the relevant axiological standard by investigating which natural
properties regulate their uses of this predicate. In turn, this knowledge would seem to
facilitate their success at satisfying this axiological standard, i.e., their success at living
good, flourishing lives. To put all of this together: The causal regulation of t-‘good’ by
these natural properties explains Twin Earthlings’ knowledge of their own axiological
standard; this knowledge explains their ability to satisfy this standard, and thus, to
successfully achieve flourishing. Assuming the transitivity of explanation, then, we may
conclude that the causal regulation of twin moral discourse by the relevant natural
properties explains the practical successes achieved by Twin Earthlings through utilizing
that moral discourse. If all of this may be coherently conceived, then there is no problem
describing a Twin Earth scenario in which Twin Earthlings satisfy both Boyd’s causal
regulation condition and the achievement explanation condition for reference. The
addition of the achievement explanation condition to Boyd’s semantics does not threaten
the cogency of the MTE argument.
It might be argued, however, that when judging the practical successes of twin
moral discourse, we should do so utilizing our own Earthling standard of human
flourishing, as captured by Tc. This is the second option mentioned above. Hitherto, I
have not specified what sort of axiology is incorporated into Tc. Let’s suppose that Tc
includes a simple hedonist theory of well-being. (According to this theory, the wellbeing of a life is a measure of the amount of pleasure the life contains, minus the amount
of pain it contains.) By contrast, we should suppose that the axiology of Td is a non-
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hedonistic theory (perhaps it is a form of perfectionism). Even with these stipulations, I
see no reason to think that a coherent MTE scenario cannot be told according to which
the causal regulation of twin moral discourse by Td properties nevertheless explains the
Twins’ practical success at achieving a high level of flourishing, where this flourishing is
measured by the hedonistic axiology (which, we are supposing, the Twin Earthlings do
not themselves accept). This could be explained by Twin Earthlings’ different
psychological temperament. Due to their temperament, the Twin Earthlings best achieve
well-being by hedonist standards when they collectively subscribe to, and act in
accordance with, their deontological theory of rightness and perfectionist theory of value.
In this way, twin moral discourse could satisfy the achievement explanation condition
even when we measure their success by our own Earthling standard of well-being.11

A.3.3. Predictive success.
It may be worth considering one more example of putative practical success that is
arguably facilitated by moral discourse. In Chapter 7, I discussed several examples of
empirical predictions generated by moral theories. As I suggested in §A.3.1 above, I
believe that the arguments I advance in that chapter warrant the conclusion that, if natural
properties do causally regulate the use of our moral terms, this fact is not part of the best
explanation of the successful predictions we make using those terms and our best moral
11

Against this, the defender of SEN may insist that, in the case I have described, Tc properties rather than
T properties are what are regulating the Twins’ use of moral terms, even if the Twins are unaware of this.
I do not know exactly how this objection would proceed, but I see a temptation to make it. In any event, I
think it can be sidestepped. I see no reason to insist that Twin Earthlings’ use of moral terms succeed in
referring to Td properties only if the regulation between their terms and the Td properties help to explain the
Twins’ ability to achieve well-being by our Tc standards. For if we did insist on such a condition, we
would be forced to conclude that, where the regulation of moral terms by Td properties fails to result in and
explain the Twins’ success at achieving well-being by our Earthling standards, twin moral terms simply fail
to refer, even if they achieve success by their own standards. It seems to me that this sort of construal of
the MTE scenario is unmotivated, at least given realist assumptions about moral discourse.
d
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theories. But suppose I am wrong about this. Let us revisit the example involving
empirical predictions based on judgments about an agent’s moral character and consider
its implications for MTE, given Boyd’s achievement explanation condition. The
question before us is this: can we coherently imagine that Twin Earthlings are able to
make successful predictions of this sort utilizing their own moral vocabulary and moral
theories (while, at the same time, Earthlings are also able to achieve a similar success
using their moral vocabulary and moral theories)? I see no reason to think not. Horgan
and Timmons’ have already stipulated that Twin Earthlings tend to perform those actions
that they judge to be “right.” Since we know that the sorts of actions that they judge to be
right are just those actions that treat no one as a mere means, and since, presumably,
Twin Earthlings apply t-‘good’ roughly to all and only those agents who have an
especially strong tendency to perform only actions that treat no one as a mere means,
Twin Earthlings should be able to make successful predictions about the behavior of
those to whom t-‘good’ is properly applied. For example, suppose that some Twin
Earthlings properly judge that t-‘good’ applies to Dr. Smith. And suppose, further, that
they properly judge that t-‘wrong’ applies to any act of organ harvesting, because such
acts involve treating someone as a mere means. Given these facts, we should expect
Twin Earthlings will be able to successfully predict that Dr. Smith will not perform the
act of organ harvesting.12 If so, then, again, there seems to be no reason to deny that a
coherent MTE scenario can be described in which Boyd’s achievement explanation
condition for reference is satisfied along with his causal regulation condition.

12

Given the sorts of complaints I raise above in §7.4.2, this may be false. But again, I am waiving those
complaints here in order to make favorable assumptions on behalf of naturalistic moral realism.
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Perhaps there are further examples of achievements that are won through the use
of moral discourse that yield more favorable results for naturalistic moral realists with
respect to the present concern. If so, I do not know what those examples are. Until such
examples are produced, I believe that the above considerations license us in concluding
for now that that Boyd’s amended semantics poses no special problem for the Moral
Twin Earth argument.

A.4. Partial denotation.
H&T formulate Boyd’s CSN in such a way that it requires a natural property to uniquely
causally regulate the use of a moral term t in order for that property to be designated by t.
However, in his (1988: 226) Boyd leaves open the possibility that more than one natural
property causally regulates our use of ‘right.’ In a scenario of this kind, according to
Boyd, the term ‘rightness’ would partially denote each of those properties.13 A plausible
illustration of partial denotation is provided by the kind term ‘jade.’ It is often claimed
that ‘Jade’ partially denotes the mineral jadeite and partially denotes the mineral
nephrite.14 Given Boyd’s semantics, the explanation for this is presumably that our use
of ‘jade’ is causally regulated by both kinds of mineral. (In addition, we may have to add
that neither mineral better explains the achievements of ‘jade’-talk than the other).
With respect to the MTE scenario, an appeal to partial denotation might be
thought to furnish a way to provide a common referent for ‘rightness’ and t-‘rightness’:

13

Here I follow Boyd in using the term ‘denotes’ to express the semantic relationship between a term and a
kind or property. While some philosophers draw a distinction between the semantic relations expressed by
‘denotes,’ ‘refers,’ and ‘designates,’ others seem to use these terms interchangeably. For the purposes of
this appendix, I follow the latter practice.
14
As far as I know, this claim entered the philosophical literature through Putnam (1975b: 241). I have
seen it repeated in a number of commentaries on Putnam, usually without objection.
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just as ‘jade’ partially denotes jadeite and partially denotes nephrite, it might be argued
that ‘rightness’ and t-‘rightness’ both partially denote both maximizing utility and treating
no one as a mere means. If so, these two terms have a common denotation; moreover,
their corresponding predicates (‘right’ and t-‘right’) express a common content. Because
of this, it might be argued, CSN does not entail a form of conceptual relativism with
respect to the MTE scenario.
The partial denotation reply will note work. The trouble becomes apparent when
we consider what we should say about the truth-conditions of sentences in which partially
denoting terms occur. To see the trouble, let’s return to the example involving ‘jade.’
Consider, first, a relatively unproblematic sentence: ‘Jade is a mineral.’ This sentence
attributes to jade a property that, as it happens, is instantiated by both jadeite and
nephrite. Because of this, there seems to be no difficulty in holding that ‘Jade is a
mineral’ expresses a truth. The more difficult case involves a sentence such as ‘Jade is
partly composed of aluminum.’ If ‘jade’ uniquely denoted jadeite, this sentence would
express a truth, since jadeite is partly composed of aluminum. If ‘jade’ uniquely denoted
nephrite, this sentence would express a falsehood, since nephrite is not partly composed
of aluminum. However, as things actually are, ‘jade’ does not uniquely denote either of
these minerals; rather, it partially denotes both. What, then, is the truth-value of ‘Jade is
partly composed of aluminum’? There seems to be two salient options. First, we can say
that the truth-value of this sentence is indeterminate. Second, we could say that, relative
to one disambiguation, the sentence is true, and relative to another disambiguation, it is
false (cf. Field 1973).

262

Assuming that ‘rightness’ and t-‘rightness’ partially denote maximizing utility and
treating no one as a mere means, the same interpretive decision is forced on us with
respect to certain moral sentences. Consider, for example, the question of what truthvalue we should assign to the sentence ‘the organ harvest instantiates rightness.’ Given
that the organ harvest has the property of maximizing utility, but lacks the property of
treating no one as a mere means, and given supposition that ‘rightness’ partially denotes
both of these properties, it seems that we are forced to say either that the sentence in
question has an indeterminate truth-value, or else that it is true according to one
disambiguation of ‘rightness,’ but false with respect to another.
Whichever of these options we choose, the prospects for building a satisfying
defense of SEN against MTE are dim. In the first place, the reason for supposing that
‘jade’ partially denotes jadeite and nephrite (at least, assuming the truth of Boyd’s causal
regulation semantics), is that both of these minerals causally regulate our uses of ‘jade.’
If only one of these minerals had causally regulated the use of ‘jade,’ it would be wrong
to say that ‘jade’ partially denotes both. Notice, however, that in the MTE story, it is
stipulated that only one property (maximizing utility) causally regulates the use of
‘rightness’ while a different, but unique, property (treating no one as a mere means)
causally regulates the use of t-‘rightness.’ Given this stipulation, there is simply no
justification for supposing that ‘rightness’ and t-‘rightness’ both partially denote the same
properties. To suggest this is to ignore the way the scenario is described. Consequently,
the observation that ‘moral rightness’ might partially denote different properties on our
planet in the actual world does nothing to supply the naturalist moral realist with a reply
to MTE.
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At best, the appeal to partial denotation might be employed to answer concerns
about a moral term being regulated by multiple distinct natural properties within a single
linguistic community. But even here it does no good. If our use of ‘rightness’ is causally
regulated by multiple distinct natural properties, then in any circumstance in which these
properties fail to be coextensive, an attribution of moral rightness will be indeterminate.
If, for example, ‘right’ were causally regulated by both Tc and Td properties, it would
follow that, prior to any disambiguation, there is simply no fact of the matter as to
whether (e.g.) it is right to keep our promises when the utility of breaking them is greater.
This seems to me to be a problem: while it is certainly unfair to require of moral realism
that every act-token have a determinate moral status, this sort of indeterminacy is just too
easy to stumble upon. The result would be that in all cases where consequentialists and
deontologists reasonably disagree about the moral status of an act (where this
disagreement is not due to ignorance of the non-moral facts), there would be no
determinate answer as to who, if anyone, is correct. Surely this is too much
indeterminacy.
I have suggested that, under the present assumptions, the partial denotation of
moral terms would render too many moral utterances indeterminate with respect to their
truth-values. To avoid this result, we might insist that partially denoting moral terms that
appear in utterances must be disambiguated before we attempt to assign truth-values to
those utterances. This maneuver permits us to say of the sentence, ‘Breaking promises to
maximize utility instantiates rightness,’ that it is true according to one disambiguation of
‘rightness,’ but false according to another disambiguation. Thus, there is no need to posit
rampant indeterminacy.
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The trouble with the disambiguation approach is that it leaves it unclear which
disambiguation of ‘rightness’ to use in which context. If there are no general rules to
guide us, then partisans of deontology may simply insist that we always understand their
uses of ‘rightness’ to denote treating no one as a mere means; meanwhile partisans of
consequentialism might insist that we always understand their uses of ‘rightness’ to
denote maximizing utility. But this is surely unacceptable; for it implies the most vulgar
kind of moral subjectivism. But suppose that we are optimistic that rules for
disambiguation can be found. What might those rules be? With respect to utterances of
‘jade’ it is natural to suppose that the principle of charity dictates which disambiguation
to select. That is to say, we should select the interpretation of ‘jade’ that makes more of
the speaker’s beliefs come out true. But notice that, if we try to apply this principle to
uses of ‘rightness,’ we will very likely be plunged back into moral subjectivism. For if
someone subscribes to Td, then surely the way to make most of her utterances involving
‘rightness’ to come out true is to suppose that the term denotes treating no one as a mere
means. Likewise, if someone subscribes to Tc, then the way to make most of his
utterances of ‘rightness’ come out true is by taking the term to denote maximizing utility.
This kind of moral subjectivism, whereby the truth-conditions of a person’s moral
utterances depend upon whichever moral standard she happens to subscribe to, almost
certainly violates moral realism’s stance independence requirement; and so, it would
seem to entail the falsity of moral realism. But whatever the case may be, this form of
subjectivism is surely an unappealing metaethical commitment in its own right. I
conclude then, that the adoption of a partial denotation maneuver cannot be used to
rescue naturalistic moral realism from the MTE argument.
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